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ABSTRACT

Nambiema, Ibrahim Mahama. M.A., Department of Political Science, Wright State University,
2012. ‘Counting Votes and Bodies,’ Election-Related Conflicts in Africa: A Comparative Study
of Ghana and Kenya.

Since joining the ‘third wave’ of democracy in the 1990s, African countries have focused
on elections. Some leaders conduct elections to legitimize their authoritarian rule. Many of
Africa’s transitional democracies are associated with flawed elections and violent conflicts. The
literature on electoral conflict places little emphasis on election governance. It is my assumption
that the high rate of non-credible elections in Africa can be associated with election management
that has exacerbated societal cleavages. Is an effective and independent election management
body a necessary prerequisite for election results to be credible? Are credible elections
correlated with lower levels of conflicts? Kenya and Ghana, with their parallel experience with
electoral conflicts, are compared to determine if the level of effectiveness of an electoral
commission is strongly correlated with the conduct of credible elections and consequently a
reduced propensity for election-related conflicts.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.0. Introduction
After nearly three decades of statehood and independence from colonialism, African
states joined the “third wave” of democratization in the 1990s (beginning with Benin in 1998) by
transforming most of the authoritarian regimes into democracies, or at least starting the process
of democratizing. Elections are the bedrock events of any democracy; they are also the political
activities most open to manipulation (Reynolds, 2005). Democratization confronts political
actors with the strategic dilemma of establishing democracy as a system of organized
uncertainty. Adam Przeworski states that “competitive elections are the quintessential
manifestation of organized uncertainty in a democracy” (Przeworski, 1991, p.14). The history of
democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa has demonstrated that competitive elections are doubleedged swords, producing change, rebirth, renewal and power alternation, but they can exacerbate
ethnic conflicts and contribute to political polarization, social disequilibrium and civil wars.
According to Dorina Bekoe, studies indicate that violence associated with Africa’s elections
affects between 19 and 25 percent of elections (Bekoe, 2010).
In some countries interest in the conduct of elections gained momentum as a form of
legitimizing the rule of autocratic leaders gaining international recognition and support from
western donors. By the end of 2010, a large proportion, 32 out of the 48 (66. 7 percent) countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa were nurturing transitions to democratic rule; Freedom House classified
1

23 of them as being partially free and 9 free (Freedom House Report, 2011). Yet some elections
that are conducted to establish and eventually consolidate many of these nascent democracies
have been characterized by fraud, disputed results and violent conflicts. According to Robert
Pastor (1999), a survey conducted on elections between 1998 and 1999 showed that Africa had
the highest number of disputed election results. Twenty-eight percent (28 percent) of disputed
results and 41 percent of African elections were described as flawed by international and local
election observers (Pastor, 1999).
Democracy promoters have hyped the need for elections as the most important event to
show that a country is democratizing to the extent that countries that do not have the minimum
systems in place to conduct credible elections are encouraged to do so. The results have often
been disastrous, a situation which Paul Collier describes as “democracy in dangerous places”
(Collier, 2009, p. 1). Collier states that among the ‘bottom billion’ (people living in developing
countries), the great political sea change, superficially, has looked like the spread of democracy,
but was actually the spread of elections. That is, developing countries’ adoption of electoral
democracy (without efforts to establish liberal democratic institutions and structures) makes the
democratization process superficial as many elections are described as shams. He argues that
when elections become a zero-sum game without strict adherence to the rules of conduct of
elections, the contestants are driven to extremes. The result, Collier contends, is not democracy
but “Democrazy” (Collier, 2009, p.16). Collier’s call for all parties in the election process to be
subjected to the rules of conduct is a fundamental duty of Election Management Bodies (EMBs)
whose mandate is rule making, rule application, and rule adjudication of the electoral process.
He stresses that if this role is not played properly the election results are disputed by contending
parties, leading to chaos and violence (Collier, 2009).

2

The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) maintains that an electoral
process is an alternative to violence as it provides a means of achieving governance. Elections
are very important activities of the democratic process, meant to replace other forms of the
selection of leaders and representatives or to decide on important national political issues by the
populace (Fischer, 2002). Successive US administrations have justified various policies intended
to promote democracy abroad by arguing that democracy promotes peace. The democratic peace
theory states that democracies rarely, if ever, go to war with one another (Kant, 1957). Why
should ballots create occasions for bullets in some countries during and after elections, when
democracy promoters and scholars have so strongly suggested that democracy promotes peace?
Contrary to the generally accepted view that democracy eventually promotes peace,
Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder (2007), Michael Mann (2005), Paul Collier (2009), and
Lars-Erik Cederman, Simon Hug and Andreas Wenger (2007) argue that in transitional states,
open political space in the early stages of democratization leads to intense competition between
old and new elites. The scholars argue that while the old autocratic power structures are in
decline, the new democratic institutions are still too weak to effectively regulate mass political
competition. The unhealthy interaction between mass political participation and underdeveloped
institutions can lead to war.
According to Staffan Darnolf, some EMBs that are mandated to be the referees
overseeing the competition for power and position fail to proactively assess, detect, deter and
mitigate election fraud (Darnolf, 2011). EMBs constitute the organizational anchor that secures
the procedural legitimacy for the substantive uncertainty inherent in competitive elections
(Przeworski, 1991). Mozaffar (2002) maintains that EMBs are now increasingly viewed as the
linchpin of effective electoral governance in new as well as established democracies.

3

The establishment of election governance institutions has increased as many African
countries transition to democracy. López-Pintor (2000) identifies three categories of EMBs in
new democracies in Africa. Those directly managed by governments represented 8 percent;
independent election commissions were 53 percent and government-cum-ad hoc electoral
authority joint management (under the auspices of the ministry of interior that administers daily
and decentralized activities of the election process) represented 39 percent. This follows the
global trend of the models of election management bodies---of 214 EMBs, 55 percent are
independent commissions, 26 percent solely government managed and 15 percent mixed models
(IDEA, 2006)
Despite the aforementioned trend of increased election governance institutions and
election fraud globally, some African countries like Ghana, Botswana, Cape Verde, and Benin
are progressing steadily on the path to establish democratic rule through the conduct of credible
elections, but others, such as Zimbabwe, Kenya, Nigeria, and Côte d’Ivoire, with similar
demographic, ethnic, socio-economic and political characteristics are associated with flawed
elections (Lindberg, 2009).

1.1. The Research
As a result of the increasing incidence of election-related violence in African countries,
the question is asked: Is an effective and independent election management body a necessary
prerequisite for free, fair and credible elections? Are credible elections correlated with lower
levels of conflicts? Several sub-questions that readily come to mind include: Can a legitimate
EMB, which is legally and operationally insulated from the manipulation of state functionaries,
administer elections as a neutral entity to produce credible results? What difference will a well-
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resourced EMB with a comprehensive voter education and fraud management plan make? What
influence can an effective dispute resolution plan, professional EMB staff and law enforcement
team have on the outcome of elections? Finally, how does the performance of EMBs impact the
political environment, particularly the legitimacy and credibility of election results and the
reaction of losing contestants after elections? These questions are important because, as Shaheen
Mozaffar and Andreas Schedler (2002) contend, disagreements and disputes over election results
in developed democracies usually fall within the accepted standard “margin of error,” but in
some African countries election results are flawed due to manipulations and fraud.1 These
disputes over election results combine with other factors to increase tension and finally
degenerate into full scale communal conflicts as in Kenya, Zimbabwe and Côte d’Ivoire. The
study is important because according to Jørgen Elklit and Andrews Reynolds as well as Robert
Pastor, electoral governance is given little attention in the study of political democratization,
particularly for transitional democracies (Elklit and Reynolds, 2000; Pastor, 1999).
The study seeks to investigate the role of election management bodies in the conduct of
elections and whether they contribute in any significant ways to reducing election-related
conflicts in Africa. Taking a most similar case design, and analyzing the series of presidential
elections conducted in Ghana and Kenya from 1991 to 2008, the study identifies factors that
might have helped Ghana to avoid large scale election related communal violence and Kenya
sliding into election-related communal violence. The two will be compared and contrasted.
The study seeks to test a sub class of Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder’s
“preconditions” theory about emerging democracies. Mansfield and Snyder theorize that certain
1

Mozaffar and Schedler (2002) argue that democratic elections entail the largest peacetime mobilization of the
national population in a short time span and require the coordination of hundreds of individuals engaged in many
different activities which are almost always affected by errors at various stages of the process. These inaccuracies
define the margin of error in all elections.
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economic, political, socio-cultural and institutional conditions must exist for a country to avoid
or reduce the threat of war during transition to democracy (Mansfield and Snyder, 2007). The
theory advances the argument that emerging democracies (with incomplete democratization) are
more likely than others states to go to war because they lack the institutional infrastructure
needed to manage the turbulent processes of increased political participation, especially in
settings where unresolved issues of national identity can be exploited for antidemocratic
purposes. The objective of this study is to test a subclass of the theory on weak institutional
infrastructure, using the role of EMBs as institutions mandated to oversee elections, a critical
component of the democratization process. The study assesses and analyzes the performance of
EMBs and their contribution to the success or failure of conducting credible elections in the two
countries. The study further ascertains the correlation (if any) between the level of credible
elections outcomes and election-related violence.
Purpose of the Research
The purpose of the research is to identify weaknesses related to election management that
may contribute to election related-violent conflicts. Scholars have given little attention to the
contribution of EMBs to the conduct of credible elections and election-related violence (Alston,
2010).2 According to Elklit and Reynolds (2005) and Mozaffar (2002), the importance of EMBs
has been neglected or taken for granted for a long time because elections in established
democracies tend to be routine events, usually producing results within a narrow, but fully
acceptable margin of error.3 This research will contribute to filling the gap by helping to

2

According to a report on election-related violence and killings submitted to the UN Human Rights Council
Fourteenth session, there is limited academic research on election-related violence (Alston, 2010).
3
Elklit and Reynolds (2005) describe the limited research in the field of election administration as a large empty
space within academia and policy analysis that needs to be filled. Mozaffar (2002) describes the situation as a
neglected variable.
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diagnose the complex problems of weak election management and election-related violence in
the two countries from 1991 to 2008.

Organization of the Study
The first chapter of this thesis provides an introduction, literature review and description
of the methodology to be utilized. The second chapter is devoted to the development of
democracy, election management and challenges facing the EMB in Ghana. The third chapter
does the same for Kenya. Chapter four is devoted to comparing the performances of EMBs in the
two countries and provides an analysis of findings, recommendations and suggestions for future
research.

1.2. Literature Review
The literature on election related-conflicts in Africa focuses on political, cultural,
economic and social factors that contribute to or exacerbate violence before, during and after
elections. Some scholars have conducted studies on the role of institutions in the conduct of
elections, but a critical component of the institutional framework, election governance, has only
recently begun to gain the attention of scholars and policy makers. According to Rafael LopezPintor, electoral management is a relatively new field of study, especially as it relates to
democratization in new democracies (Lopez-Pintor, 2000). Many countries’ adoption of
democratic rule has been accompanied by disputes over election results with some countries
sliding into communal violent conflicts. Analysts from International Foundation for Electoral
Systems (IFES), the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA),
Freedom House, and Democracy Watch are concerned that the increased propensity for
influencing election results undermines the whole democratic process. Some of the major causes
7

of electoral disputes and violence are ethnic cleavages, poverty, manipulation of elections,
fraudulent polls and negative propaganda.
Some politicians rely on ethnic loyalty to win power. Ethnic riots are used as a
particularly brutal and effective form of campaign, designed by politicians to solidify ethnic
majorities and diminish the importance of other politically relevant identities especially in
marginal constituencies and among pivotal groups of undecided voters in the run up to elections
(Gurr, 2000).
The Nature of Elections
Does democracy bring peace? The answer to this question has been the center of
scholarly debates for many years. The ‘democratic peace’ theory has evolved over the years, but
basically holds that liberal democracies never or rarely go to war with each other. In his work,
“Perpetual Peace,” Immanuel Kant postulates that peace is a reasonable outcome of the
interaction of states with a republican form of government. He believes that the republican
constitution gives a favorable prospect for the desired consequence---perpetual peace. According
to Kant, “if the consent of citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared
nothing is more natural than that they should be very cautious in commencing such a poor game,
decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war” (Kant, 1957, pp 94-95). Some scholars prefer
to talk about the ‘liberal peace theory’ instead of democratic peace, saying that this formulation
is more relevant and easier to define in empirical analyses. They agree with Kant and argue that
liberal states would not feel threatened by the universalistic outlook of other liberal republics
since they already share a similar form of government and consequently gravitate towards peace
even under provocative circumstances.4

4

John M. Owen, Liberal Peace, Liberal War, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1997 and Michael Doyle, Ways of
War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, New York, Norton & Company, 1997.
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Democratic peace theorists explain this using regime type. They assert that the checks
and balances that define a democracy constrain the autonomy of its leader to take decisions
involving the use of force. This constraint, the proponents argue, delays the dispatch and
deployment of combat troops abroad even in international crises, which creates a window of
opportunity that diplomats can exploit to settle conflicts of interests without recourse to arms.
Those who oppose the theory, for example Sebastian Roberto, argue that beside the fact that
there are plenty of historical exceptions to this rule, like the Philippine-American War and the
Irish War of Independence, one of the ambiguities associated with the theory is the definition of
a democratic state. Some nations have forms of democracy without the substance. For example,
where institutions are weak and elections are the only indicators of a government being described
as a democracy cannot be compared to consolidated democracies such as the US. According to
Christopher Layne (2003), the institutional constraint and the checks and balances argument
advanced by the democratic peace theorists is weak and does not provide compelling evidence
and an explanation for the absence of war between democratic and non-democratic states.5
Contributing to the debate on the democratic peace theory, Mansfield and Snyder (2007)
as well as Collier (2009) postulate that states in the early stages of transition to democracy are
more likely than other states to become involved in war. They explain that subsequent attempts
at democratization become more expensive after first attempt to democratize fails. They maintain
that as an authoritarian faction gains the upper hand, it develops mechanisms and tricks of
subduing prodemocracy forces, thereby curtailing any attempts at democratization. The
preconditions required to establish democracy become degraded and it takes more efforts and
resources to get started all over again during a second attempt at democratization. Ted Gurr adds

5

Cited in Rosato (2003). “The flawed logic of the democratic peace theory” argues that even if the theory is
accepted, it does not imply that peace is the key characteristic of a democracy.
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that the process of transition creates threatening uncertainties for some groups and opens up a
range of transitory political opportunities for ethnic entrepreneurs (Gurr, 2000). Mann (2005);
Cederman, Hug, Wenger (2007) and Collier (2009) agree with the position that the transitional
stages to democracy are turbulent and can lead to violence. They advocate a gradual approach to
establishing democracy in divided and weak states. Collier stresses that incomplete
democratization increases the danger of war when political institutions are especially weak and
elites are motivated to employ strategies of exclusionary nationalism in the effort to survive.
David C. Rapoport and Leonard Weinberg (2001) take the argument further, by
theorizing that, by their nature, elections are divisive because competition rhetoric must
emphasize party differences to attract votes. In the process, utterances exaggerate the potential
stakes of contending parties, thereby threatening the success of the process. The stakes are even
higher in multicultural states where political patronage is common.

Causes of Electoral Conflicts in Africa
Analysts identify a variety of causal factors for conflict during and after elections in
transitional democracies. Many contributors to the discussion on the causes of election-related
conflicts associate violence with the negative influence of ethnicity, religious differences,
political propaganda and machinations by political elites, incumbent leaders’ manipulation of
polls and the weaknesses of the electoral system.
Scholars are divided as to whether ethnic diversity per se constitutes a recipe for
communal violence. A number of scholars argue that ethnic cleavages are significantly
associated with voting behavior and the structure of party systems in Africa (Horowitz, 1991,
1993; Mozaffar et al., 2003; Norris and Mattes, 2003; Posner, 2005 cited in Mozaffar et al.,
2003). These scholars contend that as politicians seek to win power, they exploit exiting fault
10

lines among diverse ethnic groups for votes. This, they argue, increases antagonism and prepares
the ground for violence at the least provocation. Dorina A. Bekoe (2010) asserts that electoral
violence, especially when recurrent, seems indicative of more widespread systemic grievances.
Tensions over land rights, employment and ethnic marginalization are three common sources of
recurring electoral violence. Bekoe concludes that these areas intersect and are frequently
manipulated by politicians. The conventional wisdom is that ethnic voting and ethnic parties
exacerbate groups divisions rather than accommodating and mitigating them.
Horowitz (1985) and Collier (2009) posit that, because the stakes of winning and losing are very
high, elections may deepen communal frictions. Steven I. Wilkinson (2009, cited in Mozaffar
and Schedler (2002) contends that elites may seek to create conflict in order to demobilize the
supporters of their potential opponents.6 Collier (2009) observes that when elections are
superficial (that is corrupt, flawed, and ethnic) they become a matter of extreme importance such
that contestants are prepared to adopt any means possible to win. If they are not subjected to the
rules of conduct, the contestants are driven to extremes. Therefore, Collier emphases how
important it is for EMBs to subject parties to the rule of democratic elections.
On the other hand, Stephen Sideman and David Lanoue (2005) assert that elections may
serve to reduce extreme forms of dissent, as individuals and groups focus their efforts on getting
their representatives elected by traversing societal cleavages to canvas for votes. They argue that
elections may lead to restraint as groups try to avoid antagonizing potential voters and build
coalition partners. Sideman and Lanoue maintain that while ethnic conflicts obviously requires
the existence of at least two or three competing groups in a country, any significantly greater
fragmentation beyond that point reduces the likelihood of ethnic strife because larger groups are,
6

Sideman and Lanoue (2005) and Wilkinson (2009) argue that in multiethnic democracies like India, ethnic riots are
best thought of as a particularly brutal and effective form of campaign expenditure designed by politicians to
solidify ethnic majorities and diminish the importance of other politically relevant identities.
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by definition, better equipped to engage in larger protests. Therefore communal conflict is
greatest among groups that are relatively large, both in real and relative terms. The exception,
however, is that, in countries where specific ethnic groups are perpetually sidelined and
discriminated against by other ethnic groups in government, they may resort to violence
notwithstanding their relative size and strength.
Other scholars maintain that the problem of ethnicity in African politics is not as
engrained as it is purported to be. Shaheen Mozaffar and Andreas Schedler (2002) assert that
there is evidence of trans-ethnic party support for political parties and leaders. They cite a study
on Ghana’s 1992 elections (Oquaye, 1995), Mali’s 1992 elections (Vengroff, 1993 and 1994)
and Senegal’s experience with a series of competitive elections (Vengroff and Creevey, 1997;
Villalon, 1994) that show patterns of trans-ethnic voting.7 According to Mark I. Lichbach (1994)
and Stephen M. Saideman (2004), attributing election-related violence in Africa solely to ethnic
cleavages is limiting; instead they call for an in-depth study of the problem.
Leaders of African countries and losing political parties have been blamed for most of the
conflicts associated with elections in their countries for several reasons. According to Andreas
Schedler (2006), elections are tools of democratization or tools of manipulation employed by
authoritarian governments to maintain leaders in power. Beth E. Whitaker (2005), Bakarr A. Bah
(2010), and Carl Le Van (2009) assert that leadership failure, incumbents’ manipulation of the
electoral system to hold on to power and uncompromising, defeated party leaders contribute to
election-related violent conflicts in Africa. They argue that leaders, particularly incumbents,
manipulate electoral laws to exclude sections of the community which leads to violent conflicts
that threaten the security of states. Carl Le Van (2009) cites the cases of Ivoirité (a policy
introduced to identify indigenes from non-indigenes of Côte d’Ivoire as a discriminatory political
7

Cited in Mozaffar and Schedler (2002)
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tool) which was used to disqualify Alassane Ouattara as a presidential candidate in the 1998 and
2000 elections. A similar case is the failed attempt by rival politicians to disqualify candidate
Frederick Chiluba of Zambia on the grounds of his citizenship status in 1996.
Political parties, as perhaps the most influential group in the electoral process, have their
share of the blame for electoral violence. In this study, political parties refer to all accredited
political groups which contest elections in a country for political post or office. Political parties’
role in fomenting violence during elections needs to be put in context. When elections are called,
politicians and their supporters attempt to influence policy by competing directly for the votes of
the constituents in campaigns. Some activities of political parties directly or indirectly cause
conflict before, during and after elections. These may include fraud, intimidation,
gerrymandering, vote rigging and illegal interference with the process of an election. A political
party is an organization formed with specific ideology and programs with the aim of capturing
power to rule a state or an organized entity (Mozaffar and Scarritt, 2005). To keep these practices
in check, EMBs must have fraud detection and prevention mechanisms.

The Role of Electoral Institutions
According to Rafael Lopez-Pintor (2000), effective management of electoral systems
requires institutions that are inclusive, sustainable, just and independent, particularly, electoral
management bodies that have the legitimacy to enforce rules and assure fairness with the
cooperation of political parties and citizens. Gurr (1993), Pastor (1999), and Reynolds (2005)
identify weaknesses in electoral systems, administration and dispute resolution mechanisms as
the main causes of election-related disputes and violent conflicts. They stress the need for
effective electoral systems to reduce the rate of occurrence of conflicts in transitional
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democracies. Samuel Huntington (1991) shares the same opinion when he states that the gap
between high levels of political participation and poorly integrated institutions is one of the key
problems of political development in transitional democracies. Ted Gurr observes that the ‘third
wave’ of democratization has coincided with an increase in the number of ethnic conflicts (Gurr,
1993). In multi-ethnic societies, the interaction of institutions and ethnic loyalties play important
roles in shaping the attitudes of voters. Daniel N. Posner (2007) asserts that the competitiveness
of the party system affects whether ethnic groups are mobilize along language or tribal lines. 8
According to the African Union’s (AU) “Panel of the Wise” report on elections (2010),
the problems related to elections in Africa are due to weaknesses in the governance of elections,
the rules of orderly political competition, and lack of impartial judiciaries to interpret and
adjudicate electoral disputes. Can effective EMBs administer the election process so that election
results become credible and accepted by majority of the electorate and parties to neutralize the
ethnicity factor and thereby avoid the violent communal conflicts associated with
democratization?
Rapoport and Weinberg (2001) and others have identified the failure of institutions and
the design of elections as the major causes of election-related disputes and violence (Fischer, 2002).
Citing recent examples of defective elections in Haiti, Kenya and Georgia, Edward P. Joseph
(2008) concludes that, in each of these ‘election-challenged’ countries, the election management
body (EMB) was deficient. Andrew Reynolds (2009), shares the same opinion when he affirms
that the electoral system or how the votes cast are actually translated into seats has a huge impact

8

Posner (2007) argues that changes in institutional structure often trigger the activation of ethnic differences.
Particularly a shift from a one party or nonparty state to multiparty democracy makes voters inclined to support
politicians from their own ethnic groups over others and, because politicians know that voters will do this, it creates
incentives for politicians to couch their electoral appeals in ethnic terms.
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not just on inclusion and exclusion, but also on the tone of the entire political system. He stresses
the need for states to put in place the necessary systems before conducting elections.
Mansfield and Snyder agree that states should get it right from the beginning. They
explain that it is difficult to make amends if the foundation for democracy is weak. They explain
that once a country starts on an illiberal trajectory, ideas are unleashed and institutions are
established that tend to continue propelling it along that trajectory (Mansfield and Snyder, 1995).
Therefore, having a good start to the democratization process is very important. Mansfield and
Snyder (1995) as well as Collier (2009) contend that weak and fragile states should be prepared
before they conduct elections. These scholars advocate for gradual establishment and
development of democratic systems and structures such as well functioning bureaucracy, an
independent judiciary, professional law enforcement agencies, and an active civil society to
effectively participate in the democratization process. Otherwise, Collier cautions, it is not worth
conducting elections at all. Mansfield and Snyder argue that this is so important because when
elections are held in an institutional wasteland, political competition typically coalesces around
and reinforces the ethnic and sectarian divisions in traditional societies (Mansfield and Snyder,
1995).
Pastor (1999) supports this point when he states that administrative irregularities
contribute to the rejection of election results and consequently conflict in many countries. He
notes that electoral mismanagement, whether deliberate or due to incompetence, is at the heart of
the overwhelming majority of disputed elections all over the world. According to Pastor, of the
387 elections held in emerging democracies worldwide from 1989 and 1999, all party petitions,
protests, and boycotts were rooted in administrative irregularities. Therefore, effective election
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management may help steer new democracies through this quagmire where ballots provoke
bullets.
In sum, Africa presents appropriate grounds for the testing of Mansfield and Snyder’s
theory on how weak institutions can cause war or violence in emerging democracies. The
scholarship on election-related conflicts tend to focus on economic, political, socio-cultural and
other aspects of institutional arrangements such as regime type and electoral system to the
neglect of the role of EMBs. Although there is increased interest in the work of EMBs of late, as
highlighted by new studies on election governance, the role and performance of EMBs is not yet
developed (a situation Mozaffar describes as a ‘neglected variable’ in the process of
democratization in new democracies) (Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002). Many African countries,
with weak state systems and economic bases as well as multiethnic societies characterized by
cleavages, are prone to violence during elections. If EMBs are to offer some hope for managing
these conflicts, then they have to be good referees.

1.3. Methodology and Presentation
In order to evaluate the effect of EMBs on election-related violence, this study uses
process-tracing to establish a causal chain and causal mechanism between the independent
variable and the dependent variable. Two countries (Ghana and Kenya) are selected for the study
based on their EMBs’ relative performances in conducting national elections. The study
identifies possible causal factors or pathways of the differences in the performance of EMBs and
how their performance contributes to exacerbating or preventing violent communal conflicts
during electoral seasons.
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Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the historical background and development of election
governance in the two countries; each contains a brief on the development of multi-party systems
and political party interactions with other political actors and their influence on elections and
electoral violence. The study also includes a brief comparison of a two-dimensional analysis of
(the relatively better and worse performing countries) and how EMBs’ performance relates to the
trend of election-related violence in those countries.
The study measures the effects of the performance of EMBs in the aftermath of elections.
It also explores the relationship between EMBs’ performance and the level of communal
conflicts experienced as a consequence of the elections. The dependent variable is electionrelated violent conflicts and the independent variable is the performance or output of EMBs.
Election-related conflict is defined in this study as a political act or acts of aggression
aimed at subverting, controlling or disrupting the electoral process for purposes of winning
political competition for power or to settle scores with people from an opposing party before,
during and after elections (Omotola, 2008).9 The term election-related violent conflict, the
dependent variable in this study, will be used interchangeably with electoral violence, electionrelated violence, communal violence and communal conflict is defined as violent conflict that
involves large numbers of people (50 or more people) as a result of disagreements and
dissatisfaction over election results or any part of the electoral process. Election-related violence
is contextually understood to mean any violent action against people, property or the electoral
process intended to influence the electoral process or harm perceived opponents (Omotola,
2008). The study is limited to measuring acts of physical violence perpetrated before, during and
after elections only. The study focuses on manifestations of violence such as assault, death
9

Olawale (2008).
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threats, killings, bombings, looting, arson, destruction of and damage to property, abductions,
and fighting among political parties or other organized stakeholders in the electoral process.
An election is the formal decision-making process by which a population chooses an
individual or group of people to hold public office or decide on major political issues. It is the
usual mechanism through which representative democracy operates. An ideal electoral cycle
would have the following key elements: a legal framework, electoral planning and organized
implementation, civic training and education, official voter registration, election campaigning,
voting, certified verification of election results, and post-election processes. These processes are
supposed to be administered by Election Management Bodies (EMBs). EMBs are lead agencies
set up by law to oversee elections in any country. According to Mozaffar and Schedler (2002),
Elklit and Reynolds (2005) and IDEA (2006), EMBs are institutions vested with the
responsibility to organize, supervise, and adjudicate or facilitate the adjudication of electionrelated disputes. They are supposed to be politically neutral and unbiased against any actor in the
election process.
Some EMBs have permanent staff and chief executive officers, which is common in
states with fixed electoral calendars and permanent professional staff like Ghana’s electoral
commission. Other EMBs that do not have fixed electoral calendars and elections are called by
governments as and when it is deemed necessary. Countries like Benin and Niger have ad hoc
electoral commissions set up when elections are due and are often dissolved after elections
(IDEA, 2006). The compositions of EMBs vary according to country but in general terms
comprise personnel of electoral commissions and other bodies to ensure the smooth conduct of
elections. In this study, EMBs and the term electoral governance are used interchangeably,
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recognizing the fact that EMBs are a part of the whole system of governance of the election
process.
The performance of EMBs affects the general atmosphere in a country during and after
elections. The assumption of this study is that acts of communal violence targeted at opponents,
state institutions or EMBs during and after elections occur as a protest to show dissatisfaction,
dissent or disapproval of part or the whole election process. This is particularly the case when
violence appears to be the only means of seeking redress or justice. According to Gurr (2000),
the tendency towards violence is inversely related to a group’s (ethnic group, political party,
religious and other sectarian bodies) security and interest. This is because groups which resort to
violent acts are very much aware of the negative consequences such as injury, death and legal
action by state security apparatus. Perpetrators of violence may be denied their legitimate
demands because their acts may be seen as setting bad precedents for seeking redress. Given that
violent conflict is very costly, groups in democracies will try to work through the system before
they become dissatisfied and engage in serious dissent and violent behavior. The hypothesis to
be tested therefore is that election-related violence is more likely in countries with weak elections
administration and dispute management systems. It is difficult to measure the effectiveness of
elections objectively, especially when some EMB leaders are implicated or perceived to be
partisan in their judgment of election results (Omotola, 2008). This study assesses the strength of
the legal framework (legal instruments, administrative, operational and logistics arrangements
and the legitimacy of their leaders) that set up EMBs in the conduct of elections by analyzing
variety of documents mandating EMBs to operate. This assessment is performed according to the
Elklit and Reynolds (2005) scale, which measures election effectiveness. The main elements are
grouped into three main categories: rule- making, rule implementation and rule adjudication
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(Mozaffar, 2002).10 Key components of International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance (IDEA)’s framework for election management design are also adopted to enhance the
measurability of the variables (IDEA, 2006).
Other major stakeholders and factors involved in the electoral process such as political
parties, their organization, campaign activities and the role or influence of government and other
state functionaries are examined. The economic conditions of the state (as measured by
economic indicators like GDP and per capita income) and the ethnic demographic patterns vis-àvis party mobilization and party alliances are also treated as controlled variables. The effect of
local and international election observers and monitors on the conduct of elections is also
monitored as a control variable.
Operationalization
The study adopts the most similar design to measure the performance the EMBs in Ghana
and Kenya. According to Guy (1989) the most similar systems design is a comparative design,
because it is the design that attempts to manipulate the independent variables through case
selection to control extraneous variance by the same means.
In contrast, a most different system design compares contrasting cases in order to show
the robustness of a relationship between dependent and independent variables. The most similar
design assumes that by demonstrating that the observed relationships hold in a range of
contrasting settings the argument of the research is better supported. The assumption is that
extraneous variance questions are dealt with by the selection of the cases. If a relationship
between an independent variable X and a dependent variable Y is discovered, then the factors
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Elklit and Reynolds (2005) have identified 11 elements for measuring the effectiveness of elections: legal
framework, election management, constituency and polling demarcation, voter education, voter registration,
designing ballot papers and registration of candidates, campaign regulations, polling, counting and tabulation of
votes, resolving complaints/verification/certification of results and post-election procedure.

20

that are held constant through the selection of cases cannot be said to be alternative sources of
that relationship (Guy, 1989).
Tables will be used to illustrate the similarities and differences between election
management in Ghana and Kenya. The primary focus of the study is a comparative study of the
ECs of the two countries. The main sub-variables measured for EMB effectiveness, autonomy,
neutrality and legitimacy will be weighted according to their contribution towards the attainment
of credible elections results or the propensity for creating dissent, disputes and violence.
Methodology
The study utilizes a longitudinal analysis of each case from 1991 to 2008 to observe
changes over the conduct of more than two national elections. It also assesses interstate EMBs’
performances by adopting process-tracing combined with the congruence method to measure the
effectiveness of elections supervised by the EMBs. Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett contend
that in comparative case studies, a combination of process-tracing and the congruence method
reduces the problem of under determination (George and Bennett, 2005).11 According to Andreas
Dür, process-tracing helps to identify the intervening causal process and allows for the
consideration of many different rival explanation of political phenomenon.12 This is very
important because the study focuses on two distinct and different states with one independent
variable, election-related violence. Furthermore, the study deals with a complex political
phenomenon that is difficult to objectively measure, especially when assessing the legitimacy,
credibility and performance of EMBs that depends largely on people’s perceptions and

11

George and Bennett (2005) explain under-determination as dealing with many variables to determine the effect in
a study when relatively smaller numbers can have the same effect.
12
Andreas Dür (2008) explains that process tracing help identifies the causal chain and causal mechanism between
an independent variable (variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable. It allows for consideration of many
different rival explanation of political phenomenon attributable to the power of influence which is crucial in
elections campaigns and incumbent leaders’ control of state resources.
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judgments of the electoral process and its impact on election-related violence (Elklit, 2000; Elklit
and Svensson 1997; Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002).13 Using the congruence method, the study
identifies the causal effect of other intervening variables that are not the focus of this study but
which help measure the influence of EMBs’ performance on the electoral process, and by
extension, its impact on election-related violence.
The study utilizes many approaches to gather information from secondary sources,
including election database websites such as the African Elections Database on Ghana and
Kenya and data sets developed by scholars, library archives, articles and journals in the print
media, updates and diaries on important election activities by national election commissions and
think tanks. The study analyzes data on election-related violent conflicts using statistically
appropriate tools to show the correlation between election management and election-related
violent conflicts.

13

According to Elklit (2000), Elklit and Svensson (1997) and Mozaffar and Schedler (2002), determining whether
an election is free and fair is a complicated exercise because of the need to consider pre-election day, election day,
and postelection day issues; there are also difficulties in knowing how much weight to apply to each, and the
multiple dimensions involved in each.
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CHAPTER 2 : GHANA: POLITICS AND ELECTION MANAGEMENT

2.0. Ghana: Background and Political History
Formed from the merger of the British colony of the Gold Coast and the Togoland trust
territory, present day Ghana became the first sub-Saharan country in colonial Africa to gain its
independence from the British in 1957. Ghana endured a series of coup d’états before the last
military ruler, Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, led the process of drafting and approving a
constitution that restored multiparty politics and ushered the country into the Fourth Republic in
1993. The Gold Coast had operated as a quasi-democracy during the pre-independence period of
self-rule. It had only limited experience with democracy and the introduction of national
elections to elect leaders and representatives to national decision making bodies from 1951-1957
and during the post-independence period (1957-1960) before succumbing to one-party
dictatorship under Kwame Nkrumah in 1964. Ghana attempted two brief renewals of civilian
rule from October 1969 to January 1972 and September 1979 to December 1981. These periods
were interrupted by military coups and regimes starting with the National Liberation Council
(NLC) from February 1966-October 1969; the National Redemption/Supreme Military Council
(NRC/SMC I & II) from January 1972-June 1979; the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
(AFRC) from June-September 1979, and the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC)
from December 1981-January 1993 (Ayee, 1998). However, Ghana has since developed
politically to become a beacon of democracy in Africa. This chapter discusses the political
history of Ghana with a special focus on election management and the challenges of multi-party
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democracy in an ethnically diverse society. It also examines political party activities and their
influence on the electoral process as well as democratic consolidation and emerging patterns of
democratic development in Ghana.
Figure 2.1: Chronology of Ruling Administrations in Ghana (1957-2012)
March 1957–June 1960: Westminster Constitution (Nkrumah– parliamentary civilian
government)
July 1960–December 1964: First Republic (Nkrumah-presidential civilian government).
January 1964–February 1966: First Republic (Nkrumah-One-party presidential civilian
government).
February 1966–October 1969: National Liberation Council (NLC) (Ankrah, and Afrifamilitary rule).
October 1969–January 1972: Second Republic (Busia/Akufo-Addo-parliamentary civilian
government).
January 1972–October 1975: National Redemption Council (NRC) (Acheampong-military
rule).
October 1975–July 1978: Supreme Military Council I (SMC I) (Acheampong-military rule).
July 1978–June 1979: Supreme Military Council II (SMC II) (Akuffo-military rule).
June 1979–September 1979: Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) (Rawlingsmilitary rule).
September 1979–December 1981: Third Republic (Limann - presidential civilian
government).
January 1982–December1992: Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) (Rawlingsmilitary rule).
January 1993-June 2012: Fourth Republic (Rawlings, Kuffour, and Atta-Mills-presidential
civilian governments).
Source: AfriMAP and Open Society Initiative for West Africa (2007).
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2.1. Historical Overview
Historically, a large proportion of what we today know as Ghana was controlled by a
number of empires. The empire of Ashanti, which was one of the most advanced states in subSaharan Africa in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries, controlled about two-thirds of the
territory before succumbing to colonial expansionist wars. Other smaller but prominent states
included Ewe states in the present day Volta region and Gonja, Mumprusi and Dagbomba in the
northern sector of the territory. These were states ruled by dynasties with built in democratic
mechanisms for the selection and removal of leaders as well as participatory decision making
process and traditions. The Ashanti, for example, had elaborate succession procedures and
conflict resolution mechanisms that are still respected and adhered to in the Ashanti kingdom in
modern times. These states were gradually merged into one state, the Gold Coast, by the British
colonial administration prior to Ghana’s independence. Leaders of the new state adopted the
name of one of the earliest West African medieval empires, Ghana, which reigned between the
4th and 9th centuries (McLaughlin and Owusu-Ansah, 1994). Upon independence, Ghana
embarked on a checkered history of alternating civilian and military rule.
In the pre-independence period, the electoral process was characterized by ad hoc and
limiting measures and provisions. Voters were bound to meet certain tax requirements. Adult
suffrage was limited to certain categories of people based on economic and social status. Since
independence in 1957, all adult citizens (including women) of sound mind have had the right to
vote. The minimum voting age was 21 years until 1979. It has since been changed to 18 years.
The principles of political equality and secret voting have been applied since independence
(Krennerich, 2003). The election management body in Ghana has grown from one that is
controlled by government to a fully developed, independent and autonomous system with
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substantial powers and checks and balances that has enjoyed growing confidence and trust in its
execution of elections over the years.

2.2. Overview of Ethnicity and Conflicts in Ghana’s Political History
Ghana, like most countries in Africa is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural
society. According to the 2010 Population and Housing Census Interim report, Ghana’s
population is twenty four million (Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), 2011). This population is a
vast mosaic of large and small ethnic groups. For a clearer understanding of the political
development in Ghana, one needs to understand the basics of ethnic classification, ethnoregionalism, social and economic cleavages and how they interact to form complex networks of
socio-political dynamics for the capture of power and resources. One characteristic of Ghana’s
political system is that parties and voters are mobilized along political traditions (the DanquahBusia and Nkrumah) as well as issues. In contemporary Ghanaian politics, most political parties
formed after the overthrow of the first and subsequent republics have laid claim to the basic
orientations of one or the other of the two political traditions that are also the major competing
parties during the pre-independence period. The Nkrumahists dominated the politics of Ghana
from 1951 to 1966 and they produced the 1979-1982 Limann’s PNP government. The
Danquah/Busia tradition produced the Busia/Akufo-Addo PP administration of 1969 to 1972,
and Kuffour’s NPP from 2001-2008. Even though the NDC at times also claims some
connection to the Nkrumahist tradition, the Rawlings/Atta-Mills’ NDC government of 19932000 and 2008-2012 respectively is seen as a third force in Ghana’s politics. It is widely believed
that a Rawlings tradition (a belief in and the pursuit of social democratic ideals) has now been
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established in Ghanaian politics. It draws its support from each of the older established parties
(Gyimah-Boadi, 2009).
The Nkrumahist tradition is perceived in the Ghanaian popular imagination as ethnically
and socially inclusive, broad-based, populist and left-wing. The Danquah-Busia tradition in
Ghanaian politics has always been associated with liberal economic thinking and the business
sector in society (Lindberg and Morrison, 2005). It is perceived as elitist, ethnically exclusive
(predominantly Ashanti and Akyem sub-groups of the Akan), liberal-democratic and right-wing
(Whitefield, 2009). Less emphasis is placed on considerations of identity except the Ashanti and
Ewe, who have demonstrated their bias in the form of bloc voting for their home region parties
or candidates. According to Whitefield (2009), voters and political elites are mobilized around
two political traditions which provide ideological orientation and the body of stories associated
with the party’s history and political styles for the parties in Ghana. This is demonstrated by the
de facto two-party system (NPP and NDC which have won over 90 percent of votes in national
elections in the Fourth Republic) in which both parties have strong political support in almost all
regions and party identification is based on cross-cutting cleavages of which ethnicity is only one
(Whitefield, 2009).
It is estimated that there are about ninety-two distinct ethnic groups in Ghana. These
groups are often classified into a few large (linguistic) groups, namely, Akan, representing 49.1
percent of the population, Mole Dagbani (16.5 percent), Ewe (12.7 percent) and the Ga Adangbe
(8.0 percent). The other groups are the Guan (3.9 percent), Gurma (4.4 percent), Grusi (2.8
percent), Mande–Busanga (1.1 percent) and other non specified groups (1.5 percent) (GSS,
2000).
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FIGURE 2.2: Ethnologic Map of Ghana

Source: http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/tribes/map.php.

Although no part of Ghana is ethnically homogeneous, an overriding feature of the
country’s ethnic geopolitics is the north–south divide and the dominance of the southern half of
Ghana in general and in particular by the Akan group. This segment of Ghanaian society has
enjoyed relative economic and political dominance in both the colonial and post-colonial times.
This divide has created ethno-regional inequalities and resentments that have developed in
Ghana since colonial times when infrastructural development and projects have been
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concentrated in the south and left the north relatively underdeveloped (Asante and GyimahBoadi, 2004). The Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS) report (2008) identifies the three
Northern Regions as the poorest in the country.
Easy geographical mobility and people moving to seek economic opportunities have
contributed to large numbers of various ethnic groups settling throughout the country without
destroying or weakening their ethnic bonds. The effects of ethnic rivalries and the uneven
distribution of social and economic services during the pre-colonial, colonial and postindependence periods on different groups and regions of the country have all contributed to
inequalities. Some of these inequalities have persisted to date (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).
Some of the tensions within and between various ethnic groups over resources and political
power in Ghana, to a large extent, are modern conflicts with roots in colonial structures, state
politics and laws (Jönsson, 2007).
Local conflicts reflect keen competition over scarce resources and power, especially land
and traditional rulership. In Ghana, land ownership, traditional systems of land administration
and succession disputes over chieftaincy are major sources of conflict within and among ethnic
groups. There is lingering fear and suspicion of Ashanti political dominance in Ghana emanating
from pre-colonial Ashanti conquest and domination over the majority of their southern
counterparts. This rivalry created tensions between Ashanti on the one hand, and other groups,
particularly the Fanti, on the other. Bonos and Ashantis have feuded persistently over whether or
not Brong-Ahafo is a vassal state of the Ashanti kingdom. There have been instances where
Akan settler-farmers and their hosts in Akan cocoa growing areas have clashed over settler rights
versus landlord claims (similar to the situation in Cote d’ Ivoire that created a citizenship crisis
and eventually exploded into full-scale civil war). Other conflicts, like the one between the
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Nkonya and Alavanyo, Peki and Tsito in the Volta region, are consequences of cleavages and
other inequalities in Ghana (Jönsson, 2007).
The northern half of the country is not spared the challenges of these cleavages and
inequalities. Several years of relegation of certain ethnic groups, so-called ‘minority’ groups to
‘second class citizens’ in the traditional and political administration of the regions by ‘majority’
groups, and attempts to by-pass some of the ‘gates’ (royal factions) in the system of rotation in
succession to chiefly thrones have led to many ethnic conflicts in the north (Jönsson, 2007).14
These ethnic divides and inequalities resulted in the eruptions of twenty-two bloody inter and
intra ethnic conflicts in the Northern Region over a period of 22 years (from 1980 to 2002)
(Jönsson, 2007). Among them was the ‘Guinea-Fowl War’ of the 1990s which threatened
national security.15 The security threats posed by these conflicts have fueled the unproven fear
that ceding too much political, administrative and financial control to the local communities and
districts would encourage centrifugal forces of separatism, secessionism, and irredentism, that
can impede national integration and undermine the ability of central government to protect the
interests of minorities in the districts and local communities (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).
This perception has served as a powerful disincentive for effective decentralization in Ghana.

2.3. Challenges of Multiparty Elections and Democracy in Ghana
Ghana has a checked history of alternating multiparty system with no party or one party
system. Ghana experienced multiparty rule at independence in 1957 and attempted two brief

14

Majority groups have elaborate systems of traditional administration such as chieftaincy while the many smaller
groups are acephalous (lacking a centralized traditional administration). Acephalous societies were placed under a
ruling class during colonial rule (Jönsson, 2007).
15
The ‘Guinea-Fowl War’ got its name from the incident that finally sparked the violence, an argument over the sale
of a black guinea-fowl between a Konkomba and a Nanumba man (both northern ethnic groups). The dispute, in
Nakpayili market in Nanumba land, sparked a bloody conflict in the 1990s (Jönsson, 2007).
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renewals of civilian rule from October 1969 to January 1972 and September 1979 to December
1981. These periods were interwoven with one party rule and several military regimes up to
1992. The third attempt that started in 1992 has been sustained to date (June 2012). These
periods of multiparty system were characterized by pockets of ethnic voting patterns, conflicts
over resources usage and control and inequalities in Ghanaian society. Strategic attempts made
by successive governments to contain and neutralize potential dangers of these divides and
differences have been challenging to leaders in Ghana.

2.3.1. Socio-Economic Inequalities in Ghana
Like most African societies, inequality in Ghana, is associated with factors such as
geography (especially when examining the differences between the poor north and the
prosperous south, and the rural-urban divide), ethnicity, gender, disability and class. Others are a
combined effect of differential resource endowment, history, public policy and subjective factors
such as attitudes and prejudices (Ghana Human Development Report 1997). The spatial
distribution of the two major foreign religions, Islam and Christianity, largely coincides with the
division of the country into the northern half and the southern half respectively. These
inequalities are potential fault-lines for social cleavages and differences. These factors have
influenced to some extent, the outcome of elections as some electorates become tools for
politicians who exploit voters to their advantage resulting in social polarization and deepened
division among groups (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).
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2.3.2. Ethnicity and Voting Patterns in Ghana
Despite regional ethnic heterogeneity and constitutional provisions barring the formation
of political parties along ethnic and regional lines since independence, it would be disingenuous
to ignore the ethnic undercurrents in the electoral politics of Ghana especially in the Fourth
Republic. The two main parties---NDC and the NPP--- are largely perceived as Ewe and
Asante/Akan-based, respectively (Gyimah-Boadi and Asante 2006). The Ashanti-Ewe rivalry is
one of the major political divides in Ghana. It has persisted and grown into an Ashanti-Ewe bias,
which has been translated to bloc voting patterns. While other regions vote based on issues, the
Volta and Ashanti regions concentrate their votes on their home-based parties and candidates
(Asante and Gyimah-Boadi 2004).

2.3.3. Managing Diversity for Democratic Consolidation in Ghanaian Politics
Governments since independence have enacted legislative instruments to guarantee
associational and other political rights to achieve national integration. They have adopted
policies and programs aimed at building cohesion in the Ghanaian society.16 These policies have
help to neutralize the negative effect of ethnic, religious, cultural and political cleavages and
inequalities. The policies have also helped to regulate political competition and conflicts in the
public sector (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).

2.4. Political Development and Election Management in Pre-Independent Ghana
As resistance to colonialism deepened and grew more sophisticated in urban settlements,
the first political party, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) led by Joseph Baokye

16

Article 35, section 1 of the 1969 Constitution; Article 42, section 5 and 55 of the 1979 Constitution and section 4
of the 1992 Constitution all are geared towards achieving national integration and unity.
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Danquah was formed in 1947. Differences between the leaders of the UGCC and its secretarygeneral, Kwame Nkrumah, led to the formation of another political party, the Convention People
Party (CPP) in 1949. While the UGCC’s strategy was to achieve independence gradually in the
shortest possible time, the more radical and charismatic, Kwame Nkrumah wanted independence
for Ghana “now” (immediately). Nkrumah broke away from the UGCC and formed the CPP in
June 1949. These two parties form the basis of two major political traditions in Ghana (DanquahBusia and Nkrumah) (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).
Pre-independence elections, particularly those of 1954 witnessed the formation of more
political parties along regional and ethnic lines. For example, the Northern People’s Party
(NPP*) was formed to cater for the interest of the people of the Northern and Upper Regions and
the Muslim Association Party (MAP) was formed primarily to cater for the interests of Muslims
living in the Zongo (Muslim quarters) of the main towns in the country. Others are the Togoland
Congress (TC) and the Anlo Youth Association (AYA) formed in the Volta region to pursue
ethnic and regional interests (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). Lessons from these sectarian
parties such as violent attack on opponents, pursuit of sectarian rather than national interests and
the fragmentation of the Ghanaian society along ethnic and regional lines helped to shape the
legal framework for political party development and management.

2.4.1. Political Parties and their Influence on the Political Process in the Gold Coast
Political parties dominate the electoral process in shaping the discourse of campaigns, the
selection of candidates, and mobilizing citizens to vote. They also link citizen preferences to the
choice of representatives, with strong congruence between voter and party positions which are
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then translated in the formation of coalition governments and their policies (Dalton, Farrell and
McAllister, 2011).
Since independence, Ghana’s party system has undergone several transformations
through military interventions and bans on party activities. Leading members of the defunct
political parties and prodemocracy civic groups like the Catholic Bishops Conference, the media,
the Ghana Bar Association, the Trade Union Congress and other NGOs agitated for a return to
democracy. Views and interests of regional and ethnic-based political parties, Ashanti
nationalism and differences over ideology, and the appropriate type of governing system for
independent Ghana set the stage for antagonism between the emerging political traditions of the
Danquah-Busia and Nkrumah. The antagonism led to series of conflicts, particularly in Kumasi
and its environs, which is the stronghold of the main opposition party, the UGCC. Brutal street
clashes between supporters of political parties in pre and post-independence elections in the
1950s have given way today to debates on radio and television shows, especially in the Fourth
Republic (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). A variety of political developments from within
and outside the Gold Coast led to clashes between the colonial administration and Ghanaian
populace. However, the spread of liberal ideas, increasing literacy, growing awareness of
political developments in other parts of the world, and the continuous agitation for better living
conditions by Ghanaian veterans of World War II contributed immensely to creating an intense
political environment that pitched Ghanaian political elites and the masses against the colonial
administration. Street protests and industrial strikes led to violence, loss of life and property. For
example, the civil disturbances of February 28, 1948 and succeeding days, led to 29 deaths and
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237 injuries in Accra, Kumasi, Koforidua, Nsawam and Akuse (Bennion, 1962).17 A British
colonial investigative commission under the chairmanship of Aiken Watson (a British lawyer)
found that political, social and economic factors were responsible for the disturbances. The
Watson Commission’s recommendations led to the colonial administration adopting policies and
reforms towards self-rule in subsequent years (Bennion, 1962).
The British colonial rulers gradually handed power to Ghanaians under the leadership of
the first democratically-elected prime minister and later president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah.
During the pre- independence power struggle Nkrumah’s Convention People's Party (CPP)
assumed the mantle of government of the colonial state by winning the pre-independence
parliamentary elections of 1951 (22,780 votes out of 23,122) representing 98.5 percent of votes
cast; in 1954, the CPP won 79 out of 104 seats; and in 1956, the CPP won 71 of the 104 seats.
The UGCC later merged with other opposition parties to form the United Party (UP). The first
obvious reason for the CPP's victory was its slogan ‘self-government now’ and especially the
way it fired the imagination of the public with a clear vision for independence and prosperity.18
The CPP was socialist oriented and sought to develop Ghana through state owned enterprises and
industrial ventures. The other reasons are the positive achievements of the CPP government in its
first term of office (1951-54), (such as increasing number of Africans in higher positions in
government and the start of massive infrastructural development), its better organization, and the
popularity and charisma of Nkrumah (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).

17

The February 28, 1948 Christiansburg cross-road shooting incident refers to a civil protest when unarmed exservice men of WWII who marched peacefully to the seat of government to present a petition for better living
conditions were shot at by the colonial security forces. Three of the veterans were killed (Bennion, 1962).
18
The declared aim of the CPP was ‘to achieve full self-government now’ for the people of Ghana, to end all forms
of oppression and establish a democratic government, to secure and maintain complete unity of the entire country, to
promote a trade union movement and achieve better working conditions, to work for proper reconstruction of a
better Ghana, and to achieve a united and self governing West Africa (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).
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Three months after the abysmal performance of the opposition parties in the 1954
elections, an Ashanti-based political party, the National Liberation Movement (NLM) was
formed with the stated aim of safeguarding Ashanti national identity and reversing a trend that
threatened its traditional institutions with extinction (according to its leader, Baffour Osei Akoto,
a royal of the Ashanti monarchy). The NLM was ideologically inclined to liberal and capitalist
ideas such as wealth creation through encouraging the growth of private enterprises. The
emergence of the NLM as a successor of the UGCC affected the subsequent political history of
Ghana in two ways. It opened an era of violence, arson and anarchy as supporters of the two rival
political parties (NLM and CPP resorted to attack on each other) which reigned in Kumasi and
its immediate environs for about three years. It also raised questions as to what kind of
constitution independent Ghana should have and whether there should be any fresh elections
before independence. While the NLM insisted on a federal constitution, the CPP advocated for a
unitary one (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). To capture political power at the national level,
the NLM struck an alliance with Akyem Abuakwa (Akan leaders of the UGCC, J.B. Danquah
and William Ofori-Atta) and other ethnic and regional parties, such as the Anlo Youth
Organization (AYO) in the Volta region and the Northern People’s Party (NPP) (Asante and
Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).
In 1956, voters of British Togoland (a neighboring territory under British trusteeship)
voted for unification (58 percent in favor and 42 percent against) with the Gold Coast in the
plebiscite of May 9, 1956 (Krennerich, 2003). The formation of modern Ghana was then
complete. The Nkrumah government’s motion for independence was approved by the colonial
administration and a select committee was set up by the General Assembly to draw the
constitution of 1957. The committee sought the advice of a British constitutional expert, Sir
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Fredrick Bourne, who assisted the committee to include in the constitution a component of
devolution to regional levels through the establishment of regional administrations with some
levels of autonomy (Bennion, 1962). The constitution established a unitary government and a
unicameral legislature with the British queen as head of state, represented by a governor-general.
Executive power was vested in the prime minister and a cabinet of ministers who were made
responsible to the unicameral legislature (Krennerich, 2003). The Gold Coast was ready to claim
its independence.
Before the formal declaration of independence, antagonism started developing in the
various regions based on sectional interests. Despite the overwhelming percentage votes cast in
the plebiscite of May 1956 in favor of union with the Gold Coast, some people of southern
Togoland were still in open rebellion and even boycotted the independence celebrations because
they were not in favor of union with Ghana which effectively separated them from their relations
in Togoland. In Accra, tensions between the CPP and the Ga people grew worse and led to the
formation of the Ga Shifimokpee (the Ga Stand-Fast Association) in 1957 which later joined
forces with the opposition groups. A constitutional crisis emerged when the opposition boycotted
the Assembly and sent a delegation to London to press their case for a federal form of
government. The British government succeeded in persuading the two parties who finally agreed
that regional safeguards be included in the Independence constitution of 1957 to create regional
assemblies with some administrative autonomy (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).
To deal with the mounting ethnic tensions, the Nkrumah-led CPP government introduced
a number of what were widely perceived as harsh and radical political measures. Prominent
among them were the Avoidance of Discrimination Act of 1957, which forbade the formation of
political parties along ethnic, religious and regional lines and the Emergency Powers Act of
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1958. The latter empowered Nkrumah to separate the Brong-Ahafo area (which had voted
massively for the CPP in the 1956 elections) from the Ashanti region and created it as a separate
region with its own House of Chiefs. He also recognized a host of chiefs who were pro-CPP in
Ashanti as paramount chiefs. These changes contributed to some recurrent tensions between
Ashantis and Bonos (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). Despite these interventions, ethnic and
regional divides, particularly that between the Ashanti and Ewe, were to deepen after the
overthrow of the First Republic.

2.4.2. Elections and Election Management in Pre-Independent Ghana
The first nationwide parliamentary elections of the Gold Coast were held in 1951. The
leader of the CPP, Kwame Nkrumah, who was in prison custody for leading a nationwide
boycott of European goods to press home the demand for independence, was released from
prison custody by the Governor, Sir Charles Noble Arden-Clark, to head a new African
government. In March 1952, Kwame Nkrumah was designated prime minister and he appointed
an all-African cabinet responsible to the General Assembly. The prime minister submitted
proposals for a new constitution in June 1953 (Krennerich 2003). In April 1954 a new
constitution was introduced making the Gold Coast virtually self-governing. General elections
were conducted in June 1954 and 1956 in response to a pledge by the British secretary of state
for the colonies, that, if the newly elected legislature, by a reasonable majority, passed a
resolution calling for independence, a firm date for independence would be announced (Bennion,
1962). The General Assembly passed a resolution asking for immediate independence and Ghana
attained independence on March 6, 1957.
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Elections were managed by a ministry of the colonial government. The 1951 provincial
and the 1954 and 1956 general elections were managed by the colonial administration. The
government machinery managed the election process. Although the colonizers were suspected of
being in favor of continuous British control of the Gold Coast, the colonial administration was
seen as a neutral entity because the colonial leaders were not candidates in the elections.
Therefore the process created a relatively congenial electoral environment that fostered effective
competition among the African political parties. This, however, gave way to suspicion and
mistrust after Ghana became a republic and the EMB was managed by Ghanaians because of
executive control of the electoral process (Debrah, Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2010). The
president had the powers to hire and fire the chief justice who was the head of the electoral
commission. Nkrumah on December 11, 1963 dismissed Arku Korsah as the Chief Justice (and
overseer of elections) for acquitting persons accused of bomb attack on President Nkrumah’s
convoy at Kulungugu village in northern Ghana for lack of evidence (Bennion, 1962).

2.5. Political Development and Election Management in the First Republic (1960–1966)
Ghana inaugurated its First Republic, with Kwame Nkrumah as the first elected president
on July 1, 1960. The office of the governor-general and the post of the prime minister were
abolished in favor of a powerful executive president. President Nkrumah and the CPP regime
established a socialist one-party state, which was officially approved by a national referendum in
1964. While supporters of the CPP and people in government viewed the referendum as free and
fair, sections of the Ghanaian society, particularly the opposition parties described it as a rigged
referendum (Krennerich, 2003). The CPP candidates for the 1965 parliamentary elections were
declared elected without elections being held because an act of parliament had made Ghana a
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one party state and the CPP the only party legally accepted to contest elections in Ghana.19 There
was to be only one candidate for president. No other parties (most of which were regional, ethnic
or religious based had already been outlawed by the 1957 Constitution) and no non-CPP
candidates came forward to challenge the party slate in the general elections of 1965. Dissent
within the CPP had been suppressed to engender national unity. The parliamentary mandate was
extended for another five years without elections (Krennerich, 2003). The CPP government
enacted legislations and adopted policies to neutralize sectarianism and ensure national unity and
integration.20 Prominent among them was the Seven-Year Development Program of 1963 which
was aimed at restructuring the Ghanaian economy as well as tackle inequalities in the society.
2.5.1. Political Parties and their Influence on the Political Process in the First
Republic
After the passage of the Avoidance of Discrimination Act of 1957, all the opposition
parties (NLM, NPP, MAP, AYA, and the Ga Shifimokpee) formed the United Party (UP) in
1957 under the leadership of Kofi Abrefa Busia. However, the unity forged between the NLM in
Ashanti and the AYO in the Volta region was short-lived due to the killing of Colonel E.K.
Kotoka, an Ewe and a leading member of the National Liberation Council (NLC) in 1967 during
an attempted coup by Akan junior soldiers. The 1966 coup was in pursuit of the promotion of the
ethnic interests manifested in the formation of the UP. Therefore, the killing of Kotoka by Akan
junior officers and the subsequent takeover of the military government and the NLC leadership
by Major A. A. Afrifa, an Akan, marked the beginning of the parting of the ways between the
19

All 198 candidates were selected by the CPP Central Committee and were subsequently declared elected without
the scheduled election taking place (African Database on Elections, 2011).
20
The General Assembly during the CPP government passed the Avoidance of Discrimination Act of 1957 and the
Preventive Detention Act of 1958 to check sectarian tendencies and to detain offenders without trial for substantial
periods of time (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). Also the 1961 Education Act to address the problem of
inequality, especially the historically disadvantaged regions of the north led to the introduction of the Northern
Scholarship Scheme to avail students from that part of Ghana secondary education. Many highly educated
Ghanaians from the north have benefited from the scheme (Ghana Human Development Report 1997).
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Akans, particularly the Ashanti and the Ewe. By the time the NLC handed over power in October
1969 to civilian rule, the military regime had split into Ashanti and Ewe factions (Asante and
Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).
In the face of repression, internal mismanagement and economic problems, the Nkrumah
administration gradually lost the popular support that it had carefully nurtured during the
independence struggle (Krennerich, 2003). Dissatisfaction, coupled with President Nkrumah’s
overtures to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) communist bloc; his vocal attack on
neocolonialism; and his support for a Pan African agenda for a total liberation of the African
continent (epitomized by his famous declaration on the eve of Ghana’s independence, that “the
independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the
African continent”), made him a target of the West (McLaughlin and Owusu-Ansah, 1994). He
was perceived as an obstacle and a growing threat to the interests of the West in Africa. As a
result, on February 24, 1966, a CIA-supported military coup d’état led by senior military officers
toppled the CPP government and suspended the constitution, thus, terminating the
democratically-elected government (which had become authoritarian) of the First Republic of
Ghana (Blum, 1995). The National Assembly was dissolved and political parties proscribed.
The National Liberation Council Regime (1966-1969)
The coup leader made up military and police officers established a ruling junta called the
National Liberation Council (NLC). It legislated by decree and was led by General E. K. Ankrah
(who was succeeded by Brigadier Akwesi Amankwaa Afrifa). It should be noted that ethnic
sentiments and divides that characterized the 1954 period up to independence had been either
suppressed or some sections of the nation appeased by the devolution of power to the regional
assemblies. The NLC made efforts to maintain a regionally and ethnically balanced junta by
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constituting the NLC members to reflect the interests of the major ethnic groups and regions in
the country. Its members hailed from the Akan, Mole Dagbani, Ga and Ewe groups. Instead of
appealing to identity politics, the coup makers justified their actions by denouncing the
dictatorial and corrupt character of the Nkrumah’s administration, and promised to restore
democratic rule as soon as possible (Krennerich, 2003). The NLC kept its promise, constituted a
Consultative Assembly that drew the 1969 Constitution and conducted national elections on
August 29, 1969 that were won by Kofi Abrefa Busia’s Progress Party (PP). The PP won 53.88
percent of popular votes and 109 seats. The National Alliance of Liberals (NAL) won 30.81
percent and 29 of the 140 parliamentary seats (African Election Database on Ghana, 2012).

2.5.2. Elections and Election Management in the First Republic and After (1960-69)
After independence, Nkrumah’s government shifted to the independent, sole electoral
commissioner model to make the electoral commission independent of state control. Under this
model, the power to manage elections was transferred from the government ministry to an
independent election authority headed by a sole commissioner. However, executive controls over
the electoral commissioner in the First Republic undermined the attainment of credible elections.
Under the 1960 Republican Constitution, the chief justice (whose appointment was determined
and controlled by the president of the Republic) had oversight responsibility over elections.
Ultimately, the power to determine the finality of an election outcome lay with the president. The
major weakness of this system is that the executive had absolute control of its operations and
therefore not neutral. By 1964, when a single-party rule was inaugurated, the electoral
commissioner had lost his sense of impartiality, independence and neutrality on electoral matters
(Debrah, Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2010). His job as the overseer of election was rendered
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redundant as competition had almost died out under a one party state. The chief justice’s
allegiance was by default to the ruling party. There were no significant reforms during the one
party rule and the early years of the military regime that followed it, except a few amendments to
improve the electoral process. Counting of votes and the declaration of results aroused suspicion
among contending political parties. A major source of the suspicion was the counting of ballot
papers after voting had ended at the constituency centers. There were fears of ballot boxes being
stuffed or swapped in the course of transporting them from the polling stations to the
constituency counting centers. The use of opaque ballot boxes to conduct elections in enclosed
rooms also fueled countless allegations and rumors about ballot boxes being stuffed with ballots
by some voters who carried extra ballot papers in their pockets into the voting room or by party
officials and agents during the transportation of the boxes between polling stations to counting
and collation centers (Electoral Commission, 1993).

2.6. Political Development and Election Management in the Second Republic (1969–1972)
On September 30, 1969 Ghana officially returned to civilian rule. The constitution of the
Second Republic provided for a unicameral parliamentary system with a president as a
ceremonial head of state. Busia was named the head of government (prime minister) with
Edward Akuffo Addo (also of the PP) as head of state (Debrah, Asante and Gyimah-Boadi,
2010). The PP government policies focused on reviving the national economy and developing
the rural areas. These entailed the adoption of IMF and World Bank-led policies of strict
monetary control and adherence to budgetary estimates, as well as levying additional taxes for
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the revenue required for rural development. All these austerity measures culminated in the
adoption of drastic and unpalatable policies.21

2.6.1. Political Parties and their Influence on the Political Process in the Second
Republic
Despite the ban on sectarian political parties and government policies to stem divisive
tendencies in Ghanaian politics, the ethnic background of the leaders of the two leading parties in
the 1969 elections had a significant impact on the voting patterns. The National Alliance of
Liberals (NAL) led by K.A. Gbedemah (an Ewe) won all the seats in the Volta region except
Nkwanta and Kete Krachi (Akan-speaking enclaves in the Volta region) but did not win any seat
in the mainly Akan areas of the Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo, Western and Central regions. In contrast,
the Progress Party (PP) led by K.A. Busia (a Bono) won all the seats in Ashanti, Brong-Ahafo
and Central regions and a majority of seats in the two other Akan (Western and Eastern) regions
but won only two seats in the Volta region (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). Thus, the PP won
105 of the 140 seats in parliament, while NAL won 29 seats, and 6 went to three minor parties
and one independent candidate (African elections databank on Ghana, 2012).
To deal with inequalities in the Ghanaian society, the PP government initiated policies
and programs such as the 1970/71 One-Year Development Plan aimed at providing basic
essential services such as the supply of potable water, health and sanitary facilities to deprived
communities. However, the absence of Ewes in Busia’s cabinet and the disqualification of K.A.

21

In an attempt to promote a balanced budget in the economy, the PP government adopted bitter and unpalatable
policies such as the devaluation of the cedi; retrenchment in the public service, particularly in the state-owned
enterprises; withdrawal of some elite and employment-related privileges; disbanding the Trades Union Congress;
implementing the Aliens Compliance Order (which forced out of the country several thousands of African
migrants); and the dismissal of 568 senior officers from the civil and public service, some of whom successfully
challenged the legality of their dismissal (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).
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Gbedemah (an Ewe) and leader of the NAL, the main opposition party to the PP, has been cited
as a weak point in national integration by the Busia administration. Furthermore, the removal of
the most senior Ewe officers in the armed forces and the dismissal of 568 mostly Ewe public
servants, further deepened the Ashanti-Ewe rivalries (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).
The National Redemption and Supreme Military Councils Regime (1972-1979)
The Second Republic was short lived. Once again, the military overthrew the civilian
rule on January 13, 1972 after only 28 months in office, accusing it of corruption and
mismanagement. The coup happened at a time of falling living standards, high rates of inflation,
rising budget deficits, drops in foreign exchange revenue, rising unemployment, and increasing
indebtedness (Sulimani, 2007). Lower external demand and prices for Ghana’s raw materials
versus the higher prices for imported goods (fuel, food, and medical supplies) created serious
structural imbalances in Ghana’s economy. By the early 1980s it was evident that Ghana’s
economic growth and political development had nose-dived (Sulimani, 2007). As was the case
before, the coup leaders suspended the 1969 Second Republican Constitution, dissolved
parliament and proscribed all political parties. It was not possible for the PP government to solve
all Ghana’s economic problems in less than thirty months of being in office in an era of world
economic crises caused by world fuel price hikes and a general economic slowdown. Busia had
promoted Ignatius Kutu Acheampong to the high office of army commander partly as an Akan
colleague whom he could rely on. Therefore Acheampong’s overthrow of Busia’s government is
seen as a betrayal of the trust that Busia bestowed on him (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).
Acheampong assumed the position of head of state and chairman of the National
Redemption Council (NRC) that also ruled by decree. Initially, the NRC did not outline any plan
for a return to democratic rule; rather it sought to institutionalize military rule. The Ashanti-Ewe
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rivalry in the NLC and Busia’s PP governments informed the politics of the next military
administration. According to Rothchild (1978), the NRC and Supreme Military Council (SMC),
in addition to trying to reflect ethnic and regional balance, attempted to foster de-politicization
through ‘no party’ government. Towards this goal, the NRC/SMC formed a ‘Union Government’
(UNIGOV), composed of elected civilians and appointed military members. This project that
sought to position the SMC between the Nkrumah and Danquah-Busia traditions was presented
as an alternative to authoritarian rule under the military and multi-party civilian rule (Chazan,
1979). The plan for UNIGOV was approved in a referendum in March 1978 with 60.11 percent
‘Yes’ votes to 39.89 percent ‘No’ votes (African Election Database on Ghana, 2012).
The NRC’s plan to win northern votes in the referendum on the UNIGOV by appeasing
the chiefly ethnic groups with lands in the Northern and Upper Regions of Ghana undermined its
efforts of neutralizing cleavages and divides in Ghana. The military regime set up a committee
(the Alhassan Committee) in 1978 to determine in whose custody the Northern and Upper
Regions’ lands should be entrusted. The committee recommended that the lands be entrusted to
the four chiefly ethnic groups in the north.22 The Alhassan committee was skewed in favor of the
‘majority groups’ (Jönsson, 2007).23 Entrusting all the lands to the care of only four chiefly
groups---the Mamprusi, Dagomba, Gonja and Nanumba--- created groups of ‘landlords’ and
‘landless subjects.’ The consequences of this alienation of some ethnic groups was to be felt in
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The Northern and Upper Regions’ lands were taken by the colonial administration (and subsequently the
government of Ghana) on the attainment of independence until 1978 when they reverted to traditional authorities
(Jönsson, 2007).
23
The committee on ownership of land and position of tenants in Northern and Upper Regions, popularly known as
the Alhassan Committee, was established under I.R. Alhassan, a Dagomba. The committee was dominated by the
majority ethnic groups (six of the 12 members came from the majority groups in the Northern Region, two from
Upper Region and four from southern Ghana. None came from the 13 northern minority groups or those from the
Upper Region) (Jönsson, 2007).

46

the 1980s and 1990s which caused series of ethnic conflicts over land and chieftaincy as
discussed below.
Popular opposition increased in the wake of continued economic hardship. Between 1974
and 1981, for example, GDP dropped by 15 percent and cocoa exports, the leading source of
foreign exchange, shrank by more than 40 percent (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996). In response to
political pressure for further change, particularly within the ruling SMC, Acheampong was
forced to resign on July 5, 1978. He was replaced by Lt-Gen. Frederick W. K. Akuffo and the
SMC was reorganized into an explicitly transitional regime with the promise to hand over
political power to a civilian government to be elected on July 1, 1979. But the SMC was
overthrown in another coup d'état in June 1979 (Krennerich, 2003). Ashanti-Ewe rivalry surged
with the return to multi-party democracy, manifested in bloc voting in favor of their home region
parties in national elections as parties play the ethnic card during campaigns (Arthur, 2009).
The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council Regime (June-September 1997)
Dissatisfaction with the management of the economy, corruption by the senior military
rulers, discontent in the military over unsatisfactory conditions of service of the junior ranks and
the economic hardship in the country emboldened junior non-commissioned military officers to
overthrow the SMC regime on June 4, 1979. An Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)
was formed under the chairmanship of Jerry John Rawlings (an Ewe). The AFRC members were
junior military officers who cut across the regional and political divide in the country. Their
ideology was socialist oriented. Its aim was to clean Ghana of corruption and cultural decay
before returning the country to civilian administration. They launched a three-month ‘House
Cleaning Exercise’ in which top leaders of the ousted regime were arrested and executed by
firing squad for corrupt practices. Among the casualties were three former heads of state, A.A.
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Afrifa, I.K. Acheampong and F.W.K Akuffo, all from the Akan ethnic group. The military junta
also clamped down on smuggling, hoarding and other social vices with the stated aim of purging
the Ghanaian society of corruption and cultural deterioration. The AFRC handed over power to a
civilian government in September 1979 (Gyimah-Boadi, 1999).

2.6.2. Elections and Election Management in the Second Republic and After
(1969-1979)
Under the Second Republic, the NRC/SMC and AFRC regimes, two national elections
were held: the UNIGOV referendum and the 1979 elections that ushered in the Third Republic.
Minimal electoral reforms were implemented by the EC during the Second Republic. However,
for the first time, party agents were allowed to be present at the polling stations during the
counting of votes as official representatives of their parties to observe the process. The party
agents were not given copies of the results declaration sheets which constituted the official report
covering the election at the polling station because the EC feared that the party agents might
tamper with the figures and create confusion. Although a legitimate concern because technology
and communication were not well developed, given party agents photocopies of the results
would have enhanced transparency and built confidence in the work of the EC by the voting
public. Another important reform was the increase of constituencies from 104 to 140 (OseiKwame and Taylor, 1984).
The practice whereby elections were managed by a government ministry continued after
independence until 1969 when a constitutional commission of 1968 recommended the
establishment of a sole electoral commissioner with legal autonomy to manage the electoral
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process in Ghana.24 The 1969 elections were supervised by the first sole electoral commissioner,
V.C.R.A.C. Crabbe who was appointed by the prime minister (K.A. Busia). The commissioner
worked with public officers whom he recruited or co-opted to conduct the elections. He was
solely responsible for the process and the outcome of the elections. The sole electoral
commission model was an improvement over the government run EMB. It had deficiencies such
as not being neutral because the president hired and could fire him as well as manipulate the
results in his favor (Debrah, Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2010).
In the 1969 elections, competition was depressed by the official banning of the CPP and
any of its identifiable remnants. No party was allowed to use the name, symbol and artifacts of
the banned CPP. The NLC did lift the banned on political campaigning three months before the
election day but there was not enough time for new political parties to effectively mobilize
voters. Still political pundits and election watchers described the elections as free and fair. The
opposition parties, however, accused Commissioner Crabbe of colluding with the Progress Party
to ensure Busia’s victory. They alleged that the commission had been used to procure
electioneering equipment for Busia’s Progress Party and that most of the polling station election
returning officers were former workers of the Centre for Civic Education (that was headed by K.
A. Busia) (Crabbe, 1975 as cited in Gyimah-Boadi, 1996).
To address problems associated with the counting of votes, more reforms took place
during the SMC military regime. During the 1978 UNIGOV referendum, the SMC-appointed
commissioner, Justice I. K. Abban, introduced the counting of votes at the polling stations
immediately after the close of poll before transporting the ballot boxes to collation centers. This
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The NLC’s commission on electoral and local government reform under the chairmanship of J. B. Siriboe was set
up to recommend electoral procedures for the establishment of an independent electoral commission to be
responsible for the conduct of elections. An electoral commission with Justice V.C.R.A.C. Crabbe as the interim
electoral commissioner was thus set up (Gyimah-Boadi, 1991).
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reform reduced the risk of stuffing ballot boxes and swapping of the content of boxes. The
reform also contributed to the referendum being described by observers and analysts as free and
fair (Gyimah-Boadi, 1996). Chazan and Le Vine (1979) assert that the courage exhibited by the
commissioner halted the SMC’s plot to impose UNIGOV on Ghanaians. The electoral
commission was steadfast and resolute in dealing with malpractices and election-related
grievances. Although the sole electoral commissioners were not spared the criticisms that they
were being controlled by the executive and therefore not neutral and impartial, they generally
conducted the 1969, 1978 and 1979 elections that were widely perceived to be free and fair
(Ayee, 1998). In 1979 Commissioner Justice Kingsley-Nyinah demonstrated neutrality and
impartiality throughout the conduct of the 1979 elections that elected President Limann (Debrah,
Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2010). The AFRC maintained the election timetable set by the SMC,
a new constitution was crafted and multi-party elections were held in July 1979, just two months
after taking over power to implement its “House Cleaning Exercise.” The Constitution of the
Third Republic was drawn up by a constituent assembly appointed by the SMC. It came into
effect in 1979 and provided for a presidential system and a unicameral parliament (Krennerich,
2003).

2.7. Political Development and Election Management in the Third Republic (1979–1982)
Ghana once again returned to civilian rule on September 24, 1979 with the inauguration
of the president-elect, Hilla Limann of the People’s National Party (PNP). The PNP won 62
percent of valid votes cast and 71 seats; Victor Owusu led the Popular Front Party (PFP), which
won 38 percent of the votes and 42 seats; the United National Convention (UNC) won 13 seats
and the Action Congress Party (ACP) 10 seats. The election went into a runoff after none of the
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ten presidential candidates were able to obtain more than 50 percent of the votes in the first
round. Hilla Limann was a Sissala (a sub-group of the Mole-Dagbani group) from the Upper
Region and the first president of Ghana to hail from the north (Arthur, 2009).
The PNP government (the political heir of Nkrumah's CPP) faced a colossal task of
revamping Ghana’s economy. It established the constitutional institutions such as an independent
judiciary headed by a Supreme Court, which protected individual rights, and other autonomous
institutions like the electoral commissioner and the ombudsman (a government appointee who
investigates complaints by private persons against the government). The PNP government
generally respected democracy and individual human rights but failed to halt the continuing
decline in the economy (The Ghana Guide, 2010). Ghana had been under military rule since
1972; freedom of speech, press and association had been severely curtailed and the economy had
been mismanaged for most of the period. But the brief period of the AFRC raised the hope of
Ghanaians that wrong-doing in public life and acts that negatively affected the governance of
Ghana would not go unpunished (The Ghana Guide, 2010).

2.7.1. Political Parties and their Influence on the Political Process in the Third
Republic
In practice, however, the PNP administration was under the observation of officers
associated with the former AFRC, many of whom were retired by the Limann government
(Krennerich, 2003). Ghana’s economy continued to decline due to mismanagement, corruption
and an unfavorable world economic order (under which developed countries determined the
price of primary commodities) as well as Ghana’s continued overreliance on primary products
for export. The support base of the civilian government eroded as the new administration
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struggled to stabilize the economy amidst internal wrangling for power within the ruling PNP
(Krennerich, 2003). As a result of the continuous downward spiral of the country under
successive military regimes and the Limann administration’s failure to arrest the situation, Jerry
John Rawlings burst onto the political scene again by leading another coup on December 31,
1981, this time referred to as the 31st December Revolution. As was the case in previous coup
d’états, the democratic structures and the Third Republican constitution were scrubbed.

2.7.2. Election Management and Electoral Reforms in the Third Republic
(1979-1981)
The Limann administration did not supervise any elections, but the practice of appointing
a sole electoral commissioner to oversee elections continued from the Second into the Third
Republic. The government did not run its full tenure of four years due to the coup in December
1981 and no significant electoral reforms could take place (Ghana at a Glance, 2012)

2.8. Political Development and Electoral Reforms during the PNDC Regime (1982-1992)
Rawlings again became head of state and chairman of the military-cum-civilian sevenmember Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), which claimed full executive and
legislative powers. The initial seven members (made up of four military personnel and three
civilians) came from among the northern ethnic groups, the Akan, Ewe and Ga. The expanded
membership later followed a similar pattern. The PNDC’s aim was to preside over political and
economic reforms (Gyimah-Boadi, 1999).
The PNDC set out to implement far-reaching reforms that aimed to put the country back
on the path to democracy and development. To develop and implement the strategy for
democratic restoration, the PNDC set up a National Commission for Democracy. It also
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decentralized government by setting up regional administrative structures and elected district
assemblies to bring governance closer to the people. It launched a form of ‘grass-roots
participatory democracy’ couched in radical populist rhetoric with the theme “Power to the
People.” The regime started to reform state institutions and created mass organizations; it also
banned political parties from operating and silenced political opposition, especially the PFP and
the CPP, through systematic repression like media censorship of political parties with the stated
aim of entrenching the December 31 Revolution (Gyimah-Boadi, 1999). The PNDC claimed to
represent the working class and the masses across all political divides in Ghana for whom the
message “Power to the People” resonated.
The political system introduced by the PNDC regime began with strict central control
from the national headquarters. The government superimposed a centralized and controlled
administration over a non-party decentralized system, starting with district level elections in
1988/89 aimed at mobilizing rural support for the regime for national reconstruction. The ‘Power
to the People’ concept was hailed by some Ghanaians who saw it as a model of decentralization
in Africa. Local level elections continued to be held every six years (1998/99, 2004, 2010) there
elections with marked improvement in the conduct of subsequent elections. However, according
to Oquaye (1995), the PNDC strengthened its grip on power without any plans to revert to
democratic rule.
Meanwhile the PNDC signed onto a program of economic recovery that was heavily
supported and dictated by the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). By the mid-1980s, Ghana had become Africa's showcase example of
structural adjustment but with disastrous economic and social consequences like the
retrenchment of workers, increasing poverty levels and the end to subsidies and other safety nets.
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The country's GDP grew at rates of 6 to 7 percent annually from 1984 to 1988--the highest in
sub-Saharan Africa, at the time. These considerable economic accomplishments, however, began
to stall in the early 1990s, which created added economic hardship and dissatisfaction with
military rule (Hutchful, 1997).
Under increasing foreign and domestic pressure from donors, who by the late 1980s had
started warning that aid to developing countries would be tied to democratization and good
governance, the PNDC revised its policy and considered an eventual return to democratic rule.25
However, the pressure by opposition parties and civil society groups for a more participatory
government resulted in an accelerated return to democratic governance in 1992. A new
constitution was drafted by a consultative assembly and approved by a “Yes” vote of 92.59
percent to 7.59 percent “No” votes in a referendum held on April 28, 1992. The Fourth Republic
was inaugurated on January 7, 1993 (Oquaye, 1995).

2.8.1. Civil Society’s Influence on the Political Process during the PNDC Regime
A share of the credit must go to civil society for the great improvements made in the
electoral system since PNDC regime. Prominent persons and organizations used public forums
and the media to put pressure on the PNDC government to return Ghana to democratic rule.26
Examples include Adu Boahen (chairman of the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ)), the
Christian Council, the Conference of Catholic Bishops, Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), and
25

An external factor which pushed the government to conduct the elections was linked to the ‘good governance’
principle adopted by the World Bank and the West. This principle (regular, free and fair elections and strengthening
of democratic institutions) was to become one of the determinants of aid for some developing countries. In its
November 1989 report entitled “Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth,” the World Bank had
decried a 'crisis of governance' and warned that marked improvement in governance would become a condition for
aid in the future (Oquaye, 1995).
26
Albert Adu-Boahen’s memorable speech at the Danquah memorial lectures in 1988 contributed to breaking the
“culture of silence” (suppressed freedom of speech as a result of fear of intimidation and harassment by the military
regime) that was imposed on the Ghanaian polity by the PNDC regime. The PNDC eventually lifted the ban on
multiparty activities, which led to several political parties emerging on the political scene since 1992 (Fobih, 2010).
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the Ghana Bar Association (GBA). Others are the Ghana Legal Literacy and Resource
Foundation and domestic poll-watching bodies like Ghana Alert (led by veteran journalist Ben
Epson), the Network of Domestic Election Observers (NEDEO) (led by Joseph KingsleyNyinah, a retired Appeals Court judge and later EC chairman). The Coalition of Domestic
Election Observers (CODEO) also played significant role in influencing the outcome of
elections. International election observers such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the
Commonwealth, EU and AU observer groups, the Charter Foundation and the International
Federation of Electoral Systems (IFES) undertook a series of activities such as voter education,
election monitoring and funding support to the EC.27

2.8.2. Election Management and Electoral Reforms during the PNDC Regime
(1982-1992)
Bogged down by frequent military coups and counter coup d’états since 1966, repeated
attempts to install liberal democracy suffered serious setbacks until 1988. Ironically, the most
comprehensive and far-reaching reforms of the electoral process in Ghana started under a
military dictatorship, during the PNDC regime, particularly between 1988 and 1993. To kick
start the reform of elections management in Ghana, the PNDC established institutions to oversee
the reforms. One such institution was the National Commission for Democracy (NCD), which
evolved from the electoral commission of the Third Republic. The NCD was composed of judges
and experienced public and civil servants and headed by a member of the PNDC, Justice D. F.
Annan (Debrah, Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2010). In 1984 the NCD started a public discourse
27

The NEDEO comprised prominent national organizations such as the Christian Council, the Catholic Secretariat,
the Federation of Muslim Councils, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Mission, the Ghana National Association of Teachers
(GNAT), and the National Union of Ghana Students. The MFJ was formed by organizations opposed to the PNDC
military rule with the stated objective of restoring multiparty democracy and the rule of law in Ghana (Ghana Home
Page News Archives, 2012).
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on the future form of democratic government for the country. The NCD published its “Blue
Book” on the creation of district political authorities and the conduct of elections which
culminated in the district elections of 1988/89 and the subsequent establishment of 110 district
assemblies. An Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) was also established by the
PNDC to oversee a referendum over the constitution and the 1992 national elections. These
reforms marked a significant step in the transition to democracy, which led to the presidential
and parliamentary elections in November and December 1992 (Ghana Home Page News
Archives, 2012). To set the stage for elections at the national level, the first comprehensive
voters register was compiled in 1987. Although it was described as flawed and bloated, the
registrar was a first step to streamline the voting system (Oquaye, 1995). One major strategic
reform by the PNDC that has shaped the electoral system in Ghana was contained within the new
national constitution of 1992. This set the stage for a major transformation of the electoral
commission of Ghana. For the first time in Ghana, in the 1992 general elections, the presiding
officers of polling stations declared the results publicly at the polling stations and gave a signed
copy of the results to each party agent to send to the candidate or party while other copies were
sent to the constituency counting center where collation of the results from all polling stations
within the constituency were done (Debrah, Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2010).
The fact that this new Chapter in Ghana’s political history was led by Rawlings, a critic
of Western style democracy, has generated debate among political pundits. Until the early
1990s, Rawlings had divorced democracy from a system of registering voters and getting them to
vote every four years.28 Not only had he shown a preference for populist institutions such as
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According a write up on the PNDC, Rawlings strongly believed that party politics had hitherto produced two
forms of abuse of power—the “corrupt dictatorship” of the Kofi Abrefa Busia regime (1969-72) and the “arrogant
dictatorship” of the Nkrumah (1957-66) and Limann (1979-1981) governments (Ghana Home Page News Archives,
2012).

56

Committees for Defense of the Revolution (CDRs), but also, as late as 1990, he spoke against
party politics.29 To him, Western institutions and practices such as elections negated democracy
because he did not trust that elections could produce the right leaders for Ghana (Oquaye, 1995).
If Rawlings did not believe in multi-party politics and he could not accept an alternative to his
revolutionary process, why did he initiate action to draft the 1992 constitution, conduct the 1992
elections and lead the transition to civilian rule in 1993? According to Oquaye (1995), the
answer is that Rawlings was willing to shift positions in diverse ways as long as he continued to
hold on to power. This notwithstanding, Rawlings is credited for being an adroit reformist. He
responded quickly to the advice of his overseas public relations consultants in London on the
probable changes in the West’s policy towards African dictators (due to the end of the Cold War
and the trend towards political liberalization on the African continent itself) (Oquaye, 1995).
Rawlings formally announced Ghana’s return to constitutional rule on May 10, 1991,
four days before the crucial donors' conference in Paris from May 14-15, 1991 (Oquaye, 1995).
This could be seen in a positive light as a show of patriotism and functional leadership. After all,
Rawlings could have ignored the warning of the donors and advisers as other African leaders like
Gaddafi and Mugabe and bear the consequences of untold hardship to the citizenry.
The ban on political party activities was lifted on May 18, 1992, followed by presidential
elections in November of the same year. Rawlings, who ran in the election as the leader and
presidential candidate of the NDC party, won the elections by 58.4 percent (against the 34.4
percent won by Albert Adu Boahen of the NPP). Whilst international elections observers like
the Commonwealth Observer Group (COG) described the election as free and fair, there were
serious irregularities and lapses in voter-registration figures and malpractices at the polling
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Speech read at Kotoka International Airport before attending the ECOWAS Summit in Lagos (Oquaye, 1995).
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stations.30 The voters registers used in the 1992 general elections were alleged to have contained
a number of technical errors (including a larger than statistically possible number of registered
voters) caused by double entries due to human and technical errors. There were also software
problems and the electoral commission could not remove the names of voters who had expired
since 1987 (Electoral Commission, 2012).31 Consequently, the major opposition political parties
withdrew from the parliamentary elections (Ayee, 2002).32 The NDC won 189 of the 200 seats in
the largely uncontested parliamentary elections of December 1992. The Every Ghanaian Living
Everywhere (EGLE) party won 1 seat, independent candidates won 2 seats and the National
Convention Party (NCP) won 8 seats. The EGLE and NCP merged with the NDC and Kow
Nkensin Arkaah, leader of NCP, became the vice president. As in the Third Republic, the Fourth
Republican constitution provided for a presidential system of government with a unicameral
parliament. The NDC continued with its policy of reforms and national reconstruction through
decentralizing power to the district levels and beyond. Despite the lack of parliamentary
representation, opposition parties played a constructive role outside parliament through the use
of a growing media and the general public’s increasing awareness of democratic practices such
as tolerance of opposing views, regular elections being institutionalized and building institutions
of state to drive the course of democracy (Ayee, 2002).
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International election monitoring teams from the Organization of African Unity, the Commonwealth of Nations,
and the Carter Center also endorsed the results of the presidential election, although with reservations in some cases.
The national House of Chiefs also stated that the elections were free and fair (Ghana Home Page News Archives,
2012) .
31
The voter registration figures indicated that 9.2 million voters were registered in Ghana. This figure is suspect
because Ghana’s population was approximately 17 million, many of whom (nearly 50 percent) were under the age
of eighteen (Gyimah-Boadi, 1999).
32
The New Patriotic Party (NPP), People’s National Convention (PNC), National Independent Party (NIP) and the
People’s Heritage Party (PHP) disputed the results and withdrew from the parliamentary election scheduled for
December 1992. The evidence of rigging was compiled by the NPP in ‘The Stolen Verdict:’ Ghana, November 1992
Presidential Election (Accra: New Patriotic Party, 1993). The book was endorsed by the Nkrumahist parties (Ayee,
2002).
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2.9. Political Development and Electoral Reforms in the Fourth Republic (1993 - June
2012).
The president-elect, Jerry John Rawlings was sworn into office as the first president of
the Fourth Republic on January 7, 1993. The NDC supervised the 1996 and 2000 elections. It
continued the reforms started by the PNDC but initially faced criticism of running a one-party
government which lacked the benefit of strong opposition up to 1996. In accordance with the
1992 constitution, a permanent, neutral and autonomous electoral commission was established.
On December 7, 1996 Ghanaians again went to the polls to choose a president and
legislators. Once again the incumbent president, Rawlings, won the election with a wide margin
of 57.4 percent and 133 of the 200 parliamentary seats. Kuffour and his party, the NPP, won 39.6
percent and 60 parliamentary seats while Edward Mahama’s PNC won 3 percent of votes (Ayee,
1998). The 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections were more competitive than the 1992
elections because the EC did a better job of voter registration (an entirely new voter register was
compiled for the 1996 elections) that was devoid of the problems associated with the 1992
voters’ register. The EC also educated the public as well as political parties on the voting
procedure. Election observers described the 1996 elections as fairer and freer.33 One factor that
certainly contributed to the competitiveness of the elections was that the two main opposition
parties, the People’s Convention Party (the CPP was renamed PCP because of a ban on the use of
old parties’ names at the time) and the NPP formed ‘the Great Alliance’ to contest the election.
This alliance has been described as a marriage of convenience because the two political
traditions have different ideological inclinations and have been staunch opponents in Ghana’s
33

International observer groups for the 1996 elections included the Commonwealth Observer Group, the European
Union, the US-based National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Organization of African Unity. All issued reports
describing the elections as free and fair (Gyimah-Boadi, 1999).
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politics. As was anticipated by political pundits and observers, ‘the Great Alliance’ could not put
up a unified opposition to the NDC at the polls due to squabbles and differences between party
operatives at the national and constituency levels. Rawlings’ re-election ushered him into a
second four-year term in office as president of Ghana from January 7, 1997 to January 6, 2000.
This marked an era in the political history of Ghana because, for the first time, an elected
government had completed its term of office and was re-elected in competitive elections
(Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2011).
In the third presidential and parliamentary elections of the Fourth Republic, held on
December 7, 2000, Rawlings was constitutionally barred from contesting the elections. Instead
of seeking to amend the constitution to allow a third term as many others have done elsewhere,
Rawlings nominated his vice president, John Evans Atta-Mills, as the presidential candidate for
the NDC. The 2000 elections were held at a time of widespread disenchantment with the ruling
NDC government, particularly in urban areas where problems such as increasing employment,
inflation and, a depreciating currency had become burdensome. Furthermore, reports in the
media of corruption among government functionaries reduced the chances of the NDC retaining
power (Ayee, 2002). In the 2000 elections, none of the seven candidates for president won a
clear majority of more than 50 percent of the valid votes cast (as stipulated by the 1992
Constitution). Therefore a runoff took place on December 28, 2000 between the two parties that
won the largest number of votes, the NPP (48.4 percent) and the NDC (44.8 percent). John
Agyekum Kuffour of the NPP won with 56.9 percent of valid vote cast against 43.1 percent votes
for John Evans Atta-Mills of the NDC. Kuffour was sworn in as the second president of the
Fourth Republic on January 7, 2001 marking another historic journey in Ghana’s march towards
democracy. This was the first time in Ghana that an elected president has handed over the mantle
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of administration to another elected president of an opposition party. Upon taking power, the
NPP administration embarked on an economic stabilization and growth program and led Ghana
to adopt the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt cancellation program of the West to
reduce Ghana’s foreign debt burden and reduce poverty. Substantial amounts of Ghana’s income
that would have gone into servicing and repaying foreign debts were channeled into poverty
reduction programs. As of 2001, Ghana’s economic growth was on course to becoming a low
medium income nation with an annual GDP rate (PPP) of 3.97 percent rising steadily to 8.07
percent in 2008 (Ghana Living Standard Survey (GSS), 2009). President Kuffour won a second
four-year term with 52.45 percent of the votes (Atta-Mills won 44.64 percent) in the December
2004 presidential elections. The NPP won 128 and the NDC 94 of the 230 parliamentary seats.
During the rule of the NPP, many of the reforms adopted over the years were consolidated and
deepened. Confidence-building reforms such as shifting from opaque to transparent ballot boxes,
to voters casting their votes in small enclosures placed in the full view of the public (rather than
in a completely enclosed structure) were institutionalized. Having served two four-year terms in
office, John Kuffour was constitutionally barred from contesting the 2008 elections (Aryee,
2002).
On December 7, 2008, the fifth elections of the Fourth Republic took place but did not
produce an outright winner. A runoff was conducted on December 28, and a third round of
elections were held a week later in the Tain district (that could not vote during the runoff due to
logistical problems) to determine the winner of the closest and most competitive elections in
Ghana’s history. John Evans Atta-Mills of the NDC (presidential candidate for the NDC in 2000,
2004 and 2008) won the elections by a very narrow margin. He won 50.23 percent and Nana
Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo of the NPP won 49.77 percent of vote (Electoral Commission,
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2009). The NDC won 114 and the NPP 107 of the 230 parliamentary seats while the rest went to
independent candidates. The Atta-Mills/NDC administration continued with the NPP’s economic
growth agenda. The NDC’s Better Ghana Agenda program (dubbed “The Ghana Shared Growth
and Development Agenda”) has reduced inflation to a single-digit figure (8 percent in March
2012) and produced a GDP growth rate of 13 percent in 2011(Ghana Statistical Service, 2012).
The sixth successive presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled to take place
on December 7, 2012 (Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2011). The electoral process in Ghana
has improved drastically over time, gaining the trust and confidence of the populace as
evidenced by the acceptance of the results of five consecutive elections by the public and
opposition political parties since 1992. Democratic institutions such as the electoral commission,
the judiciary and the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) are
being strengthened through legislative reforms, restructuring, and public sector reforms. These
bodies are gradually institutionalizing democratic values and practices such as the tolerance of
opposing views, participation in public decision making, and the conduct of regular elections
(Whitefield, 2009).
Vital to this evolutionary process is the decentralization of power to regional, district,
local and unit levels across the country. As of March 2012, there were 212 District Assemblies
(170 old districts and 42 newly created ones). The districts are administered by assemblies made
up of elected and appointed members. The district chief (DCE) executives who head the
assemblies are appointed by the president and approved by a two-thirds majority vote of the
Assembly (Ministry of Local Government, 2011). The approval of the DCE by the Assembly
members is to ensure that participatory processes of selecting the district mayors are followed as
well as to foster accountability of local government officials to the citizenry. Decentralization

62

has been taking root and public participation in local governance is gaining momentum. There is
a high degree of public interest in participating in local decision making processes at the
assembly and local council levels. The progress in democratization is attributable to a neutral EC
that has consistently reviewed and reformed its systems and procedures. This adaptability has
enabled the EC to conduct consistently credible elections over the years (Fall, et al., 2011).
2.9.1. Ghana’s Electoral Commission of 1993
The transition to the Fourth Republic suffered many setbacks because of a public
perception of government’s manipulation and interference in the work of the hurriedly appointed
INEC (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009). The INEC managed the 1992 constitutional referendum and the
presidential and parliamentary elections of 1992. The INEC, like almost all of its predecessors,
was viewed by politicians, especially those from opposition parties, with suspicion. They feared
and denounced the manipulation of elections through the ruling parties’ control of the INEC. The
major political parties that participated in the November 1992 presidential election, including the
NPP, PNC, PHP and even the NDC, complained of deficiencies, challenged the results and
subsequently the three parties boycotted the presidential elections of December 1992. These
challenges informed the drafters of the 1992 Constitution to provide for a neutral and
independent Election Management Board. The drastic changes were timely because Ghanaians
were tired of military rule. Credit goes to the PNDC, particularly Justice D. F. Annan (member
of the PNDC, a renowned judge and chairman of the NCD), leaders of the EC, particularly
Chairman Afar Djan for being consistent, impartial and ready to learn from their experiences.
They have galvanized the support and energy of civil society groups and political parties to
gradually develop and build credibility in the work of the EC (Fall, et al., 2011).
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The Electoral Commission was established by the 1992 Constitution, in Articles 43, 44,
45 and 46, and the 1993 Electoral Commission Act 451, clause 125.34 The constitution specifies
the composition, selection, duration of term, conditions of service as well as the salaries of EC
members (Article 451). The Constitution also establishes the core functions of the commission,
the composition of its mandated entities, financing and auditing of its operations (Electoral
Commission, 2011).
The EC is composed of seven members, including a chairperson, two deputy chairpersons
and four other members appointed by the president in consultation with the Council of State, an
advisory body. The EC manages its staff almost entirely on its own discretion in accordance with
Act 451, section 8 of the constitution. The commission recruits and appoints its officers
autonomously, on competitive bases in consultation with the Public Service Commission through
objective criteria. Almost all vacancies are published in the media. Qualified applicants are
shortlisted and interviewed. The best qualified candidates get the job, purely on merit and not by
any political considerations (Debrah, Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2010). This process is a marked
improvement over the previous practices of recruiting EC members. The right persons have been
recruited to enhance the quality of the work of the EC.
The EC has a notably wide mandate, with powers that extend beyond the strict
organization of elections, to monitoring the activities of political parties, including party
registration, policing their activities and auditing their accounts Fall et al., 2011. The commission
is organized into two divisions: the Operations Division made up of four departments (the
34

The constitutional provisions for the holding of elections are contained in Chapter 7 (Articles 42–54) of the 1992
Constitution and supported by the Electoral Commission Act of 1993 (Act 451) at the national level and the Local
Government Act of 1993 (Act 462), for district and local elections. Article 51 of the 1992 Constitution and Section
12 of Act 451 empower the Electoral Commission to ‘make regulations for the effective performance of its
functions, under the Constitution and any other law; in particular, registration of voters and the conduct of public
elections and referenda, including providing for voting by proxy’ (AfriMAP and Open Society of West Africa,
2007).
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Elections, Training, Research, and Monitoring and Evaluation departments) and the Division of
Finance and Administration (Human Resources and General Services, Finance and Information
Technology departments). See Appendix 1.
Despite the significant strides Ghana has made towards consolidating democratic
processes, it faces legal, constitutional, operational and capacity constraints and challenges.
Some political pundits and analysts view the appointment of the EC chair and the two deputies
by the president without the involvement of political parties and other interest groups are not
sufficiently far-reaching. There is no requirement for the president to obtain the consent or
consultation with a body like the parliament which reflects the political configuration of the
country. The president is only required to seek a non-binding opinion of the Council of State,
whose members are mostly appointees of the head of state Fall et al., 2011. This does not build
confidence in the legitimacy of the process, or the EC itself. The robustness of this arrangement
to withstand partisan political machination is yet to be tested because as of 2012 the first set of
leaders of the EC (the chairman and his deputies) were still in office (since they were appointed
in 1992).
Other Reforms in the Fourth Republic
Once in office, the Rawlings government appointed the leaders of the new electoral
commission with Kwadjo Afari Djan as the first chairman. Afari Djan is credited with setting up
of the EC and working tirelessly to develop it to an enviable status as one of the best election
management bodies on the African continent Fall et al., 2011. Another important reform was the
establishment of a national Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) by an act of parliament
(Act 452) in July 1993 to educate the electorates. It has branches in all regions and districts of
the country. They lead voter education campaigns during general and local elections by working
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closely with civil society groups to achieve national coverage (AfriMAP and Open Society
Initiative for West Africa, 2007). The NCCE has a broad mandate with regard to political
participation.35
To improve the trust, confidence and working relationships between the commission and
registered political parties as well as to enhance transparency in its operations, the EC instituted
the Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) in 1994. IPAC has provided and still provides an
innovative mechanism for the EC to meet representatives of political parties and other
stakeholders that support the electoral process. Other important issues discussed include election
preparations, confidence building measures like the issue of photo identity cards, provision of
transparent ballot boxes and determining dates for presidential and parliamentary elections to
avoid the Band-wagon Syndrome.36 IPAC also advocated the need to involve the political parties
in all stages of the political process. The EC developed a code of conduct for political parties to
improve relations between the parties and the behavior of political parties’ members during
elections (Debrah, Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2010).
The IPAC consists of representatives of the various political parties and the EC with
representatives of development partners invited to participate in meetings. Its principal function
is to serve as a channel of information between the EC and the parties and to build consensus on
contested electoral issues. This participatory and consensus-building mechanism has been
sustained and replicated in monthly meetings at the regional and district levels. The IPAC code
covers the campaigns, activities undertaken outside the campaigns, elections, mode of
35

The NCCE is mandated to create and sustain awareness of the principles and objectives of the Constitution; to
educate and encourage the public to defend the Constitution; and to formulate, implement and oversee programs
intended to inculcate in Ghanaians awareness of their civic responsibilities and an appreciation of their rights and
obligations as free people (Electoral Commission, 2012).
36
The 1992 election in which parliamentary and presidential elections were held on different days was affected by
the Bandwagon Syndrome in which the outcome of the presidential elections prejudices voters’ choices in the
parliamentary elections. In subsequent elections, both presidential and parliamentary elections were held the same
day (Electoral Commission, 2012).
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application, implementation and dispute resolution mechanisms. The grievance investigation
team is made up of political parties, the EC and NGOs such IEA at the national, regional and
district levels. IPAC’s conflict resolution committee has the power of sanction in the form of
reprimands. The code also includes the right of victims to bring a criminal or civil action before
ordinary courts Fall et al., 2011. It has drastically improved the electoral process.37
In the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections, transparent ballot boxes were
introduced with donor support to forestall allegations and suspicion of ballot boxes being stuffed.
According to the EC, the transparency of the voting process led to higher voter turnout, which
shot up from 56.2 percent in 1992 to 78.2 percent in 1996 (Electoral Commission, 2012). Since
the mid 1990s, the EC has consistently reviewed and updated the electoral register as well as the
electoral process. A compilation of a credible electoral roll to replace the bloated 1987 register
took place in 1995 with the active collaboration and participation of the political parties. The
new voters register greatly enhanced the credibility of the 1996 elections (Electoral Commission,
1999).38 Moreover, the transparency in the collation and declaration of elections results has
improved over the years. It has boosted public confidence in the electoral process.39

37

A major achievement of IPAC is the development of a code of ethics for political parties which regulates interparty relationships and the behaviour of the parties during political contests. The formation of a Media Watch
Committee to monitor the reporting of all election-related issues in the local media for accuracy and to maintain the
integrity of the EC is another success story. IPAC has contributed to constant review of the training and
remuneration of poll workers in order to enhance their competence and ensure their commitment to duty (Debrah,
Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2010).
38
In order to allay the fears which the anomalies in the existing electoral roll had generated in certain sections of the
voting public, the EC ensured that about eighty thousand party agents observed the 1995 registration exercise. The
party agents were trained together with the EC’s registration officials. This obviously gave the party agents a lot of
insight into the registration process, a knowledge which they could share with their party colleagues. The political
parties subsequently accepted the new registers without any complaints and upon request they were each supplied
with a set of the newly compiled registers. This fulfilled a crucial requirement in the organization of free and fair
elections and eliminated the source of a major dispute that had undermined the credibility of the 1992 presidential
and parliamentary elections (Electoral Commission, 2012).
39
After the collation of results, the total votes obtained by each candidate is recorded on a constituency results
declaration form duly signed by the polling station returning officer and countersigned by agents of the candidates or
political parties, with each agent given a copy. The results are then announced by the returning officer and the
winner declared for parliamentary contests. A copy of the results is posted in a conspicuous place at the counting
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The EC uses technology to enhance its effectiveness. In 1995 the introduction of optical
mark readers (OMR) into the voter registration system in connection with data capturing
improved the 1995 voter registration exercise significantly. It has also installed a Local Area
Network (LAN) and Wide Area Network (WAN) at its head office linking all computers located
on the premises to regional and district offices for quick and effective communication and
transmitting of election results (Electoral Commission, 1999).
Another important step to strengthen the electoral process even further has taken place.
The EC made a huge improvement in the electoral process when it completed the compilation of
a biometric voters’ register, which took place from March 24 to May 12, 2012. The objective of
the biometric voters’ register is to eliminate multiple voting, delete ‘ghost’ names from the
register and other irregularities associated with the voters registers (Electoral Commission,
2012).
In sum, the performance of the electoral commission has gradually improved over time,
due largely to the quality of the staff (especially its leadership) as well as the support and
positive attitude of the other key players in the electoral process such as political parties, the
media, state institutions and civil society organizations (CSOs).

2.9.2. Political Parties and their Influence on the Electoral Process in the Fourth
Republic
Elections in Ghana since 1996 have been competitive because the NDC and NPP serve as
credible opposition parties to government. The parties mobilize voters and political elites around
the two political traditions (Nkrumah and Danquah-Busia). The Ashanti, Bono and Ahafo and
centre and the returning officer transmits the final results to the commission through the district officer and the
regional director (Debrah, Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2010).
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Akyem (Akan sub-groups) tend to gravitate towards the Danquah-Busia tradition. The believers
of the Nkrumah tradition cut across all ethnic groups. Rawlings’ tradition is most favored by the
Ewe, but has large following across all ethnic divides. These political traditions cut across social
cleavages such as ethnicity, region, urban/rural and social status. Both the NPP and NDC parties
have established institutional networks in all the regions of the country, except the Volta and
Ashanti Regions, with bloc voting pattern (electorates vote amass for their home region or party).
Despite these strongholds, the outcomes of elections are determined by swing regions such as the
Central, Western, Greater Accra and Brong Ahafo Regions which contain a large number of
floating voters who are not party loyalists and may switch their vote based on government’s
performance (Arthur, 2009).
Representatives of political parties are involved at every step of the voting process on
election day, and this has helped to increase transparency and instill trust within political parties
in the process.40 All the 18 registered political parties in Ghana (as of 2012), are led by
executives dominated by men, except the CPP whose leader is a woman (the daughter of the first
president of Ghana). Positions generally occupied by women are treasurer and women’s wing
leadership positions (Fobih, 2010).

40

On election day, each political party has an agent at every polling station that is certified by the commission.
These party agents observe the whole voting process, drawing attention to any irregularities. They also stand next to
the returning officer who supervises the counting of votes at the polling station in the full view of the public who
must help to agree on whether ballots are valid or marked improperly. Where there is a disagreement between any
two party agents, election officials and other party polling agents (who have been trained how to detect spoiled
ballots) have the final say. The spoiled ballot is determined in the full view of the public and serious disagreements
referred to the law courts (Electoral Commission, 2011).
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2.9.3. Election Management and Electoral Reforms in the Fourth Republic
(1993-2012)
Several attempts at establishing democratic rule after the various military interventions
were accompanied by the development of legal and constitutional provisions aimed at regulating
political parties’ activities. Ghana’s return to civilian rule with the Fourth Republic produced the
most progressive legal institutions to entrench democracy in Ghana. These are Article 55 and 56
of the 1992 Constitution together with the Political Parties Law (PNDC Law 281) of 1992. The
1992 Constitution grants every citizen of Ghana of voting age the right to form or join a political
party. Most significantly, the constitution outlaws the formation of sectarian political parties (to
foster national integration).41 Other provisions seek to ensure that all presidential and
parliamentary candidates are treated equally in the use of state resources such as air time and
space on the state-owned radio, television and print media (Electoral Commission, 1992).

Electoral Malpractices and Ethnicity in the Fourth Republic
Critical to the electoral process is the behavior of political parties during and after voting
day. Electoral malpractices, violence and other election-related irregularities have been
associated with political parties as they work to secure political power. In the Fourth Republic,
several covert and overt irregularities have been cited that are linked to one political party or the
other. In the 2004 elections for example, The Daily Dispatch newspaper reported that a total of
10,259 votes were inflated in 122 polling stations in five regions (Greater Accra, Western,

41

All parties must be registered with the EC; at least one of the founding members should be resident and registered
as a voter in each of the districts of Ghana; a party must have branches in all the ten regions of Ghana; it should be
organized in not less than two-thirds of the districts in each region. Furthermore, a party’s name, emblem, color,
motto or any other symbol must not have any ethnic, regional or religious connotation nor give the appearance that
its activities are confined only to a part of Ghana; only a citizen of Ghana can contribute to the funds of a political
party.
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Central, Ashanti and Volta). These irregularities were masterminded by the two dominant
parties, NPP and NDC. Similarly, in the 2008 elections in Akwatia and Asutifi South
constituencies, ballot boxes were tampered with at some polling stations on voting day while
other boxes were stolen in a coordinated ‘robbery.’ The EC declined to declare election results in
affected constituencies. The irregularities were investigated by the courts, which ordered fresh
parliamentary elections in Akwatia constituency (won by the opposition party (NPP)
parliamentary candidate) (Epson, 2011). The two parties indulge in violent acts more in their
strong-holds (NPP in Ashanti and NDC in the Volta and Northern Regions). In all the elections
held in the Fourth Republic, the NDC won by a landslide in the Volta Region (94.5 percent in
1992; 93.2 percent in 1996; 88.47 percent in 2000; 83.8 percent in 2004 and 82.88 percent in
2008). The NPP similarly, won the most votes in its home region (61 percent in 1992; 65 percent
in 1996; 74.6 percent in 2000; 74.6 percent in 2004 and 72.4 percent in the 2008 presidential
elections (Arthur, 2009). Contributing to the discussion on the voting pattern of these two
dominant parties, Gyimah-Boadi has noted that:
The importance of ethnicity was perhaps best demonstrated in the 2000 presidential
elections. Atta-Mills’ placards and billboards in the Central Region carried the slogan Adze wo
fie a oye, the Fanti expression of “It is better to have your own” by implication, Atta-Mills was
urging voters to support him simply because he was from their ethnic group. After losing the first
round of the 2000 elections, the NDC reprimanded the traditional rulers and the people of the
Central and Western regions for failing to vote for their “native son,” and urged them to do so in
the runoff (Gyimah-Boadi, 2001:63).
The Ashantis and Ewes have displayed the least flexibility in their voting behavior. The
pattern of voting among broadly suggests that the country is polarized along ethnic and political
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party lines. The consequence is that electoral contests have often increased tensions between the
two groups but has so far not caused any large-scale violent conflicts (Arthur, 2009).
The electoral significance of ethnicity and cleavages goes beyond Ewe and Ashanti
rivalry (Arthur, 2009). Within regions in the northern part of Ghana, electoral politics is based, to
some extent, on conflicts between chiefly and acephalous tribes. Examples include tensions
between the Kusasi and the Mamprusi in the Bawku area of the Upper East Region that claimed
more than 50 lives during the 2000 elections (Arthur, 2009). The Dagbon Crisis, an intra-ethnic
lineage dispute between the Abudu and Andani royal families, which culminated in the killing of
the King of Dagbon (the Ya-Na) in 2002, is linked to national party struggles. The Abudu faction
is said to support the NPP, and the Andani faction the NDC. The Andani faction accused the
NPP of complicity in the killing of the Ya-Na. The NPP lost almost all the seats it had won in
Dagbon traditional area in 2000 to the opposition NDC in the 2004 and 2008 elections. The loss
was partly due to the political slant and the perception that top members of the NPP government
who are Dagombas were behind the escalation of the crisis and the murder of the Dagomba king
and his elders.42 These ministers resigned their posts to facilitate investigation into the conflict in
2002 (Arthur, 2009).
The NPP and NDC governments, in an attempt to reduce high levels of poverty in the
northern sector of Ghana, have initiated special development programs. One such example is the
Northern Development Authority started by the NPP and renamed the Savannah Accelerated
Development Authority (SADA) by the NDC. SADA is aimed at bridging the gap between the
poor north and the well-endowed south (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). All three presidents

42

Ministers who are Dagombas in the NPP government who resigned as a result of the Yendi crises were: Malik AlHassan Yakubu, (the MP for Yendi and the Minister for Interior), Major-General (rtd.) Joshua Hamidu (National
Security Adviser), Major Sulemana Tali (National Security Council member) and Prince Imoru Andani (Northern
Regional minister) (Arthur, 2009).
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(Rawlings, Kuffour and Atta-Mills) have adopted policies with the aim of eliminating
inequalities in Ghanaian society.43

2.10. Consolidating Democracy in Ghana:Lessons and Prospects
The legal reforms, operational design and arrangement and the powers bestowed on it
make Ghana’s EC powerful and truly independent of the state and governmental apparatus. The
permanent nature of the commission ensures growth, institutional learning and consolidation.
Top brass of the EC are able to work without fear of government and other state control. For
example, the chair and the two vice-chairs cannot be relieved of their posts (unless they commit
serious offenses) to the extent that the law places the EC chair on the same terms and conditions
of service as the judges of the Courts of Appeal and the two vice chairs on the same level as
those of the High Courts. The conditions for putting an end to the tenure of commissioners and
retirement age are clearly defined by law. This job security for the EC staff has helped Ghana to
consolidate democratic processes and made the commissioners more independent from those
who selected them because the renewal of their mandates does not depend on political power
(Fall et al., 2011).
Interparty dialogue and forums, civil society groups and the growing confidence of the
Ghanaian populace in the electoral process provide hope for consolidated democracy in Ghana.
Political analysts and observers argue that Ghana’s democratic political system survived the
closeness and intensity of the 2008 elections because it has developed stabilizing characteristics--an independent EC and transparent electoral processes, the growth of democratic practices
43

Ghana Vision 2020 under Jerry John Rawlings (1992-2000) aimed at reducing poverty and enhancing economic
growth. The Ghana Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I and II) and the Highly Indebted Poor
Countries Initiative (HIPC) of John Kuffour (2001-2008) and the Atta-Mills’ Better Ghana Agenda, “The Ghana
Shared Growth and Development Agenda” (GSGDA) (2010–2013) are programs meant to address imbalances in the
Ghanaian economy and social life between religious, ethnic and regional groups (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).
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among the political elite alongside the creation of norms and institutions that mold elite behavior,
and the institutionalization of political parties (Whitefield, 2009).44 According to Whitefield
(2009) the highly competitive elections since 1996 are the result of a de facto two-party system
where voters and political elites are mobilized not on communal divides but around two political
traditions (Nkrumah and Danquah-Busia) which provide the parties’ vision, founding
mythologies (the body of stories associated with the culture of the party) and political styles
adopted by the parties.
Ghana’s experience holds out the possibility that parties in Africa do not have to be based
strictly on identity to be institutionalized. However, they will need an issue-based party culture
that cuts across region and ethnicity to provide the anchor upon which political elites gravitate to
neutralize ethnic politicization and promote the consolidation of political parties. This is
prominent in a two-party system where both parties have strong political support in almost all
regions and parties’ identification is based on cross-cutting cleavages of which ethnicity is only
one (Whitefield, 2009). In addition, Rawlings stepping down after he reached the constitutional
limit of two terms as president in 2000 without attempting to change the constitution marked an
important step towards democratization in Ghana. The peaceful change of power in 2001 and
2008 showed it is possible and that parties can lose power through the ballot box and regain
power again in later elections.
The changeover of power between the two dominant parties in Ghana as a result of
successful elections confirms that Ghana has passed Huntington’s “two turnover test.”

44

Despite heated political tensions and violent acts between the NPP and NDC supporters, the 2008 elections tested
the strength of Ghana’s electoral commission. A winner emerged with a very slim margin after three rounds of
voting. The EC emerged stronger and reliable. The achievement also demonstrates the political maturity of the
Ghanaian public and political leaders. The defeat of the NPP is probably the narrowest for a ruling party that did not
degenerate into violent conflict in the history of elections in Africa (Whitefield, 2009).
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Huntington (1991) theorized that when a nation transitions from an "emergent democracy" to a
"stable democracy," it must undergo two democratic and peaceful turnovers to confirm that it has
gone passed the stage of democratic reversal associated with emerging democracies before it
moves the stage of a stable democracy. Similarly, Przeworski, et al (1996) postulate that three
consecutive multiparty elections is the minimum requirement to show that the ‘alternation rule’
(peaceful change of power from one administration to the other) is being institutionalized.
Vibrant civil society’s vigilance and participation in the electoral process has contributed
greatly to the success of elections, particularly in the 2008 elections. Civil society interventions,
along with media vigilance, helped to keep campaigns issue-based and peaceful.45 The IPAC has
ensured that political parties and donors make input into electoral reforms by inviting them to
participate in IPAC meetings as well as make financial support to the EC to implement reforms,
help to manage the electoral process and bring forward their concerns for general discussion
(Boafo-Arthur, 2006).
The electoral process in Ghana is not perfect, and the highly competitive 2008 elections
exposed its weaknesses. However, in general, electoral procedures were followed and the
process was transparent enough to invoke trust from all parties and the electorate. The
foundation of norms and institutions, slowly built since 1992, has molded the behaviour of the
political elite (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009). Thus, meaningful reforms aimed at building institutions
and structures have reduced the incentives for state capture and partisan abuse. The result is an
emerging trend in democratic rule in Ghana that has the potential to withstanding any electoral
shocks if sustained. Therefore, strategic planning meant to create a secure atmosphere for
45

Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) held live televised presidential and vice-presidential debates. It also drafted
and submitted to parliament a presidential transition bill which has been passed into law to streamline the handing
over of power from one government to another after elections. The Association of Ghanaian Industries held
meetings with all the presidential candidates to discuss economic policies. The CODEO and international agencies
help to create an enabling atmosphere for peaceful elections in Ghana (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009).
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campaigning, polling, and post-election activities has been the hallmark of elections in the
Fourth Republic (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009).

2.11. Emerging Patterns of Democratic Development in Ghana
The vision of political parties and their leaders to maintain a united and cohesive
Ghanaian society has, to a large extent been achieved, as Ghana continues to make uninterrupted
strides towards democratization since 1992. As Sideman and Lanoue (2005) postulate,
politicians and the electorate appear to have come to the realization that becoming electorally
viable requires the political parties vying for political power to strike alliances with other parties
and ethnic groups, thereby fostering the inclusion in government of smaller parties and ethnic
groups. The pattern since independence, and particularly in the Fourth Republic, has been one of
seeking balance and inclusion of all interest groups in Ghana to secure votes to win power and to
be able to preside over a united country. Political parties have therefore carefully played their
cards in such a way as to ensure balance and national integration by selecting political leaders
from a variety of ethnic and social classes in the country. There is a conscious effort on the part
of the political parties to present ethnically mixed presidential slates in elections. This trend of
cross ethno-regional and party alliances has become prominent in presidential campaigns since
the year 2000. Each of the parties has ensured that its presidential ticket reflects an ethnoregional balance, so that if the presidential candidate is from the southern part of Ghana, the
running mate is chosen from the northern part and vice-versa.46 This balancing act has

46

Candidate Atta-Mills of the NDC, an Akan-Fante, in 2000 appointed a northerner, Martin Amidu from the Upper
East Region while Akan-Ashanti candidate Kuffour of the NPP chose a northern Muslim, Alhaji Aliu Mahama as
his running mate. In 2004 President Kuffour maintained his vice president Aliu Mahama while candidate Atta-Mills
chose Alhaji Mohamed Mumuni, a northern Muslim, as his running mate. This balancing practice was maintained in
2008 and the December 2012 elections as Mahamadu Bayumia, a northern Muslim partnered with NPP presidential
candidate Nana Akuffo-Addo, an Akan-Akim. Atta-Mills has also maintained his 2008 running mate and current
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contributed largely to neutralize the effect of ethnicity and cleavages in the voting patterns in
presidential elections in Ghana (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004).
The balancing arrangement is not limited to national level activities only. However, the
regional impact on electoral outcomes in Ghana is very difficult to gauge mainly because some
regions are largely coterminous with ethnic groups or sub-groups of ethnic groups while others
are not. Unlike some African countries, this geographic pattern does not seem to indicate the
pattern of voting except in two regions--- the Ashanti and Volta (referred to as the “World
Bank”) of NPP and NDC, respectively (Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). Even in these two
regions voters are gradually shedding their practice of bloc voting for their home candidates or
parties as evidenced by the downward trend of the number of votes obtained by NPP and NDC
parties in Ashanti and Volta regions as discussed earlier. Although regional patterns of voting
could contain hidden ethnic dimensions, the trajectory of electoral politics in Ghana shows that
by and large, ethnicity is not a variable that determines the outcome of national elections (Asante
and Gyimah-Boadi, 2004). This is unique in Africa.
Another trend in Ghana’s democratization process is that political leaders are elected to
public positions by contesting on political party tickets more than contesting as independent
candidates. A limited number of independent candidates are elected to Ghana’s parliament. The
1956 elections produced two independent candidates representing 1.9 percent of the vote; one
candidate in 1969 (0.7 percent) and two candidates in 1992 (1 percent). The 2000 elections
produced four independent candidates (2 percent); one candidate in 2004 (0.4 percent); and four
candidates in 2008 (1.7 percent). No independent presidential candidate has ever been elected
president in Ghana (Krennerich 2003; Whitefield, 2009). Political parties are therefore very

vice president, John Mahama, a northern Christian, as his running mate for the 2012 elections (Asante and GyimahBoadi, 2004).
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important in Ghana’s democratization process and both state and non-state institutions need to
invest in the development and management of viable political parties.
The lack of homogeneity among the regions of the country is seen by some political
pundits as a blessing for Ghana. It has made it more difficult for politicians to make ethnic
considerations a prominent feature in elections. Ethnicity manifests only a moderate salience in
Ghana. Political and constitutional arrangements in Ghana have succeeded in muting ethnic
cleavages. According to Arthur (2009), ethnicity is not that important in the Ghanaian context,
since interpersonal relationships such as marriage ties, friendship, and school mates (“old boys”)
cut across ethnic groups in almost random fashion, neutralizing ethnicity’s potential political
impact and drawing various groups into a network of reciprocal obligations.
The efforts of succeeding political leaders to strengthen democratic institutions such as
the Electoral Commission, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice
(CHRAJ) and the growing checks and balances among the three branches of government
(executive, parliament and judiciary) has led to sustained progress in building a stable democracy
in Ghana. The trust and confidence reposed in the Electoral Commission has enabled the EC to
shape the electoral landscape by building confidence in elections as the most acceptable
approach to choosing political leaders. This success is crucial to democratic consolidation
(Debrah, Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2010).
Thus, since the brutal and antagonistic rivalry between the CPP and UGCC/UP
ideological groups during the pre-independence elections campaign in the 1950s, Ghana has
developed a ‘home grown’ election management body that makes Ghana a beacon of hope for
democracy in Africa. Ghana, a country with economic, social and political characteristics similar
to many other African countries undergoing democratic transitions, has achieved major successes
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in conducting many elections because it has developed and sustained a credible, effective and
neutral election management body that has helped to neutralize the destabilizing societal
cleavages that have ravaged other countries like Kenya and Cote d’ Ivoire.
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CHAPTER 3 : KENYA : POLITICS AND ELECTION MANAGEMENT

3.0. Kenya: Background and Political History
Having had economic relations with Arabs, Asians and Europeans, Kenya was colonized
by the British during the partitioning of Africa by European powers in the last quarter of the 19th
century. Like the Gold Coast, the British introduced a quasi-democracy in Kenya during the preindependence era. This continued after independence under Jomo Kenyatta. Kenya gained
independence from the British in 1963. It is an ethnically diverse society with ethnic tensions and
violent eruptions during national elections. This notwithstanding, Kenya has had stable
governments since becoming a republic in 1964 under three long serving presidents---Jomo
Kenyatta of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) from 1964-1978, Daniel Arap Moi (also
of KANU) from 1978-2002 and Mwai Kibaki of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) from
2002-2007 and the Party of National Unity (PNU) from 2007-2012. After a brief democratic
transition after independence, one-party rule, dictatorship, suppression of political opposition and
adoption of divisive tactics characterized the governance of Kenya. How all these played
together to sustain the relative stability of government in Kenya are dealt with later in the
chapter. The election management body in Kenya has not developed much since independence,
except for occasional amendments by successive governments which have influenced the
electoral process (Ajulu, 2002). This chapter discusses the political history of Kenya with a
special focus on election management and the challenges of multiparty democracy. It also
examines political party activities and their influence on the electoral process as well as
democratic challenges and patterns of democratic development in Kenya.
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Figure 3.1: Chronology of Ruling Administrations in Kenya (1963-2012)
December 1963-December 1964: Westminster Constitution (Kenyatta- parliamentary
civilian government)
December 1964–August 1978: Republic (Kenyatta- presidential civilian government)
August 1978-January 1993: Republic (Moi- one party presidential civilian
government)
January 1993- January 2003: Republic (Moi-multiparty presidential civilian
government)
January 2003-May 2012: Republic (Kibaki-multiparty presidential civilian
government)
Source: Hartmann (2011).

3.1. Historical Overview
Kenya as a country never existed; it was created by the colonialists. Many communities
in Kenya lived in harmony except for sporadic, small-scale clashes. Each had their unique
system of governance (Chemaswet, n.d). In the pre-colonial period all groups in Kenya were
acephalous in nature except the Wanga of Western Kenya who had a centralized system with the
Nabongo king as their leader and the Arab-led autonomous city states at the coastal trading
centers (Chemaswet, n.d). The British declared Kenya a protectorate (a British sphere of
influence) in 1895 and it officially became a British colony in 1920. The main reason for
colonizing Kenya was to control the source of the strategic Nile River and British interest in the
upper Nile region, particularly Egypt and the Suez Canal. The colonialists tried to work with
existing community leaders by elevating them to the status of chiefs and paramount chiefs
(Chemaswet, n.d). They replaced those leaders who disobeyed British orders with indigenous
persons who were ready to collaborate with them to grab the best lands. These newly created
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paramount chiefs cooperated with the colonialists to grab lands from indigenes (Chemaswet,
n.d).
Kenya’s friendly geographical environment (highlands with favorable weather conditions
and relatively little threat of malaria) attracted many European settlers from Britain in the early
part of the 18th century. The settlers, who the British government gave land on highly
concessional terms to establish plantations, gradually gained control of very fertile lands from
Kiu (in Machakos) to Fort Ternan (Kericho) and declared the area as “White Highlands.” Only
Europeans were allowed to settle in the reserved area. This led to massive alienation of Africans,
with many of them being pushed to infertile lands with its attendant problems of squatters in
white settled areas, racial segregation and forced labor in European plantations (Mwaruvie,
2010). The alienation and displacement of Africans from their ancestral lands became the basis
for African nationalism. Many political associations were formed in the early part of the 20th
century to resist imperialism. They fought until independence was achieved in 1963.
In the pre-independence period, the electoral process in Kenya was characterized by ad
hoc and limiting measures and provisions. Voters were bound to meet certain tax requirements.47
Adult suffrage was limited to certain categories of people based on economic and social status.
Since independence in 1963, all adult citizens (including women) of sound mind have had the
right to vote (Ajulu, 2002). The election management body in Kenya has had a checked history
of being influenced and controlled by governments for political interest and expediency. This
development has not enabled the EMB to fully develop into an independent and autonomous
system that can win the confidence and trust of the electorate, despite conducting regular
elections to change governments since independence in 1963.
47

In 1957 a limited franchise was allowed by the colonialists. Educational qualifications and an income of not less
than Kenyan shilling (Kshs) 2400 per annum among others were prerequisites for men and women to vote. The age
for voting was later reduced from 21 to 18 years (Ajulu, 2002).
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3.2. Overview of Ethnicity and Conflicts in Kenya’s Political History
Kenya is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural society. Swahili/Kiswahili (a
fusion of the language of the Shirazi (Persian and Arabian) traders and emigrants with the coastal
Bantu in the 9th century) is culturally important to Kenyan history. Swahili is widely spoken as a
national language in Kenya and other neighboring countries in the East Africa region. Although
Kiswahili is widely spoken, it has failed to bond Kenyans as people belonging to one culture and
speaking a common language. Rather various ethnic groups maintain their identity and belonging
to their ethnic and religious groups (Mwaruvie, 2010).
The political history of Kenya is influenced by the negative use of ethnicity, ethnic
classification, ethno-regionalism, social and economic cleavages, political party alliances and
coalitions which combine to determine who controls power in that country (Oucho, 2002). Each
of these ethnic groups or tribes has its own unique values, language and cultural practices. Thus,
most Kenyans belong to specific ethnic and religious groups that they identify with, first and
foremost. One characteristic of Kenya’s political system is that parties and voters are mobilized
along ethnic and regional lines (Oucho, 2002). The Kenyan African Union (KANU) dominated
the politics of Kenya from 1963 to 2002 under Presidents Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi.
Political alliances and coalitions like the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), the Party of
National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) have dominated the
politics in Kenya since 2002 (IFES Final Report, 2008).
Kenya’s population of 43,013,341 is made up of three major linguistic groups (the Bantu,
Nilotes and Cushites) subdivided into 42 tribes and sub-groups as well as a minority Arabs,
Asians and Europeans (Kenya Population Census, 2009). The religious composition of the
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population is estimated as follows: Protestant 45 percent, Roman Catholic 33 percent, Muslim 10
percent, indigenous beliefs 10 percent, others 2 percent (CIA World Fact Book, 2012).
Kenya's Bantu people live mainly in the coastal, central, eastern and western regions of
the country. They form about 70 percent of the entire population but they occupy less than 30
percent of the Kenyan land (Kenya Population Census, 2009). The Kikuyu (the largest ethnic
group in Kenya) represent 22 percent of the entire Kenyan population. They have long been very
influential in Kenyan politics, dominating organized resistance to colonial rule. Presidents Jomo
Kenyatta and Mwai Kibaki are Kikuyus. The Luhya, also known as the Abaluhya (14 percent), is
the second largest tribe living in Kenya's Western Province. The Abaluhya tribe comprises 17
sub-tribes, each speaking a different dialect. The most dominant Abaluhya sub-tribes are the
Bukusu, Maragoli, Banyore, Gisu, Idakho, Isukha, Kabras, Khayo, Kisa, Manyala, Marachi,
Saamia, Tachoni, Tiriki, Tura, Wanga and Watsotso. The Kamba (11 percent) is the fifth largest
ethnic group in Kenya. They are renowned for their exceptional wood carving skills (Oucho,
2002). Three other large Bantu sub-groups are the Kisii (6 percent) and Meru (6 percent) of the
Kenyan population. The rest of the Bantu ethnic groups constitute less than 1 percent of Kenya’s
population (Kenyan Population Census, 2009).
The most significant tribes of the Nilotes are the Luo (13 percent), Kalenjin (12 percent),
Maasai (2 percent), Turkana (1percent), and Samburu (0.50). They represent approximately 18
percent of Kenya’s population. The Nilotes are traditionally pastoralists and fishermen. They
reside in Kenya's broad Rift-Valley region, around Lake Victoria. The Luo live on the shores of
Lake Victoria and are Kenya's third largest ethnic group. They are influential in Kenyan politics
and have produced many of the staunch political opposition leaders. The Kalenjin are prominent
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in Kenyan politics. President Arap Moi, the longest serving president of Kenya, comes from the
Kalenjin tribe. They have also produced many prominent long distance athletes (Oucho, 2002).
The Cushitic people represent less than 1 percent of Kenyan population. They live in the
arid and semi-arid eastern and northeastern parts of Kenya. Most of them are nomadic
pastoralists who own large herds of camels, sheep, cattle and goats. The Asians are mostly
descendants of Indian railway workers brought to Kenya in the 19th century. The Europeans are
largely British and they own large pieces of land in the Rift Valley Province (Ajulu, 2002).
Figure 3.2. is a map showing regional distribution of ethnic groups in Kenya.

Figure 3.2: Ethnologic Map of Kenya

Source: <http://www.ethnologue.com/maps/ken_eth.jpg>.
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Many conflicts in pre-independence Kenya were nationalistic in nature and directed at
preventing or stopping European domination of African lands. Another source of conflict in
Kenya has been the internal migration system, which has pitted migrant settlers and squatters on
the one hand, against the indigenous people on the other, precipitating intermittent conflicts in
opposition strong-holds such as the Rift Valley region (Ajulu, 2002).

3.3. Challenges of Multiparty Elections and Democracy in Kenya
Since attaining independence in 1963, Kenya has had a fairly limited experience with
competitive multi-party politics. The first experiment with political pluralism was from 1963 to
the “Little General Election” in 1966. The second began in 1991 and includes the multiparty
elections of 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. In both periods, cleavages and violence have
characterized political competition.

3.3.1. Socio-Economic Inequalities in Kenya
Like most African societies, inequality in Kenya is associated with such factors as the
effects of colonial policies and control over resources such as land and conflicts between the
landed and landless. Inequality is seen in landlessness, gender status, youth unemployment, the
widening gap between extremely wealthy and extremely poor citizens, and the marginalization
of some ethnic communities (Ndungu, 2008). These inequalities are potential fault-lines for
social cleavages and differences that have influenced heavily the outcome of elections as
politicians mobilize voters along ethnic lines and fan ethnic sentiments and divides. As a result
of this history, Kenya is one of the most unequal societies in the world. The inequalities have
contributed to the eruption of direct and indirect state violence to maintain political control
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during colonialism and after independence. Violence has also been initiated by non-state actors
as a form of resistance to these historical developments (Ajulu, 2002).48 Figure 3.3, map of land
inequity and violence in Kenya.
Figure 3.3: Kenya Land Inequity and Violence

Source: Kniss, Michael (2010), p. 17).
Kenya’s geographical mobility, especially of people in search of economic prospects,
followed a similar trend to Ghana. Many emigrants moved to areas that the British had acquired
land to work on the plantations. Pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial government policies
have contributed to an uneven distribution of resources. This trend has contributed to large
numbers of various ethnic groups settling throughout the country without destroying their ethnic
bonds which has led to overcrowding and conflicts (Ajulu, 2002).
48

Examples of state violence include colonial cruelties, the Mau Mau rebellion in the 1950s, post-colonial
assassinations of some top politicians such as Tom Mboya, ethnic cleansing, crime, militia and police violence
(Ajulu, 2002). According to the Waki Commission (2008), officials failed to act on intelligence regarding potential
violence; failed to respond adequately to violence; and police lacked discipline and impartiality, and used unjustified
force in responding to post-election demonstrations and violence. Police were responsible for 405 deaths (35.7 per
cent of the total) (Alston, 2010).
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3.3.2. Ethnicity and Voting Patterns in Kenya
Since political organizations channel, aggregate, and express political demands, they play
an important role in the management as well as escalation of conflict in societies divided along
cultural, linguistic, religious and regional lines. Political parties are thus intimately linked to the
rise and fall of conflicts in ethnically plural societies (Reilly, 2006). Kenya’s experience with
election-related violent conflicts follows this trend. Like many other countries in Africa, Kenya’s
challenges are that elections are inherently problematic because of the pressures for politicization
of identity issues and the failure of the Election Management Bodies to conduct transparent, free
and fair elections (Reilly, 2006). It is often easier for campaigning parties to attract voter support
by appealing to ethnic allegiances than issues of ideology. Aspiring politicians have a strong
incentive to mobilize followers along ethnic lines, and unscrupulous leaders who ‘play the ethnic
card’ are rewarded with electoral success as was evidenced during the long reign of President
Arap Moi (Ajulu, 2002).49
There has rarely been a level-playing field for political parties, presidential candidates
and other candidates contesting elections at different levels in Kenya. Governments’ failure to
provide an even-playing field is aggravated by political parties themselves by refusing entry of
their rivals in their strongholds. Therefore, during campaigns, Kenya is practically divided into
party zones. The major determinant of who controls what zone is the ethnic identity of the
candidate or leaders of the political party.50 Governments in Kenya have so far failed to adopt

49

A case in point was in early 1993 (soon after the 1992 elections) when President Moi publicly commended
Nicholas Biwott, one of the alleged perpetrators (named by both the all-party group and the task force commissions
of inquiry into the 1992 election violence) for having ensured that KANU gained ground in the Rift Valley Province.
Biwott was subsequently appointed as a minister in the president’s office (Ajulu, 2002).
50
The Rift Valley was a KANU zone in the Moi years. The Forum for the Restoration of Democracy in Kenya
(FORD-K) (a splinter group) FORD-Asili and the Democratic Party of Kenya (DP) in 1992 and in 1997 controlled
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policies to mitigate the effect of this phenomenon but have rather encouraged these divisive
tendencies. Nukuri (1997) states that conflicts and violence in Kenya are based upon and
organized by elites, and extended outward into society as supporters are recruited and rewarded
for the basic benefit of their patrons. Rok Ajulu supports this statement and concludes that:
Ethnicity has thus become the medium through which class politics is mediated. Ethnic clashes,
which have characterized much of the period of multiparty politics, are not tribal conflicts in the
primordial sense; rather, these constitute politically organized conflicts orchestrated to achieve
short and long-term political, and ultimately economic, advantages (Ajulu, 2002, p.1).

3.3.3. Managing Diversity for Democratic Consolidation in Kenyan Politics
Successive governments led by Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Arap Moi, and Mwai Kibaki
failed to address comprehensively the problems of inequality and the marginalization of some
ethnic communities (Ajulu, 2002). All governments since independence have entrenched certain
biases and prejudices of the past, particularly during the Kenyatta and Moi periods. Those
entrusted with high political positions encouraged tribalism and the use of ethnic identities to
foster patron–client relations for the purpose of retaining political power. The general public,
civil society organizations and the donor community urged the governments to redress the trend.
Instead, successive Kenyan governments made unfulfilled promises and established commissions
to investigate particular issues of national importance without implementing the findings of these
commissions (not even President Kibaki and his coalition government---from whom more is
expected because he rode on the back of change to power ---has made the necessary changes)
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008).

Central Province. Nyanza was a FORD-K zone in 1992 and a National Democratic Party (NDP) zone in 1997
(Oucho, 2002).
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3.4. Political Development and Election Management in Pre-Independent Kenya
From a very early stage of colonial experience, Kenyans organized themselves in
different forms to count their economic and political exclusion and fight for their rights. At first,
they took traditional forms like tribal associations. Later, trade unions grew up and focused
mainly on trying to protect and extend the rights of African wage-earners. However, these unions
also provided an opportunity for the first generation of anti-colonialist leaders to share ideas on
wider issues and gain experience of grassroots mobilization. The first indigenous political
groupings were organized along ethnic lines but did not restrict themselves to ethnic issues. They
dealt with economic and political issues such as land ownership and resistance against British
rule. The Nandi ethnic group started the struggle against growing foreign domination of
economic and political lives of Kenyans in the late 1890s. The struggle gathered momentum in
other regions from the early 1900s (Mwaruvie, 2010). Tribal associations were formed after
initial nationalist movements like the East African Association (EAA), which was banned by the
colonialists who adopted divide-and rule tactics by encouraging and fanning tribalism and tribal
sentiments among the various ethnic groups, purposefully to weaken their front.51 The tribal
associations’ nationalist agenda of stopping foreign domination of their territories received a
boost from WWII veterans who had convinced themselves that the British, with whom they have
fought side-by side in the war, were not superior after all. Many of these soldiers began to

51

Kenya’s first political organization, the East African Association (EAA), formed in 1919, was a truly pan-tribal
political organization. Its leadership was composed of the different ethnic groups, Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba, Luhya, and
some Ugandans. Following the Nairobi riots of 1922, which were led by the EAA, the arrest and deportation of three
of its Kikuyu leaders (Harry Thuku, Waiganjo Ndotono and George Mugekenyi), the colonial government resolved
not to encourage nation-wide African political activity. Rather, the policy was to encourage tribal associations. The
subsequent period thus witnessed the proliferation of many tribal bodies (Ajulu, 2002). This was to keep Kenyans
divided and weak to prolong colonialism.
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organize and form stronger movements.52 Later some cross-ethnic associations also sprang up.
They included the Kavirondo Tax Payer Association in Nyanza, the Kalenjin, Masai, Turkana
and Samburu Alliance (KAMATUSA) and Western Kalenjin Congress among others which
addressed labor related grievances. The leaders of some of these nationalist groups such as
Masinde Muliro, Daniel Arap Moi, Ronald Ngala, Jomo Kenyatta, Oginga Odinga and Tom
Mboya later formed the core of political parties’ leaders to fight for independence (Ajulu, 2002).
Rok Ajulu postulates that it is colonial capitalist penetration in Kenya and the different
responses to the colonialists’ economic programs by the major ethnic groups that best explains
the context in which politicization of inequalities and ethnic cleavages have come to dominate
Kenyan politics (Ajulu, 2002). In the central province of Kenya, among the Kikuyu ethnic group,
capitalist penetration by the colonizers resulted in proletarianization on a large scale and, at the
same time, engendered a concentration of a landed and propertied class (mostly Kikuyus). It was
the landed and landless who were to confront each other during the fight for independence in the
1950s (Ajulu, 2002). The Luo responded to the modern economy as suppliers of labour as
railway works in Kisumu and Mombasa partly due to the minimal agricultural potential of
Nyanza, lack of infrastructure, and markets for wage goods. Among the Luhya in the Western
Province, the colonial administration led to proletarianization and peasant commodity
production. Ultimately, all these factors led to a landed propertied class on the one hand, and, on
the other, proletarianized landless owners of patches of land (Ajulu, 2002).
In 1944 the first national African organization, the Kenya African Union (KAU) was
formed with strong support from the Kikuyu, with members from other ethnic groups. Another
52

The Kikuyu for instance, formed the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), the Akamba formed the Ukambani
Members Association (UMA), the Luhya formed the Luhya Union (LU), the Luo formed the Young Kavirondo
Association (YKA), the Kalenjin formed the Kalenjin Political Alliance (KPA), the coastal tribes formed the
Mwambao Union Front (MUF), and Taita formed the Taita Hills Association (THA). Consequently, a common
political voice was not possible for a long time (Nyukuri, 1997).
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prominent group was the Mau Mau resistance movement which launched a nationalist campaign
aimed at claiming back Kenyan lands and to seek political independence from Britain (Ajulu,
2002). Some Kenyan collaborators of the colonialists embarked on a propaganda that divided the
front of Kenyans. Some Kenyans, especially the Home Guards, fought alongside the colonial
forces against the Mau Mau forces.53 The colonialists took advantage of the situation to divide
the front of nationalist movements even further (Ajulu, 2002).54 The British authorities reacted
brutally, killing an estimated 13,500 Africans and detained 100,000 in detention camps during
the uprising. The British declared a state of emergency in October 1952 and banned the Mau
Mau and KAU in 1953. The ban was lifted when the attacks on the British stopped (Ajulu,
2002). The resistance and nationalism (in the form of protests and violent acts) against foreign
control of African lands grew until Kenya attained independence (Human Right Watch, 1993).
The period leading up to the first independence elections in 1963 saw a proliferation of
regional and ethnic based political organizations which were to constitute the most effective
recipe for the politicization of ethnic cleavages in Kenya. During this crucial period of imminent
transfer of state-power into the hands of indigenous classes after the colonial state removed
barriers to the formation of national political organizations in 1959, ethnic identities appear to
have been constructed as instruments of negotiating access to that power. The result was a
disharmony created between two forces: broader nationalists whose traditions of anti-colonial
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The colonial regime co-opted a layer of rich peasants composed of land-owning, educated Christians. These
“loyalist” Kenyans included Kikuyu landowners who were deeply hostile to the landless Kikuyu masses and
supported the British in suppressing them. The division and tension within the nationalists has led to the uprising
being regarded in some academic circles an intra-Kikuyu civil war (International Communist League, 2011).
54
Pre-independence ethnic and regional based organizations include the Mombasa African Democratic Union
(MADU), the Taita African Democratic Union (TADU), the Abagussi Association of South Nyanza District
(AASND), the Masai United Front Alliance (MA), the Kalenjin People’s Alliance (KPA), Nairobi People
Convention (NPC), Nairobi African District Council (NADC), the Rift Valley People’s Congress (RVPC), Kenya
Peoples Party (KPP), the Baluhya Political Union (BPU) and Akamba Peoples Party, later named African Peoples
Party (APP) (Ajulu, 2002).
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resistance could be traced back to the second decade of the 20th century versus the political elite
that had emerged in the post-Mau Mau. This period contributed to widening cleavages in Kenya
which persists today (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008).

3.4.1. Political Parties and Their Influence on the Political Process in PreIndependent Kenya
Although African political parties remained banned after the Mau Mau uprising,
nationalist leaders continued to agitate for independence. The nationalist movements (through
protests and other forms of political dissent) pushed for independence from the British from the
mid-1950s. As resistance to colonialism deepened and grew more sophisticated in urban
settlements, particularly after WWII the first cross-ethnic political movements were formed. The
Kenya African National Union (KANU) under Jomo Kenyatta and the Kenya African
Democratic Union (KADU) led by Ronald Ngala were the first such groups to champion the
fight for independence. KANU, which had its stronghold in the largest ethnic groups, the Kikuyu
(of Central Province) theoretically had its stated objective of becoming a center-left ideological
party but never developed along that line as ethnicity has become the medium through which
class politics is mediated (Ajulu, 2002). Its platform called for immediate independence, a
centralized, unitary state and a republican government. The KADU which was dominated by the
Luo (from Nyanza) also aimed to become generally more conservative. It favored a federal
system of government and a capitalist economic system with minimal state interference (Githu,
1998). The KADU, concerned about the prospect of Kikuyu domination and the strong white
settler community who had substantial control over the colonial state, pressed for majimboism

93

(federalism based on ethnicity). It was envisaged that regional assemblies would be semiautonomous (Ajulu, 2002).
In 1961, the British government began the Lancaster House constitutional process.55
KANU and KADU began to operate legally and that paved the way for the first general elections
in Kenya in which African political parties freely competed for power. With overwhelming
support from the two largest ethnic groups in Kenya, the Kikuyu and the Luo, a large following
in the urban centers and relatively better organization, KANU won the 1963 elections despite the
colonialist maneuvers to let KADU, which was more sympathetic to the colonialist course, to
win. However, in protest at the continued detention of its leader, Jomo Kenyatta, by the colonial
administration, KANU refused to take office until after KANU and KADU forged an agreement
to incorporate federalism in the independence constitution. The British government influenced
the negotiation process in favor of federalism which the colonialists believed would protect the
interests of white settlers in Kenya. In June 1963 Kenya was granted internal self-rule and it
attained independence on December 12, 1963 (Ajulu, 2002). Federalism was, however, shortlived because the Kenyatta administration was bent on frustrating what was seen as an
“imposed” constitutional dispensation. KADU merged with KANU at the beginning of 1964
(Holmquist and Githinji, 2009). Nonetheless, the violent conflicts, triggered by differences over
majimboism and unfair distribution of resources in the Rift Valley Province, for example, have
become hot spots for election-related violence in Kenya (Ajulu, 2002).56
55

The Lancaster House Conferences were designed by the British Empire to prepare its colonies for independence
between 1953 and 1979. The first such meeting in 1960, resulted in an interim constitution that failed to grant any
substantial autonomy to Kenya. The second conference in 1962 negotiated a framework for self government while
the third and final conference in 1963 resulted in the drafting and adoption of Kenya's first independent constitution
by the British Parliament perceived my many Kenyans as an imposed constitution (Ajulu, 2002).
56
KADU with its allies lunched majimboism under the slogan “Regionalism or Civil War” when William Murgor,
then parliamentary secretary to the defense and internal security in the transitional government, invited his Kalenjin
tribesmen to sharpen their spears and wait for the sound of his whistle to begin the war to drive non-Kalenjins out of
the Rift Valley. Moi, then chairman of KADU, vowed to shed his blood to ensure that regionalism was written in the
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The history of the Kenya land settlement programme is riddled with politics, economics,
intrigue and the deliberate twist of facts. The colonialists tagged “African Trust Lands” also
known as “reserves” as the Kamba reserve, Luo reserve and the Kikuyu reserve, giving it a
divisive slant, cultivating an image of ‘the paternal protector of the weaker African interest,’ and
personalizing the state (Oucho, 2002). The colonial governor’s decision as the father of the
nation (rather than through effective democratic structures) was made to look like policies were
meant to serve the poor Kenyans when, in effect, it was to satisfy colonial objectives of feeding
its home country industries with raw materials from the colony. This paternal style was to be
continued by politicians after independence.
In Kenya ethnic vote mobilization widened existing rifts and created more in the society.
Three years after independence the Luo-Kikuyu alliance fell apart. Kenyatta and his Kikuyu elite
took over the state; the Luo, led by Oginga Odinga (Raila Odinga's father) formed an opposition
party, the Kenya People’s Union (KPU), that was eventually quashed. Kenyatta established a
one-party state in 1969 and tossed the opposition, including Odinga, into detention. The Kikuyu
then enjoyed many of the country's spoils throughout Kenyatta's reign. Kenyatta reneged on his
promise to revert all British-confiscated lands to the local communities when Kenya attained
independence. Instead, his former home guards from Central Kenya, with the support of the
Kenyatta government, hatched an elaborate scheme to buy land from the British and allocate it to
themselves and their henchmen (“Kikuyu mafia”). KANU leaders consolidated land in the
Central Province and displaced many people into the Rift Valley (Chemaswet, n.d).57 Ajulu

independence constitution (Ajulu, 2002). Thus, from 1961, ethnic clashes swept through the Rift Valley Province as
the Kikuyu, Luhya and other ethnic groups, which had lived in the area for years, were labeled foreigners, their
houses burnt, and the majority of them were rendered refugees. The main divide was the majority Kikuyu against
the other tribes (Ajulu, 2002).
57
This was allocated only to Kikuyus. The Luos were also rewarded for supporting KANU by transferring 650,000
acres of Nandi land to Luo Nyanza. Another 850,000 acres of Nandi and Koony land was chipped off and annexed
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(2002) asserts that to strengthen the hold of the Kikuyu tribe on the governance of Kenya ,
Kenyatta’s government organized and orchestrated an oath taking campaign to mobilize the
Kikuyu peasantry, the urban committed supporters, and its professional classes behind the
Kenyatta regime, arguing that the entire Kikuyu ethnic group was under threat. Kikuyu therefore
had to take the oath in readiness to defend the House of Mumbi, the eponymous founder of the
Kikuyu tribe. This development bred ethnic resentments among other tribes against the Kikuyu
(Ajulu, 2002).
Several decades after independence, the British colonial legacy still impacts significantly
Kenya’s governance system. Administrative boundaries created along ethnic boundaries by the
British have remained largely the same in Kenya to present. Apart from Nairobi and the Rift
Valley Provinces, all the other six provinces hold one dominant ethnic group or culturally similar
groups (Oucho, 2002). These ethnic-based regional boundaries, unresolved land acquisition, land
ownership problems, conflict-prone migrant and labor system and the failure of governments to
drastically reform an imperial constitution has stifled efforts to entrench democracy in Kenya
(Oucho, 2002). These factors have influenced the eruption of conflicts in Kenya during elections.

3.4.2. Elections and Election Management in Pre-Independent Kenya
The election management body in Kenya has not been reviewed and reformed regularly
until 2010 due to continuity in government and the conservative nature of successive
governments, (Hartmann, 2011). The quasi-democracy introduced by the colonialists was
characterized by national elections to elect leaders and representatives to national decision
making bodies.
to the Western Province to form part of Bungoma. The Kalenjin and Maasai tribes felt shortchanged (Chemaswet,
n.d).
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The KAU pushed for reforms and greater African participation. Some constitutional
changes in 1951 increased the African representatives (appointed) from 4 to 5. The colonial
administration introduced the first restrictive elections for African representatives to the
legislative council in 1957 and the Lennox Boyd Constitution increased the number of elected
African members to 14 (to equal European representation in the legislature) (Githu, 1998). The
restrictions and governmental control of the election process could not have made those elections
free and fair. In the 1961 Legislative Council elections, KANU won 19 and KADU 11 of the 30
elective seats. Twenty seats were reserved for communal interests (10 for Europeans, 8 for
Asians, and 2 for Arabs). Another 12 were filled by special members (to cater for the interest of
the other sectors of Kenyan society) bringing the total number of legislative council members to
65. The Legislative Assembly elections of 18 to 26 May 1963 were the first that were held under
the conditions of universal, direct and equal suffrage (right to vote in elections). KANU won the
elections with 83 seats, representing 66.9 percent of the 124-member House of Representatives.
Other political parties together won the rest of the 41 seats (African Election Database on Kenya,
2012). Kenya, at independence, inherited the electoral management body in which civil servants
oversaw elections under a director of elections. Before 1992, elections were conducted under the
supervisor of elections, an officer in the Attorney General’s chambers appointed by the president
which does not make him/her neutral and non-partisan (Institute for Education in Democracy,
1998). This system oversaw several elections in Kenya until the Electoral Commission of Kenya
(ECK) was established in 1991. The president’s appointed election supervisor was open to abuse
and the impulses of the executive branch (IFES Final Report, 2008). Kenya has first past the post
electoral system where the candidate who receives the highest votes is declared a winner. The
pre-independence elections of 1957 and 1963 were managed by the colonial administration that
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did not contest the elections for power but had a stake in protecting its political and economic
interests (power and landed properties for whites in Kenya). Therefore, there was a relatively
congenial electoral environment that fostered competition among the African political parties,
despite suspicion of manipulation of the process by the colonialists to favor parties who
sympathized with their course. The elections were seen by the colonialists and some contestants
as relatively free and fair (Ajulu, 2002).

3.5. Political Development and Election Management in Post-Independent Kenya (19631978)
Following its victory at the polls, KANU was invited to form the first autonomous
government on June 1, 1963 with Jomo Kenyatta as prime minister and Queen Elizabeth II of
England as the head of state represented by the governor-general. Like most former British
colonies, Kenya, adopted the Westminster system of government at independence. Kenya
became a republic on December 12, 1964 and changed to a presidential system of government
with Jomo Kenyatta (a Kikuyu), as president and Oginga Odinga (a Luo), as vice-president. With
a large majority in the legislative assembly, KANU overcame resistance by convincing the
opposition to accepting a merger of KADU with KANU with the stated aim of ensuring national
unity. Kenyatta dismantled the federal system and created a unitary government in 1964. Kenya
has presidential system of government to date (Throup, 1993).
The KANU-KADU coalition fell apart in 1966 when Oginga Odinga resigned his post as
the vice president due to differences between him and KANU leaders. Daniel Arap Moi (a
Kalenjin), was appointed vice-president (Nyström, 2003). Odinga broke away from KANU and
formed the Kenyan People Union (KPU) which got the support of 29 members of parliament
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(Ajulu, 2002). In 1967, the Senate and House of Representatives were merged to form the
National Assembly. The executive powers of the regional assemblies were abolished by 1968.
The multiparty system did not survive for long as a consequence. KANU responded to the KPU
defections by passing a constitutional amendment that forced the defectors to seek re-election in
what became known in Kenyan political parlance as the “little general elections.” The opposition
leaders were constantly harassed and often imprisoned. Kenya was becoming an authoritarian
regime because under a one party system, Moi could legislate as he wished and he used the
opportunity to silence opposition by putting down dissent to his authority (Ajulu, 2002).58
The “little general elections” were held in 1968 and the KPU won 9 out of 29 seats. All 9
seats were from Odinga’s ethnic group in the Nyanza areas. The KPU was tagged as a Luo-based
party and banned in 1969. Odinga was arrested and detained after Luo youth rioted following the
assassination of Tom Mboya, a Luo, and the secretary-general of KANU. Its objective of
building a strong opposition to check government excesses was defeated. Kenya had become a
de facto single-party state by 1969, supposedly, to create a governing coalition that represented
all sections of Kenyan society (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006). Rather, both Kenyatta and
Moi exploited the situation to serve their ethnic groups and cronies.
Kenyatta politicized patterns of economic accumulation such as land and other resources
which raised the stakes in the contest for political power. Corruption became the order of the
day. Under this kleptocracy, however, came some economic gains (Kagwanja, 2003). Kenya’s
economy recorded some growth under Jomo Kenyatta. Kenya’s thriving tourist industry was
established and coffee and tea production was expanded. With extensive investments in
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In 1969, shortly before the next general elections, the KPU was banned and its leaders detained leaving
individuals like Martin Shikuku, Jean-Marie Seroney, J .M. Kariuki, and a few prominent dissidents like Oginga
Odinga (Ajulu, 2002).
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infrastructure, and the expansion of education, the economy grew at a rate of 5 to 8 percent in
almost every year from 1963 to 1978. Kenyatta concentrated most of the country’s prosperity
among the members of his ethnic group, the Kikuyu (Barkan, 2004). President Kenyatta died in
office in 1978 and was constitutionally succeeded by Vice-President Arap Moi on 22 August
1978. The succession led to changes in the political and electoral system of Kenya
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2006).
3.5.1. Political Parties and their Influence on the Political Process in Kenya

(1963-

1978)
After independence, President Jomo Kenyatta took advantage of his control of power to
settle his kinsmen. He invoked the constitutional provision that allowed Kenyans to settle
anywhere in the country and the colonial land ordinances.59 The land settlement programme
involved resettlement of people and land acquisition through political patronage as well as landbuying companies (Oucho, 2002). It was adopted to settle the poor and landless people first and
foremost and then those who have the capital and were willing to buy lands. This provided an
opportunity for temporary emigrant squatters in the Rift Valley Province to stake claims to land
that belonged to other groups, particularly the Kalenjin and the Maasai. Coastal land was
similarly acquired without due regard to the rightful claimants such as the Mijikenda (Oucho,
2002). In reality, Kenyatta’s land settlement program was meant to compensate the landless
Kikuyu who had fought for Kenya’s independence under the banner of the Mau Mau. The
program resulted in defining three types of settlers: the poor, unemployed landless persons; the
middle-income group with some capital who occupied larger landholdings; and the rich, most
59

The “land question” originated during the 1930s when the Kenya Land Commission (1932-33), otherwise known
as the Carter Land Commission made recommendations that planted seeds of discord among Kenyans. The rejection
of the notion that Africans had any land rights in the former “White Highlands” set the stage for the Resident Labour
Ordinance of 1937, which defined squatters as laborers. The ordinance directed that the disaffected Kikuyu be
awarded 21, 000 acres (8,500 hectares) of land and £2,000 as compensation for loss of land (Oucho, 2002).
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privileged persons capable of buying more land (Oucho, 2002). The settlement was regionally
biased and settlers remained in their provinces except those from the Western and Central
Provinces who crossed over to the Rift Valley Province mostly as laborers. The immigrants in
the Rift Valley Province have been victims of political attacks, looting, arson and destruction of
property anytime politically motivated violence erupted (Oucho, 2002).

3.5.2. Elections and Election Management in Post-Independence Kenya (1963-1978)
Kenya has had two major constitutional reforms since gaining independence. In 1969, the
independence constitution was replaced with a new text that entrenched amendments already
made to the system of government contemplated by the independence constitution. These
amendments were meant to strengthen the executive branch of government and foster national
unity. Election management was affected as a result. Kenya has held ten elections in the 44 year
period from 1963-2007; it had one alternation in power, with power passing from party to
another in that period (Oucho, 2002). Although multiparty competition was suspended in 1966,
national elections were held regularly. In the single party state, national assembly elections were
held in 1969 and 1974. Kenyatta was reelected unopposed by the National Assembly.
Parliamentary elections remained open contests that allowed for those who did not challenge
KANU and Kenyatta's monopoly of power (Hartmann, 2011). The ruling party's primaries
became the key stage in the electoral process and a major determinant of who was elected to
parliament. Semi-competitive elections in single-member constituencies were thus transformed
into a series of local referendums on the ability of individual leaders to secure state resources for
their ethnic followers. Electoral politics provided a mechanism by which the regime could
facilitate the appointment of individual leaders into and out of positions of power, deal with local
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discontent, and thus endowed the regime with a considerable degree of political legitimacy and
support as it touted the country’s democratic credentials as one of the few in Africa that leaders
are elected through the ballot box (Hartmann, 2003). Citizen voting age was pegged at 21and
later revised to 18 years. The national parliament until 1966 consisted of two houses: the House
of Representatives with 117 elected members to serve five years (eligible for re-election), and
the Senate which was made up of 41 members, representing each district and Nairobi city. They
were elected for a six-year term. One-third of the House was to seek renewal of their mandate
from the electorates every two years (World History Archives, 2012). Candidates for both
chambers had to be at least 21 years old, be able to speak and read English as well as meet
certain tax requirements. Aspiring senators were required to show a record of residency in their
respective constituency for at least five years. The membership of the Assembly has increased
over the years from 158 to 222 by 2007 (World History Archives, 2012).
Since independence, all parliamentary elections have taken place in single-member
constituencies under the plurality formula and the president has been elected for a period of five
years. Parliamentary and presidential elections were held with a single ballot, and for the
presidential elections, an absolute majority system has been applied. To win the elections, a
presidential candidate had to win himself a seat in Parliament and the parliamentary candidates
supporting him had to win at least 50 percent of the seats in the National Assembly (Hartmann,
2011). This 2010 constitution changed this to allow for a run-off.
In Kenya, the position of the supervisor of elections was retained after independence until
1992 when it was abolished per Constitutional Amendment Number 17 of 1990 (Okello, 2006).
Executive controls over the electoral commissioner in Kenya under Kenyatta undermined the
credibility of elections. The president appointed and could fire the supervisor of elections.
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Ultimately, the power to determine the finality of an election outcome lay with the president.
Therefore the system was not neutral as the executive had absolute control over its operations
(Hartmann, 2011).

3.6. Political Development and Election Management in Kenya (1978-1991)
Daniel Arap Moi succeeded Kenyatta who died in office in 1978. Moi ruled Kenya from
1978-2002. President Arap Moi, a Kalenjin, set off to stamp his authority on KANU and the
country after taking office in 1978. After having successfully won over open Luo and Kikuyu
political resistance, Moi began the formalization of the single-party regime through
constitutional amendment.60 As he gained a firm grip of leadership, his government changed the
constitution in June 1982 to make Kenya a one party state. Moi began to rebuild the former
KADU ethno-political alliance to counterbalance the political and economic influence of the
Kikuyu. He reallocated vast resources to the hitherto neglected peripheral regions, but
strengthened the control of KANU over the political process while the political space for
opposition to his government’s policies reduced through constitutional amendments that gave the
president more power (Barkan, 2004).61 Increasing international pressures, culminating in an aid
freeze in 1991 by major donors like the US and International Monitory (IMF) which stopped
grants and loans to Kenya.62
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Moi’s government foiled an attempted coup by the Air Force in 1982. He dismissed an influential Kikuyu
minister, Njonjo in 1983 for his alleged sabotage of the government and silenced other position members (Barkan,
2004).
61
Moi reduced the freedom of intra-party lobbies and those by lawyers and religious groups as well as farmers'
associations which had maintained a relatively autonomous status in the Kenyatta era (Nyukuri, 1997).
62
The changed international climate at the end of the Cold War proved decisive. The United States, Kenya’s Cold
War era ally who had been silent on Moi's stewardship throughout the 1980s became increasingly critical of Kenya's
record of economic management, corruption, and human rights. Sharing these concerns, international donors
suspended $250 million in aid to Kenya in November 1991. Within a month, Kenya's constitution was amended to
permit the return to multiparty politics (Barkan, 2004)
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Kenyatta’s policies had contributed to allowing the Kikuyu (who formed the core of
Kenya's nationalist movement), to dominate the civil service and the private sector during the
1960s and 1970s. Moi sought to redress this imbalance by adopting a set of redistributive
policies that unfortunately were not any better than Kenyatta’s own.63 The Kikuyus’ fortunes
took a turn for the worse under President Moi. Western Kenya enjoyed the economic benefits of
state largess until Moi was voted out of office in 2002, at which point the pendulum again swung
back to the Kikuyu, led by the incoming President Kibaki (Oucho, 2002). Moi’s policies favored
his own ethnic group, the Kalenjin and other disadvantaged tribes in the Rift Valley. These
policies were initially hailed as proactive measures to fairly distribute Kenyan’s resources but
they triggered a failed coup attempt in 1982 after which President Moi became increasingly
repressive and demanded absolute loyalty to his rule. He adopted divide and rule tactics and
rewarded acquiescent members of the legislature with ministerial positions and punished
dissenting members by expelling them from the ruling party. Elections were often rigged, the
press and civil society were suppressed, and opponents were jailed. Human rights violations,
including torture, became increasingly common (Barkan, 2004). Barkan sums up the state of
Kenyan economy under Moi as follows:
By the end of the 1980s, Kenya had become a classic example of "big man" rule in
Africa. Moi turned Kenya into a kleptocracy under which KANU leaders looted with
impunity. Corruption became the principal mechanism for regime maintenance. Not
surprisingly, the economy declined. From 1990 through 2002, annual per capita
income in Kenya fell from $271 to $239 and poverty rose from 48 to 56 percent. Basic
63

Just as Kenyatta rewarded his henchmen, so did Moi. He razed part of the forests and allocated it to some Kikuyu,
Embu, Meru and Akamba people who were his henchmen, including some of his own Kalenjins. Most of these acts
were done in the name of resettling squatters and the landless. Ten forest areas were taken by Moi and Kenyatta.
This practice of illegal allocations of land was to increase dramatically during the late 1980s and throughout the
1990s. Land was granted for political reasons or plundered by a few people at the expense of the public (Human
Rights Watch, 2008).
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social services and infrastructure, particularly roads, decayed or collapsed. The civil
service, the legislature, and the judiciary became impotent, little more than rubber
stamps for Moi's repressive policies (Barkan, 2004 p. 89).
Moi was worse than Kenyatta. While the latter achieved some economic growth, Moi presided
over a declining economy and prevented critical reforms that could turn round the fortunes of the
country. However, during the early 1990s, international factors such as the end of the Cold War
and the West’s policies towards Africa, coupled with internal pressure for multiparty democracy,
forced Moi and KANU to recognize the inevitable and to restore the right to form alternative
political parties. This development paved the way for multiparty elections in December 1992.

3.6.1. Political Parties and Their Influence on the Political Process in Kenya
Kenya made second attempt at multiparty democracy in 1991 with the abolition of oneparty rule. The re-introduction of pluralism in Kenya significantly altered electoral politics and
the contours of the political system, but failed to weaken the dominance of President Moi and
KANU until the early 2000s. Returning to multiparty politics saw the formation of many
political parties such as the Forum for Restoration of Democracy-Kenya (FORD-Kenya, led by
Odinga) and FORD-Asili (led by ex-cabinet minister Kenneth Matiba, and the Democratic
Party). Subsequently, other splinter FORD groups were formed. A total of eight political parties
contested the 1992 elections yet Moi’s divide-and-rule strategy of fomenting trouble and
sponsoring vigilantes to perpetuate violence in opposition strongholds, controlling and
manipulating the election process and setting up opponents against each other. As a result, the
opposition was not strong enough to wrestle power from KANU (Commonwealth Secretariat,
2006).
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Moi dissolved parliament ahead of a meeting of MPs, which was to deliberate on the
draft constitution before the 2002 elections. Effectively, Moi had blown the last chance that
Kenya could have had a constitution before the 2002 elections. However, it did not play out in
KANU’s favor. Moi and KANU lost the elections to a promising opposition which had been key
advocates of constitutional and institutional reforms (World History Archives, 2012).
In the face of deteriorating socio-economic conditions and growing discontent among the
Kikuyu-dominated elite over corruption and mismanagement and the grossly rigged and widely
boycotted elections of 1988, it was clear that the power base of the government had begun to
decline. This circumstance opened up the space for effective electoral politics in Kenya (Barkan,
2004). By 1990, foreign donors had joined the opposition to criticize the dictatorial regime,
repression against the opposition and the government’s human rights record.64 Moi's grip on
power started to slip and political momentum gradually shifted to the opposition. President Moi
constituted a KANU review commission and held a conference in December 1990 that cancelled
the restrictions such as non-secret ballot (queue-voting) and the expulsion of dissenting party
members from KANU which had been forced upon the party since the mid-1980s (Nyukuri,
1997). These reforms never stopped the growing mobilization of civil society and opposition
groups. Moi’s government tried to suppress demonstrations in Nairobi but failed. As Moi’s
resistance to the call for multiparty democracy became steadfast, so did civil society and the
opposition groups. These advocates for multiparty democracy adopt strategies to put pressure on
the government to initiate reforms. The reformists networked within the Ufungamano Initiative
to organize and push for a legislative framework to govern the process and for further
64

Moi’s attempt in the 1992 elections to drive out of the Rift Valley Province, (an opposition stronghold) those
voters who were unlikely to vote for him, particularly the Kikuyu, led to clashes that claimed the lives of up to 1,500
people and 300,000 were displaced in the Rift Valley and Coast Provinces (Human Rights Watch, 1993). Electionrelated violence in 1997 and 2002 confirmed the lack of government commitment to deal with criminal behaviour
and/or connived with such acts (Alston, 2010).
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constitutional amendments under the Inter Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG).65 The IPPG
rewrote the country’s constitution in 1997 (World History Archives, 2012). President Moi
dissolved parliament ahead of a meeting of MPs, which was to deliberate on the draft
Constitution before the 2002 elections. Effectively, Moi had blown the last chance that Kenya
could have had a constitution before the 2002 elections. Moi eventually succumbed to the will of
the people in December 1991 by revoking Article 2(a) of the Kenyan Republican Constitution
and reluctantly agreed to move to multiparty politics.66 Hopeful about the brighter chances of a
Kikuyu candidate to win the elections, Moi appointed Uhuru Kenyatta as the presidential
candidate against the will of many stalwarts in the party.67KANU could no longer legislate as
Moi pleased with a narrow parliamentary majority after the 1997 elections. A coalition of
politicians led by Mwai Kibaki began to assert its independence and openly defy Moi. The
gradual process to unseat KANU’s dominance of Kenyan politics was in sight as the tide began
to turn. After losing the 1992 and 1997 elections, Kibaki made gains and finished second in 1997
(Electoral Commission of Kenya, 1998).

3.6.2. Elections and Election Management in Kenya (1978-1991)
Under Moi, elections continued to be held and as was the case with his predecessor, Moi
and the 158-member National Assembly were reelected unopposed in 1979, 1983 and 1988
because he was the sole candidate for presidency. The presidential office and the regional
administrations increasingly controlled and manipulated elections. Moi supervised six elections:
65

The “Ufungamano Initiative” was a church-led coalition consisting of over 52 religious and secular groups who
opposed parliament's control of constitutional reform from 1919-2005 (Human Rights Watch, 2008)
66
President Moi predicted that Kenya was going to slide into violence and chaos under multiparty democracy. He
made this a self-fulfilling prophecy by consistently adopting divide-and-rule tactics to keep the opposition weaker
and instigated violence in regions that supported the opposition parties (Barkan and Ng'ethe, 1998).
67
A parliamentary act in December 1991 repealed the one-party system provisions of the constitution and
effectively established a multiparty system.
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three National Assembly elections under single party rule in 1979, 1983 and 1988 and
presidential and parliamentary under multiparty system. As the sole party, KANU introduced
open primary elections, the notorious “mlolongo” (the queue-voting system) to select official
KANU candidates to contest the 1988 elections. On the day of the primaries, KANU members
were made to demonstrate their support for a specific candidate within their constituency by
lining up behind him/her or the image. A candidate with more than 70 percent of voters present
queued behind him/her was assigned the parliamentary seat right away. In 1988 this was the case
in 65 out of 188 constituencies. There were reports of rigging as voters were harassed to join the
queues of favorite candidates of KANU as well as double counting of voters which brought
dissatisfaction with the one-party system to new heights. Throup (1998) described the 1988
elections as the most rigged elections in Kenyan’s history. The public expression of
dissatisfaction and demand for change led to the Saba Saba riots of July 7, 1990.68 The protests
were violently broken up by the police, and many demonstrators were killed. Consequently,
KANU established a review committee to gather Kenyans’ opinions in preparation to reform the
party. KANU finally abolished the system of queue-voting in December 1990 (OSIEA, 2006).

3.7. Political Development and Electoral Reforms in Kenya (1992-2002)
Since returning to multiparty elections Kenya has conducted four presidential elections --in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. During these periods, ethnicity has emerged as the single most
important factor in political competition. Although party mergers and coalitions in 2002 and
2007 ended the dominance of KANU, it is yet to neutralize the forces of ethnicity in the voting

68

The Saba Saba riots of July 1990 were public protests against persistent refusal of the Moi government to grant
pro-democracy groups led by former MPs Matiba and Rubia license to hold political rallies to advocate for
multiparty democracy in Kenya. The security forces broke up the crowd gathered at the Kamakujin grounds in
Nairobi, arrested and charged over 1000 and killed over 30 people (Diepeveen, 2010).
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behavior in Kenya. Political parties are organized along ethnic identities and state power is
aggressively contested on the basis of mobilized ethnicity. There are no identifiable established
traditions or ideological patterns associated with political parties in Kenya (Ajulu, 2002). The
establishment of the electoral commission of Kenya was to sanitize the electoral process and
reduce government control of the process.

3.7.1. The 1992 Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK)
The Electoral Commission was created by the Constitution, which also sets out its powers
and responsibilities. It has been in existence since the first independence Constitution in 1963. It
was, however, unknown to Kenyans until in 1991 when the late Justice Mr. Chesoni and his team
of commissioners were appointed to prepare the country for the 1992 general elections (Kivuitu,
2001). The Constitution specifies the composition, selection, duration of term and conditions of
service. The Constitution also establishes the core functions of the commission, the composition
of its mandated entities and financing of its operations (Kivuitu, 2001). The ECK is composed of
21 commissioners (members) and a chairman appointed by the president. The ECK manages its
staff almost entirely on its own as stipulated by the Constitution. The commission recruits and
appoints its officers autonomously in consultation with the Public Service Commission and other
relevant bodies (Constitution of Kenya, 1991). The ECK has wide discretionary powers to
determine the electoral delimitation of parliamentary constituencies and make periodic reviews
of electoral boundaries.
Administratively the ECK has a secretary and a deputy and heads of departments for
finance, supplies, public relations and computer and cartography. During general elections,
however, the ECK can employ temporary staff to assist them. At the district level, District
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Election Coordinators (DECs) are in charge of such functions as the ECK may specify. Basically
the DECs provide support services to the returning officers (ROs) during elections. They are
registration officers as well and they oversee the revision of voters' registers in their respective
districts (Kivuitu, 2001).
Other Electoral Reforms
Other legal frameworks that enhance the role of the Electoral Commission of Kenya
(ECK) include: the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act (NAPEA) (the
Constitution of Kenya, section 41); the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act
(Chapter 7 of the Laws of Kenya); the Election Offences Act (Chapter 66 of the Laws of Kenya);
and the Local Government Act (Chapter 265 of the Laws of Kenya). These legal instruments
empower the ECK as the sole agency responsible for the conduct of elections in Kenya. The
ECK as a public body was created in 1991 under section 41 of the Constitution to manage and
conduct elections (Kivuitu, 2001). Appendix 2 provides details on the ECK.

3.7.2. Political Parties and Their Influence on the Political Process in Kenya
(1992-2002)
Having served two terms after 1992, President Moi was constitutionally barred from any
further term in office, and he accordingly stood down and nominated Uhuru Kenyatta (son of the
first president of Kenya) as the presidential candidate for the KANU party in 2002
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008). This sparked discontent among top ministers in KANU and
those who questioned Moi’s arbitrary nomination were sacked from the government.69 Raila

69

Leading KANU politicians opposed to Kenyatta’s nomination as presidential candidate formed a faction within
KANU known as the Rainbow Alliance. President Moi responded by removing Vice-President George Saitoti from
office for publicly expressing his intention to seek nomination as a presidential candidate for the ruling party and for
openly criticizing Moi’s arbitrary nomination of Uhuru Kenyatta as his successor (Barkan, 2004).
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Odinga, who had sought the presidential nomination to KANU, felt discriminated against when
Moi designated Uhuru Kenyatta as presidential candidate for the KANU party. He subsequently
left the coalition government. Dissent activities increased in KANU and on October 14, 2002
when Kenyatta was officially confirmed as the presidential candidate, influential politicians took
over the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).70 Two days later, as many as 30 KANU MPs led by
Secretary-General, Raila Odinga publicly crossed the parliamentary floor and took seats on the
opposition benches. This action sparked a steady stream of defections from the ruling party,
including cabinet ministers. Kenyatta’s nomination also led to violent protests at rallies
addressed by President Moi. At least two people were reportedly killed (Commonwealth
Secretariat, 2008).
The opposition had learned from its mistakes in the 1992 and 1997 elections and they
worked hard to put together an effective coalition. The campaign for the 2002 elections
effectively began soon after the 1997 general elections when Kenya witnessed a significant
realignment of political forces, with the major parties seeking to strengthen their respective
ethno-political support bases ahead of the 2002 polls (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008). The
opposition succeeded in forming and holding together a coalition known as the National
Rainbow Coalition (NARC).71In a bid to strengthen KANU and appease dissenting KANU
members, President Moi in a cabinet reshuffle in June 2001, appointed the Luo opposition
politician, Raila Odinga as the energy minister (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008). Yet the
government rejected amendments to the independent anti-corruption watchdog bill in parliament
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KANU political heavyweights such as Raila Odinga (Secretary-General), Kalonzo Musyoka (Information
Minister) and Saitoti (former Vice-President) left the ruling party and joined the LDP (Throup, 1998).
71
Leading opposition parties formed the National Alliance for Change in February 2002. It was composed of the
Democratic Party, Ford-Kenya and the National Party of Kenya. Ten other parties, together with two pressure
groups, later joined these three to form the National Alliance (Party) of Kenya (NAK) (Commonwealth Secretariat,
2008).
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that would have given the watchdog wide-ranging powers. Parliament responded by throwing the
bill out in August 2001. This was a major setback to the government’s hope of improving
international confidence in the county’s economy, particularly for the IMF to resume its lending
programme to Kenya which was suspended in 1997, pending the government’s action to
eliminate corruption and improve revenue collection (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008). The
government, in a kneejerk attempt to restore donor confidence in the Kenyan economy, set up
two anticorruption courts and a police unit specialized in fighting the growing menace of crime
in the cities. This only worsened the already low international confidence in Kenya’s economy.
Kenya’s tourism industry, the cornerstone of its economy, declined further due to the 1998 antiAmerican terrorist attacks on Nairobi and Dar es Salaam; widespread criminality in Kenya’s
major cities and the aftermath of September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US (Commonwealth
Secretariat, 2008).
From mid-2002, the key political issues were the succession of President Moi, the timing
of the general elections and the fate of a long delayed constitutional review amid a declining
economy.72 The atmosphere was politically charged with a more organized and vibrant political
opposition (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008). This atmosphere set the tone for more
competitive elections.

72

The constitutional reform issue had been on the table for more than a decade, but Moi's resistance to change meant
that the Constitution of Kenya Review Commission, the body charged with drafting a new basic law, was not
established until April 2001. It issued its first draft just three months before the 2002 elections, by which time both
KANU and the opposition had decided to contest the polls under the existing rules. The commission's proposal
called for the devolution of authority to district governments, a substantial reduction of presidential authority, and,
most controversially, the establishment of a new prime minister post that parties were not prepared to work with for
the pending (2002) elections (Barkan, 2004)
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3.7.3. Election Management and Electoral Reforms in the Republic of Kenya (19922002)
Major constitutional amendments were made during Moi’s regime. In 1991 the
Constitution was amended to restore multiparty democracy in Kenya. In 1997 all political parties
were granted equal access to the media, detention without trial was prohibited and the opposition
was allowed to participate in selecting the 12 nominated members of the National Assembly.
Other reforms in 1999 reduced the level of presidential control over the legislative process
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008). Official and civil society consultation processes led to the
adoption of what became known as the "Bomas draft" Constitution (after the location of the
conference that adopted it). The reforms made in 1991 and after were the most comprehensive
and led to establishment of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK).
In December 1992, Kenyans voted in the country’s first multiparty elections in twentysix years. As Kenya prepared for elections in 1992, a fierce tribal conflict gripped western
Kenya. About 2,000 people were killed in the run-up to the election, caused by state sponsored
gangs in opposition strongholds (Ajulu, 2002). The divided front of the opposition parties was an
opportunity for Moi and the KANU party to dominate the politics of Kenya. Opposition
members of parliament (MPs) continued to view the single-member constituencies as local
battle-fields between contenders carrying different party colors without linking their competition
to national politics and therefore forging a united front to unseat the president. Civil society, with
support of external donors, continued to push for democratization and institutional reforms and
threatened to boycott the elections (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008).
Agitation and civil demand for electoral reforms increased after the 1992 elections that
were won by Moi who had not shown any commitment to reforms. On December 31, 1995,
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President Moi responded to public demand for reforms by promising the public that
constitutional review would begin. Civil society organizations mounted pressure on the
government to make good on its promise. A National Convention Planning Committee (NCPC),
the executive branch of prodemocracy forces was formed to advocate for constitutional change.
The independence of the ECK was put to a test in the 1992 elections. According to several
elections observer reports, the ECK’s management of the electoral process was below standard
(Commonwealth Observer Group Report, 2003). Part of the problem was identified as the lack
of independence of the ECK (particularly the mode of appointment of commissioners and its
composition) (Okello, 2006). Although the 1992 elections were declared free and fair by
observers, albeit with reservations, there were widespread electoral malpractices and rigging.
Government’s instigated violence was reported in many areas.73 Moi and KANU maintained
control over the electoral process and instigated ‘ethnic clashes’ in opposition strong-holds that
deprived hundreds of thousands of their right to vote and the loss of lives and property. The
elections were non-competitive (Mueller, 2011). They were described by observers as not being
free and fair, and did not bring the expected victory for the opposition because it had split along
inter and intra-ethnic lines. President Moi was re-elected with 40.6 percent of the vote, while his
nearest rivals, Kenneth Matiba of the FORD-Asili party won 26 percent, Mwai Kibaki of the
Democratic Party (DP) won 19.5 percent and Oginga Odinga of FORD- Kenya won 17.5 percent
(African Election Database on Kenya, 2012).
In 1997, the National Convention Assembly and its executive branch, the National
Convention Executive Council (NCEC), were formed to advocate for reforms in Kenya. Between
May and July, pro-democracy forces led widespread mass actions, forcing the government to
73

The 1992 elections in Kenya were held against the backdrop of a violent electioneering campaign in which
vigilante groups such as the “Baghdad Boys,” “Angola Musimbiji,” and the “Old Man’s Army” (jeshi la mzee in
Kiswahili) terrorized non-conformists of the KANU party and the government with impunity (Mueller, 2011).
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concede to the minimum constitutional and legal alterations necessary to facilitate more free and
fair elections (OSIEA, 2006). As a consequence of the agreements reached between the
parliamentary political parties during the IPPG process, the opposition proposed ten additional
ECK commissioners in 1997. All nominees were to be appointed by the president
(Commonwealth Report, 2006).74 The cross-party parliamentary reform initiative of 1997 revised
a number of the oppressive laws inherited from the colonial era that had been used to limit
freedom of speech and assembly. The law has been changed to limit the number of
commissioners on the ECK to no more than twenty-one commissioners. This improved public
freedom and contributed to relative improvement over 1992 elections (Electoral Commission of
Kenya, 1998). The increased number of commissioners to include opposition party
representatives made marginal improvement as Moi prevailed in the 1997 elections.
In December 1997, Kenyans went to the polls to elect a president and parliamentarians in
the second multiparty elections at the height of tension between the opposition and the ruling
KANU party. Once again, Moi had managed to strike a last-minute parliamentary alliance of
opposition parties and KANU had agreed on some minor constitutional and political concessions
in October 1997 but ignored the question of presidential powers and the design of the electoral
system. The elections took place at a time of economic decline as articulated by Barkan (2004)
above. Despite the unimpressive economic and social conditions, Moi was re-elected for the
second time under the multiparty system. As was the case in the 1992 elections, Moi’s victory
was largely due to divisions within the opposition camp and the inability of the opposition to
back a single candidate against Moi and the KANU (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008). KANU
won a narrow majority of seats in the National Assembly but not a majority of the ballots cast.
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The number of commissioners was increased in 1997 in order to allow greater representation by opposition parties
(Commonwealth Report, 2006).
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Moi’s KANU won 40 percent and his closest rival Mwai Kibaki’s DP won 31 percent. KANU
won 107 (plus 5 more of the 12 appointed members to make a total of 113) seats in the 222member parliament while the opposition parties together secured the remaining 103 seats.
International and local election observers such as the EU, Carter Center and domestic monitors
reported that while there were some irregularities, the results of the elections reflected the wishes
of most Kenyans. The 1997 elections were also characterized by communal violence and foul
play. Therefore, the elections could not be described as completely free and fair, despite the
presence of domestic and international observers (Barkan, 2004).
The reforms continued after the 1997 elections. Some significant changes in the electoral
laws and procedures prior to the 2002 general elections significantly improved the political
space. More importantly, in 1999 an amendment had reduced the level of presidential control
over the legislative process (OSIEA, 2006). In December 2002, Kenya held national elections
that were deemed generally free and fair by international and domestic observer groups (the
Commonwealth, EU and AU). The 2002 elections marked an important turning point in Kenya's
democratic evolution as power was transferred peacefully from KANU to the National Rainbow
Coalition (NARC), a coalition of multiple political parties. The NARC and Mwai Kibaki won the
elections with 63 percent of votes, followed by Uhuru Kenyatta of KANU with 31 percent and
the rest of three parties together won 6.5 percent. In the parliamentary elections NARC won 125
seats; LDP won 59; DP won 39, FORD-K won 21, NPK won 6, KANU won 64, FORD-P won
14 while four other parties together won the remaining seven of the 210 elective seats (African
Election Database on Kenya, 2012).
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3.7.4. Election-Related Violence under Arap Moi (1991-2002)
One legacy of Moi’s long rule is the creation of a violent elections environment. Every
election since the establishment of a multiparty system in 1991 witnessed widespread violence
(Human Rights Watch, 1993). Among the most explosive periods in the pre-2007/2008 period in
Kenya’s post-independence history was between 1991 and 1993 when President Moi tried to stir
up sentiment against the Kikuyu in the Rift Valley to consolidate his vote in that province (the
area with the most parliamentary seats).75 He drove out those unlikely to vote for him,
particularly the Kikuyu. The clashes in the Rift Valley and on the coast left up to 1,500 people
dead and 300,000 displaced. Several perpetrators of the violence were not arrested although they
were identified by the Akiwumi Commission (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Where arrests were
made the culprits were set free at the intervention of their political benefactors. Election-related
violence in the 1992, 1997 and 2002 elections confirmed the lack of government intervention in
criminal behaviour as demonstrated by the unwillingness of government to implement the
recommendation of commissions it had set up to investigate post-election violence such as the
Akiwumi and Kiliku parliamentary select committees in the 1990s. The government’s inaction
led to recurring violence, murder and evictions in the Rift Valley just before the general elections
in 1992 claiming 779 lives and creating 50,000 displaced persons; Coast Province in 1997 and
the Likoni areas in the 2002 elections witnessed similar levels of violence (Human Rights
Watch, 2003). As the debate about majimboism resurfaced with a vengeance, politicians in the
Rift Valley and the Coast provinces incited and organized pogroms against ‘outsiders,’ mostly
Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya, and Kisii emigrants perceived as political rivals. High-ranking politicians
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According to the Kenyan Human Rights Commission (2001) state-sponsored or state-condoned violence killed an
estimated 4,000 people and displaced 600,000 others over the period 1991-2001. Much of this violence occurred in
the Rift Valley and in urban areas, especially in Nairobi where the opposition held sway since 1992 (Kagwanja,
2003).
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made inflammatory speeches in support of this chauvinistic interpretation of majimboism that led
to ethnic violence (Human Rights Watch, 2008).
President Moi’s long reign was characterized by impunity, shielding criminals for
political gains and promoting sectarian private security forces. This approach, coupled with
Moi’s unwillingness to implement recommendations of commissions of inquiry into electionrelated violence and malpractices amounted to purposeful neglect.76 Therefore aggrieved
sections of the Kenyan population harbored the desire for revenge and were ready to strike at the
least provocation (Kagwanja and Southall, 2009).

3.8. Political Development and Electoral Reforms in Kenya (2003-2012)
Mwai Kibaki was sworn into office as the third president of Kenya on December 30,
2002. The most important factor behind Kibaki's victory was the opposition's decision to unite
around a single candidate. It was a lesson that had taken a decade to learn --- NARC did not
come together until ten weeks before the 2002 elections. The NARC coalition came to power
with the stated aim of consolidating Kenya's decades-long struggle for democracy and to
improve the economy (Barkan, 2004). NARC had promised in the campaign that it would restore
economic growth and create 500,000 new jobs a year. Kibaki’s government faced the daunting
task of delivering on its campaign promise because it was saddled with a coalition government
that was beset with fundamental weaknesses like disagreement in implementing the terms of the
coalition agreements and fixing a declining economy (Barkan, 2004).
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Two separate commissions, the all-party group and the task force established by the National Council of Churches
of Kenya (NECK) and the Parliamentary Select Committee, conducted an inquiry on the clashes and arrived at the
same conclusions--- that they were instigated by the government for political gain (Ajulu, 2002).
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Kibaki inherited an economy clouded by insecurity and the growing threat of terrorism. It
also suffered from high crime rates in Kenya's urban areas since the early 1990s due to bad
governance (authoritarian rule and corruption) and a declining economic outlook. Other
challenges were rural-urban migration, the burden of managing nearly 900,000 AIDS orphans,
and the influx of small arms and refugees from Somalia (Barkan, 2004). These factors created a
climate of fear and insecurity among Kenyans. To reverse this trend and to make good the
NARC’s promise to the electorate, the Kibaki government embarked on a series of reforms and
pragmatic policies to revamp the Kenyan economy. The government claimed it appointed
competent people into the top hierarchy of the governing machinery; it reformed and resized the
bloated civil service from the bottom up and instituted a comprehensive pay policy reform that
necessitated retrenchment in the civil service. The lack of private-sector employment
opportunities for potential displaced civil servants led the Kibaki government not implementing
the retrenchment exercise. It embarked on a program to expand, equip and motivate the Kenya
police force, provided better salaries for workers, and reduced unemployment (Barkan, 2004).77
By 2007 the economy recorded growth of 6.4 percent. Ironically, the poverty indicators for the
same period showed that 58 percent of the population lived on less than 2 US dollars a day
(Human Rights Watch, 2008).

3.8. 1. Political Parties and their Influence on the Political Process in Kenya (20032012)
NARC remained a coalition of convenience (made up of 14 political parties), united more
by what it opposed than by what it actually stood for (Barkan, 2004). NARC's inherent weakness
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Kenya had 190,000 civil servants (excluding teachers). According to Barkan (2004), this figure was roughly 20
percent more than the country needed. Most of these workers are prone to corruption because they are poorly paid.
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was compounded by Kibaki's poor health (he was hospitalized in January 2003 after suffering a
stroke that kept him unfit for about four months). His ill health (coupled with his laisser-faire
leadership style) created a vacuum at the center of government and fueled speculation that the
new president might not serve his full term in office (Barkan, 2004). The absence of a strong
hand at the center of government encouraged prominent leaders in the new government to pursue
their own agendas, resulting in confusion and conflict within the ruling coalition. Consequently,
five factions emerged in the Kibaki government: 1) the old politicians and Kibaki’s cronies who
favored conservatism and return to Kenyatta’s style of strong- man rule; 2) the former LDP
members who were not happy because of the non-adherence of the coalition terms; 3) differences
between the LDP and NAK members within the coalition; 4) those opposed to Kibaki’s cronies
and whose agenda was to work to change system for the better by serving the interest of the
elites, professionals and other economic groups and 5) the Vice-President Moody Awori’s
faction that represented the main force for moderation and cooperation within the coalition
(Barkan, 2004). With these differences threatening to break-up the coalition, it was clear that the
2007 election would be hotly contested. Shortly after the NARC’s victory political parties began
to realign and configure political arrangements that were attractive to the Kenyan public rather
than simply rely on ethnic allegiances (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008).
Kibaki pushed for further reforms, but the coalition was soon plagued by disagreement
over the constitutional reform question which exacerbated tensions within NARC. Odinga and
his faction supported the original draft, but the old guard and the other factions were adamantly
opposed to its provision for a non-appointed prime minister. They argued that Kibaki was elected
under the pre-reform constitution and thus entitled to retain his full set of executive powers and
not to share with a prime minister. It appeared that the divides were caused by each party’s
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interest in controlling power and resources to serve their supporters. The dispute paralyzed the
government and contributed to Odinga leaving NARC to form the Orange Democratic
Movement (ODM) to contest the 2007 elections (Barkan, 2006).
In the run up to the 2007 elections the realignment of political parties and levels of voter
mobilization were unprecedented in Kenya’s political history. Hitherto opposing parties and
ethnic enclaves agreed to work together to grab power from the majority Kikuyu while the
incumbent did same to retain power. 78 Raila Odinga was nominated the presidential candidate
for the ODM which was made up of several political parties and interest groups that mobilized
votes from many ethnic groups that traditionally were not allies. The incumbent president, Mwai
Kibaki, put together an alliance made up of six major political parties and a number of smaller
fringe parties called the Party of National Unity (PNU) (IFES Final Report, 2008). Although
these political realignments were not without their ethnic undercurrents, this appears to be the
first time attempts were made to mobilize votes on national rather than ethnic considerations.
The campaign period was dominated by the unfinished business of constitutional reforms and the
debate on whether to maintain a centralized government or adopt a federal government structure
(majimbo). While the ODM argued that majimbo stood for devolution, the PNU was emphatic
that majimbo referred to ethnic enclaves. Ethnicity was heightened due to perceptions of ethnic
bias in public appointments. Politicians from each side of the political divide demonstrated their
inability to build consensus on major political issues (IFES Final Report, 2008).
Like his predecessors, Kibaki did not deal with the most fundamental problem underlying
Kenya’s violence and disunity (injustice, grievances over land ownership and inequalities).
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The alliance formed in the ODM was made up of regions opposed to the government such as the Nyanza and the
Rift Valley Provinces. A surprising member of the ODM alliance was the Western Province because since
independence the Luhya had distinguished themselves as an unpredictable voting bloc (in 1963 and 1992, they split
their votes between the Kalenjin, Kikuyu and independent candidates but seldom voted for a Luo candidate) (IFES
Final Report, 2008).
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Although Kibaki launched the Ndung’u Commission to investigate patterns of corruption and
unfair allocation of land, the final report was deemed too controversial and was never
implemented (Waki Report, 2008). The report recommended radical measures to redistribute
land and to take measures to deal with the injustice and inequalities in the country. Kenyans,
especially those who feel discriminated against, are disappointed that Kibaki’s performance was
business as usual; little significant has happened to change things for the better.

3.8.2. Elections and Election Management in the Republic of Kenya (2003-2012)
In fulfillment of his campaign promise to provide a new constitution for Kenya, Kibaki
established a constitution drafting commission. However, differences over the draft constitution
contributed to the collapse of the coalition. Kibaki delayed the process and watered down key
reforms before the draft was presented.79 Raila Odinga and those who opposed the proposed
constitution won an easy victory with 58.12 percent ‘No’ votes as against 41.88 percent ‘Yes’
vote in a referendum on the draft constitution in 2005 described as free and fair by both domestic
and international observers. Kenya’s struggle for constitutional reform was set back to square
one (African Election Database on Kenya, 2012). It was a major blow to Kibaki’s government
and was seen by some political analysts as a referendum on Kibaki’s government. The Kenyan
electorates’ resounding defeat of a new draft constitution backed by the Kibaki government in
the 2005 referendum further boosted public confidence in the ECK to conduct credible elections
free of intimidation, harassment and rigging. However, the Kibaki government’s subtle
withdrawal from pursuing reforms shortly after the failure of the referendum to approve the
proposed constitution, raised suspicion about Kibaki’s commitment to sustain the improved
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The draft that emerged from the National Constitutional Conference included revised provisions for the reduction
of presidential powers, the creation of a new post of prime minister, parliamentary oversight of the central
government, land rights, and judicial independence (Human Rights Watch, 2008).
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environment for free and fair elections (OSIEA, 2006). Despite this pessimism, Kenya remained
remarkably stable, probably because the coalition leaders were determined to chart a path of
peace and to allow the ballot box to decide in 2007. Unfortunately the ECK delivered flawed
elections to Kenyans in 2007 that threw that country into chaos and violence.
As the political temperature of Kenya heated up, several opinion polls pointed to a close
contest between the ODM and PNU. This raised the stakes very high. The Kibaki government
took certain actions that were interpreted as a well-orchestrated plan to ensure a predetermined
election result. President Kibaki abrogated the IPPG 1997 agreement (10 seats reserved to be
filled by persons appointed by the president on the recommendations by opposition parties in
parliament) for appointments to the Electoral Commission and instead single-handedly appointed
all the 22 commissioners of the ECK. Kibaki’s unilateral action elicited protests from the
opposition who said that he was fortifying the ECK with his supporters.80 Another issue was
allegations of questionable procedures in the appointment of returning officers (IFES Final
Report, 2008). In addition, the Kibaki administration and the ECK fueled suspicion when they
turned down an offer from the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) to install a
computer program that would have enabled election officials in the constituencies to submit
results electronically to Nairobi and then display results on to a giant screen available to the
public to promote transparency and forestall any manipulation of election results. Furthermore,
the practice of using ECK staff in the verification and tallying center was abandoned in favor of
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Apart from bypassing political parties to appoint electoral commissioners, Kibaki prepared the ground for rigging
when he made his former lawyer the vice-chair of the commission. He also created a number of new judicial
vacancies, including appeals judges before the election. As a result of these actions, institutions that already had
been seriously weakened totally lost their autonomy, independence, integrity and legitimacy over time (Mueller,
2011).
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direct recruitment of casual staff by the commissioners. The commission also refused the
proposal that election officials in areas with large predictable majorities for any of the candidates
should be people from different areas to reduce the likelihood of ballot stuffing. With the benefit
of hindsight, it is possible to infer that a well-orchestrated plan was implemented to ensure a
predetermined election result (IFES Final Report, 2008). Kibaki ignored the criticisms saying
that the ECK is neutral and has the capacity to conduct free and fair elections, citing the 2002
and 2005 elections which results were accepted by most political actors (Commission of Inquiry
into the Post-election Violence Report, 2008).

The 2007 Elections and After
Kenya has held several national elections, many of which were characterized by violence
but smooth changeovers of governments. However, the 2007 highly competitive elections and its
attendant violence exposed the challenges and weaknesses in Kenya’s democracy. Although the
period preceding the 2007 election saw an escalation of violence in many parts of Kenya, with
some 600 people being killed in political violence in the three months before polling day, there is
consensus among many observers that the voting itself in 2007 was relatively peaceful. Many
people made optimistic predictions that Kenya would witness yet again a peaceful change of
power (Mueller, 2011). However, the gradual decline in trust in the government and the ECK
and the national security apparatus’ inability to provide security made the political environment
in the run up to the 2007 elections vulnerable to violence. The parties were driven by ethnic
interests with winner-take-all views of political power and its associated economic rewards
(Mueller, 2011). The elections took place in an atmosphere of diffused violence that could be
ignited easily but not controlled; non-credible and non-neutral but critical institutions coexisted
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with political leaders and followers who perceived the elections as a ‘do or die,’ zero-sum game.
Had the election not been so close, these same factors may have been held in check for a while
but there is no guarantee that that would have been the case, given the poor performance of the
ECK (Mueller, 2011).
The elections were characterized by relative peace and calm on the voting day until the
tables began to turn during ballot counting when it was reported that Kibaki, who was trailing
Raila Odinga initially, closed the gap and overtook his opponent by a substantial margin to win
amid largely substantiated claims of rigging (most notably by European Union observers) (IFES
Final Report, 2008). The results as published by the ECK were as follows: Mwai Kibaki of (DP)
PNU: 46.42 percent; Raila Odinga of ODM: 44.07 percent; Kalonzo Musyoka of the ODM-K:
8.91 percent; the other six candidates won the remainder of the votes cast. In the parliamentary
elections, ODM allies won 102 seats [ODM won 99], PNU allies won 78 [PNU 43], KANU won
14, and ODM-K won 16 seats. The rest of the 19 minority parties won the rest of the seats
ranging from 1 to 5 seats (African Election Database on Kenya, 2012). Protesters discredited the
ECK for collaborating with the government to rig the elections. The conflict escalated into
unprecedented violence in Kenya, leading to over 1,000 deaths and the internal displacement of
more than 350,000 people (IFES Final Report, 2008).81The first attacks were led by opposition
supporters, mostly against Kikuyus. Later retaliatory attacks were led by Kikuyus on ODM
supporters (Mueller, 2011). The outcome of the elections deepened the already ethnically
polarized country.82 The post-election violence of 2007/2008 points to the fact that Kenya had
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The counting and tallying of presidential votes at the constituency levels, at the national tallying center in Nairobi
and the transportation of ballot boxes were criticized as deeply flawed by observer teams including the EU, East
African Community, the Commonwealth and the Kenya Elections Domestic Observation Forum (KEDOF). Serious
concerns were raised about the manner in which the ECK concluded the presidential elections, declaring a winner
under tight security and hurriedly inaugurating Kibaki as president (OSIEA, 2006).
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In the run up to the elections, different key players such as vernacular FM radio stations, the ‘yellow press’ and
some politicians relayed news inflammatory and intemperate language. They also played offensive music aimed at
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become divided into 5 ethno-cultural zones; the GEMA in Mount Kenya region, the Kalenjin
enclave in Rift Valley, the Luhya zone in Western Province, Luo and Gusii enclaves in Nyanza
and the Muslim dominated Mombasa area (Mueller, 2011).
According to the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) and the
Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence (CIPEV) (“The Waki Report”), top Kenyan
politicians were suspected to have instigated (organized and financed) the violence.
Consequently, after investigation the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted four political
leaders for instigating the violence. The Kenyan Government was given the chance to establish a
special tribunal to try the accused persons but the Parliament failed to pass a law to establish it.
Furthermore, an extended effort by the UN envoy mediating the conflict, Kofi Annan, yielded no
results. The accused are from both the government and opposition. They include top level
political figures: three cabinet ministers, Kenya’s most senior civil servant, the former chief of
police, and one radio broadcaster (Mueller, 2011).83
Post-election reconciliation initiatives were immediately put in place with the support of
the international community to stop the carnage and resolve the impasse between the two
political rivals. The deadlock over the Constitution was finally broken by the intervention of the
African Union through a mediation team. Under the leadership of a group of eminent African
personalities, which included former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and human rights
advocate Graça Machel, the three leading Kenyan political parties reached a power sharing
agreement in February 2008 to end violence and restore stability through the creation of a
‘enemy’ groups, circulated and/or churned out alarmist information as well as made inflammatory statements against
other communities which sparked off confrontations at the least provocation (CIPEV, 2008).
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Judges examined approximately 30,000 pages of evidence. Those charged by the ICC for murder, deportation or
forcible transfer and persecution, as well as sexual violence and other inhumane acts include: Uhuru Kenyatta,
deputy prime minister and finance minister; William Ruto, Eldoret North member of parliament; Francis Muthaura,
one of Kibaki’s closest allies and postmaster-general; and Joshua Arap Sang, a journalist with the privately owned
Kass FM Radio. Charges were dropped against two others, former Industrialization Minister Henry Kiprono Kosgey
and ex-Police Commissioner Mohammed Hussein Ali (Alston, 2010).
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Government of National Unity (GNU). The agreement created two commissions with mandates
to examine the 2007 elections. One commission was to examine the causes and consequences of
the violence while the Independent Review Committee (IREC), was charged to examine the
electoral process (IFES Final Report, 2008).
The coalition government of the PNU, ODM and ODM-Kenya is headed by Kibaki as the
president (serving a second and last term), Prime Minister Raila Odinga from the ODM, and
Vice President Musyoka Kalonzo of ODM-Kenya. As the dust settled, pragmatic efforts have
been made to reform and restructure the electoral system in Kenya to forestall a recurrence of the
2007 post-election violence (Mueller, 2011).
With support from international pro-democracy agencies, Kenya drew up and approved a
new constitution in 2011. Kenya has also passed a number of preemptive legislative acts directly
related to the conduct of elections (including a replacement for the ECK). The Interim
Independent Electoral Commission (IIEC) formed after the 2007 elections to oversee elections
has won the confidence of most Kenyans for its conduct of the 2011 constitutional referendum.
The IIEC demonstrated professionalism in the conduct of the referendum. According to recent
polls, the chairman of the commission is the most highly trusted person in Kenya. The IIEC was
replaced with a more permanent EMB, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
(IEBC) at the beginning of 2012. The IEBC members were appointed by a consultative process
involving the executive and parliament with civil society input. The IEBC began its work by
completing a revised map of electoral districts in Kenya (IFES, 2012).
In addition to an improved electoral commission, an important reform that holds
prospects for a brighter future for Kenya’s democratization process is the enactment of the
National Cohesion and Integration Act of 2008. This law has created a commission which is to
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facilitate and promote equality of opportunity, good relations, harmony and peaceful coexistence between persons of the different ethnic communities of Kenya. It is also to advise the
government and to promote the elimination of all forms of discrimination on the basis of
ethnicity. The law makes it a crime to discriminate on the basis of ethnicity in employment or
other avenues of life and sets a quota for ethnic representation (of no more than 30 percent of one
ethnic group) in public entities (Githush, 2011). However, some analysts are skeptical of Kenyan
politicians and express fears that these reforms may not be implemented and that leaders may not
change from their old practices of business as usual. Is the optimism that Kenya will avoid
another electoral violence real or a mirage? Since the establishment of the GNU in February
2008, several programs aimed at promoting reconciliation as well as legal and constitutional
frameworks to develop democratic institutions and ensure national integration have been
pursued. In addition, there was landmark approval of a new constitution for Kenya as 67 percent
voted “Yes” in a peaceful referendum on April 4, 2010. Just as in 2005, the referendum has been
heralded as evidence of Kenya having discarded violence and embraced a new era of peace. Is
Kenya out of the woods yet? Is a peaceful referendum an omen of peaceful elections in the
future? As was the case in 2005, the 2010 referendum was not an election; it was not about who
gained and lost power or wealth nor were the results close. Furthermore, the state provided heavy
security during the referendum. In the Rift Valley alone 18,000 security forces were deployed
(Mueller, 2011). While we should embrace these institutional and legal changes, the incentives
that guide political life in Kenya are still much the same. According to Mueller (2011),
politicians are still mostly concerned with positioning themselves and their ethnically rooted
parties for the 2013 elections.84 Gangs still hold sway in many parts of the country, with the state
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Politicians are amassing wealth, are reluctant to pay taxes and seem more intent on building expensive mansions
for the vice president and the prime minister and refurbishing various rural state houses than dealing with hunger in
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having become impotent, indifferent, or having colluded with some gangs to gain power, thereby
making them untouchable and heightening insecurity among the citizenry. Muller (2011) reports
that a recent survey by Synovate shows that in areas affected by the 2007 elections, 40 percent of
respondents predict more violence in 2013 while a similar survey commissioned for the Kenya
National Dialogue and Reconciliation (KNDR) monitoring project found that 77 percent of
respondents blame politicians for inciting violence between different groups (Mueller, 2011).85
The hope of many Kenyans is that the ICC trial of accused perpetrators of the 2007 violence may
serve as deterrence to politicians indulging in criminal and violent acts during elections. The
2013 elections is likely to follow the same trend as 2007 in terms of party alliances and vote
mobilization. Uhuru Kenyatta is likely to be the presidential candidate for the governing
coalition against Raila Odinga of the ODM. Therefore, the probability that ethnic undercurrents
and tensions play out again is high. What is needed is to strengthen the democratic institutions
and security measures and admonish and punish fairly and firmly politicians who fund division
and violence.
3.9. Consolidating Democracy in Kenya –Lessons and Prospects
Elections in Kenya have provided an avenue for voters to vent their frustrations from
injustices, inequality, poverty and bad governance on perceived ‘enemy’ groups. Electoral
violence in 1988, 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007 deepened fault lines caused by a combination of
injustices from Kenya’s colonial past and the failure of successive governments to address
comprehensively the problems of inequality of its citizens. Political campaigns during past

the countryside. The political wrangling (due to nepotism, ethnic identity and manipulation) between the PNU and
ODM has not ceased (Mueller, 2011).
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Gangs have continued to proliferate, have increased their shakedown operations, and some areas such as in Nyeri
(Kibaki’s home town), Murang’a, Meru and the slums of Nairobi have become virtual shadow states. Increasingly,
the state has lost or abrogated its monopoly of legitimate force and finds it difficult to maintain peace or order
(Mueller, 2011).
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elections have heightened the expectations of Kenyans, as politicians have promised to address
the issues of inequality overnight. Resolving issues concerning truth and justice, particularly the
issues of corruption and past violence, demand that political leaders give up their own privileges
and ambitions (such as fringe benefits and winning elections at all cost) in favor of the national
interest and development (Ndungu, 2008). Kenyan democracy is far from being consolidated; it
may be best described as a shell of democracy produced by political liberalization without the
democratization of political institutions and the establishment of rules of the ‘political game.’
The institutions of democracy, particularly the Electoral Commission of Kenya, have been
sacrificed for personal and sectional interests and the control of power and resources (Nasong’o,
2007).86 However, the National Cohesion and Integration Act of 2008, provides a ray of hope for
change in Kenya as it has created an opportunity to criminalize discrimination of any form,
ensure fairer representation and distribution of national resources by political leaders, and work
towards building a more cohesive Kenya.
3.10. Emerging Patterns of Democratic Development in Kenya
The history of opposition in Kenya since 1992 is one of division, infighting, and a consistent
inability to cooperate to achieve common goals (Githu, 1998). One characteristics of Kenya’s
fledgling democracy is that as rival parties agree to pool efforts for political gains and a process
of ‘outbidding’ ensues, pushing the locus of political competition towards the extremes (Reilly,
2006; Collier, 2009). Therefore, the winner-take-all mentality drives the use of foul means to
gain power at all costs. The consequence is the endemic election-related violence.
An emerging pattern in the Kenyan democratization process is the gradual shift from the
dominance of KANU in Kenyan politics. Since 2002, the realignment and formation of
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The Independent Review Commission, chaired by South Africa’s Johann Kriegler, found the ECK’s execution of
the 2007 general election sloppy and recommended dissolution of the body to create a leaner and more credible
commission (Ndungu, 2008).
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coalitions and alliances has become the preferred way to mobilize voters. It was done initially to
unseat the dominant KANU, but is gradually becoming one of the reliable ways of capturing
power. If the parties are able to move beyond simple alliances to mergers, they could probably
become more nationalistic and ideological in developing policies and programs which will
eventually reduce the incentive for making emotional appeals to issues of identity and history.
The parties that are opposed to the Kikuyu dominance of Kenyan politics such as those in the
ODM coalition are likely candidates for a merger. On the other hand, beneficiaries of state
largess under Presidents Kenyatta and Kibaki, most likely the GEMA group and other minority
ethnic groups, are more likely to merge. It is, however, unlikely in this early stage to have a Luo
and Kikuyu merger, given the bitter rivalry between them.
Yet another pattern of Kenyan’s democracy is the reconfiguration and realignment of
hitherto ethnically-based political parties around national issues rather than ethnic and sectarian
issues. The pooling of efforts and resources in the form of coalitions and alliances like NARC in
2002 and the PNU and ODM that contested the 2007 elections are manifestations of this new
pattern. Although these coalitions are still alliances of ethnic-based parties, it is a good start for
the establishment of parties with national outlooks. The practice of bringing smaller parties
together has been given a boost by the post-2007 legislation that criminalizes all forms of
discrimination and sectarian politics in Kenya.
Yet another pattern in Kenyan politics is seeking power through pooling resources for
selfish, not national interest. There is still evidence of the strong presence of ethnic identity and
cleavages among governing coalitions. The inability to sustain the 2002 NARC coalition and the
difficulties the current GNU faces (to deal with differences and perceived hidden agendas of
coalition members) are pointers to the fact that the unresolved historical injustices and unfair
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distribution of the nation’s resources still dictate political discourse in Kenya. The coalition
building, although an encouraging development, it is seen by some as a selfish move by
politicians to satisfy their individual and group interests. On this note, Kagwanja and Southall
(2009) agree with Elischer and Horowitz’s (2004) classification of political parties into three
types. These are the mono-ethnic party, the multi-ethnic alliance type and the multi-ethnic
integrative types. Although the multi-ethnic integrative types such as the NARC and GNU have
incorporated diverse communities, they have consistently failed to bridge the country’s dominant
ethnic cleavages. Both PNU and ODM were multi-ethnic coalitions forged to win power (and
simply a marriage of convenience, as is the GNU) (Kagwanja and Southall, 2009). Oucho (2002)
shares this view and argues that argue that alliances and coalitions between ethnic-based parties
since independence are for convenience and control of power, not for the national good. He
states that the periodic mutilation (amendments) of the imperial constitution that portrayed a
deceptively smooth transition for governments since independence resulted in a misguided
perception that the country was a bastion of peace in a politically volatile region. This
misperception suited the powers that be, but was hardly in the interest of the electorate (Oucho,
2002). The formation of multi-ethnic alliances in Kenya have always revolved around one or
more of the four major ethnic groups: the Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo and Kalenjin. At any one time, the
winning coalition is the one that is able to win the support of the majority of voters from these
four groups. This trend has serious implications for the stability of Kenya (Kagwanja and
Southall, 2009). 87 For example, one of the immediate causes of the 2007/2008 post-election

87

All three Kenyan presidents, Jomo Kenyatta, Daniel Arap Moi and Mwai Kibaki, ascended to power through a
strong coalition of two or more of the four major ethnic groups in Kenya (Kagwanja and Southall, 2009)
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communal violence was the construction of political coalitions around Kenya’s 42 ethnic groups.
The 2007 elections campaign was critically shaped by ODM’s rhetoric of ‘41 against one’ (the
rest of the 41 ethnic groups against the Kikuyu) (Kagwanja and Southall, 2009). Thus,
throughout the three regimes, Kenya belonged to cliques that did not care about the problems
facing the country and its citizens (Oucho, 2002). Therefore, when the regime that the electorate
was determined to vote out allegedly stole the presidential election, it had to be stopped at any
cost---hence the post-election violence. Kenya needs real integrative national parties with
policies that will ensure national identity (not sub-national ones), unity, and a fairer distribution
of resources.
Kenyan politics is also characterized by leaders’ manipulation of the constitutions to
control and weaken democratic institutions to their advantage. All three presidents rode to power
on the back of ethnicity and sometimes relied on the subtle endorsement of the use of violence or
election malpractices as a means to sustain them in power. For many years this practice helped to
keep Kenya deceptively stable, with change of governments through sometimes flawed elections
but without the progressive development of institutions that support and sustain the
democratization process. Therefore, despite an impressive record of successive elections since
independence there has been little alternation in power. Kenya is yet to pass Huntington’s “two
turnover test” of a nation transitioning from an "emergent democracy" to a "stable democracy,"
partly because the elections are not free and fair (Oucho, 2002). Given this history, Kenya’s
democratization process can be salvaged if only leaders rigorously implement the progressive
reform stated in the 2010 Constitution, particularly the electoral reforms and the nondiscriminatory laws. The 2013 elections in Kenya will be a litmus test of the resilience of the
democratic institutions and processes in that country, particularly the EMB. However, political
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leadership is key to creating an enabling environment for the EMB to operate freely according to
its mandate.
Despite being one of the few African countries with a record of regular elections to
choose national leaders, Kenya’s electoral system and the election management body is seen as
weak and underperforming. The EMB has a history of executive control over its activities.
Therefore, the EMB in Kenya is perceived not be legitimate, neutral or effective despite
availability of constitutional provisions meant to insulate the EMB from all forms of control and
abuse. Election malpractices, flawed elections and violence associated with many elections in
Kenya point to the fact the EMB is yet to get its house in order and be the referee that the
electorate and political actors expect of it. Unless the new independent Election and Boundary
Commission is supported adequately to perform its role as a legitimate, autonomous, neutral and
effective referee and it wins the confidence and trust of the electorate, Kenya is not out of the
woods. In 2013, the onus rests on the political leadership of Kenya and the IEBC to move Kenya
out of this quagmire of election-related violence.
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS: COMPARING GHANA’s AND KENYA’s EMBs
4.0. Analysis of Findings
Determining the performance of election management bodies (EMBs) or electoral
commissions based on the relative quality (judgments and assessments by informed election
observers and specialists based on a set of standards) of elections is not an easy task. Many
factors combine to determine the success or failure of elections and the performance of the EMB
is just one of those. Even more complex and daunting is determining how EMBs’ performance
influences election-related violence in emerging democracies, particularly in multi-ethnic
societies in Africa. One of the most important exercises of the democratization process,
elections, has become a curse for some countries and a blessing for others. Elections should be
procedurally fair and technically sound and the results should reflect the will of the voters, freely
expressed at the ballot box. In turn, the process should enhance public confidence in the electoral
system as a whole because of its perceived fairness, accuracy, and efficiency which should
invoke the acceptance of the results by all as credible (Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002). But as
discussed in the previous chapters, elections conducted in some emerging democracies have
either precipitated political disputes or have escalated simmering tensions to an outburst of
conflict (Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002).88 The questions then are: Is the existence of an effective
and independent election management body a necessary prerequisite for election results to be
credible? Are credible elections correlated with lower levels of election-related violent conflicts?
88

The credibility of many elections in Africa are marred by the negative application of ethnicity and religious
differences, political propaganda and machination by political elites, incumbent leaders’ manipulation of the polls
and the weaknesses of the electoral system that leads to communal violence (Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002).
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Chapter 1 detailed the main assumptions underlying this study. It is hypothesized that
election-related violence is more likely to occur in countries with weak elections administration
and dispute management systems. Furthermore, the findings of this study support the conclusions
of scholars like Lopez-Pintor (2000), Gurr (1993), Pastor (1999), Reynolds (2009), (Darnolf,
2011), (Przeworski, 1991), Bratton (2006) and Mozaffar (2002) who emphasize that election
governance is an important factor in determining whether the results of an election are credible.
This view is aptly articulated by Robert Pastor (1999).89 It is against this background that the
study analyzed the effect of the performance of EMBs in Ghana and Kenya from 1991 to 2008
and the correlation between election management and communal violence during election
periods.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The first section compares and contrasts
the performance of EMBs in Ghana and Kenya from 1991-2008. The next section analyses the
impact of EMBs on election outcomes and their influence on communal violence in particular
and the democratic process in general. The comparative discussion and analysis of the
performance of EMBs in Ghana and Kenya has demonstrated that the hypothesis--- electionrelated violence is more likely in countries with weak election administration/management
bodies and dispute resolution mechanisms is upheld. The third section discusses the theoretical
implications of Mansfield and Snyder’s war theory for transitional democracies. The final
section draws conclusions and makes recommendations for further research.

89

As far as people take for granted the administrative dimension of elections they tend to overlook the critical role
of electoral governance in securing the credibility and continued legitimacy of democratic elections. The character,
competence and composition of EMBs determine if an election becomes a source of peaceful change or a source of
serious instability (Pastor, 1999).
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4.1. Comparing the Performance of EMBs in Ghana and Kenya
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the performance of the EMBs of Ghana and Kenya are
impacted by socio-economic, cultural and political factors that have played important roles in
determining the credibility of elections and the development of electoral management bodies in
these countries since independence. According to Nicholas Kerr (2009), diffuse support for this
institution is critical for the acceptance of election results. He asserts that diffuse support of an
institution arises when citizens respect the role and function of the institution--- even when the
institution delivers outcomes that diverge from their preferences. Therefore, institutional trust
(the extent to which citizens believe that a specific institution will promote citizens’ preferences
even when the authorities in control of the institutions are not being directly monitored) is
fundamental to assessing the performance of EMBs and their output in determining whether
elections are credible. In this regard, a central thesis of this study is that the performance of
electoral management bodies has an influence on citizens’ evaluation of election quality in the
context of emerging democracies, and consequently, determines the propensity of the electorate
to react peacefully or violently to the results of elections. Factors such as ethnicity, political party
formation and management, political leadership, constitutional and institutional framework for
elections as well as resource allocation and management determine to a large extent why
Ghana’s and Kenya’s EMBs perform differently at certain times in their political development.
These factors also provide some insight into the nature of the EMBs, the political environment
and incentives for either embarking on reforms or maintaining a conservative approach to
managing elections in the two countries.
As stated in Chapter 1, the study has adopted the most similar design to compare the
performance of the electoral commissions of Ghana and Kenya. The study focused on the three
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main facets of rule making, rule adjudication and rule enforcement. It assessed the EMBs’
legitimacy (legal status and the level of acceptance by the electorate), neutrality (the absence of
government and other stakeholders’ control of the electoral process) and effectiveness of the
EMBs (services delivered as mandated).90 The study relied on the reports and perceptions of key
political actors such as election observers, political parties and civil society groups who are
directly involved in the election process to gauge the performance of the ECs in their conduct of
national elections and referendums. The data used in this study is derived from Ghana and
Kenya’s constitutions, electoral codes, EMB procedural regulations as well as scholarly research
like Kerr’s (2009) study on assessing the impact of EMBs, Straus and Tailor’s (2009) assessment
of EMBs and Elklit and Reynolds’ (2000) work on the impact of election administration on the
legitimacy of elections in emerging democracies. Also considered is election observers’ reports
that detail formal rules governing assessment of the electoral process and quality of the work of
EMBs.
Tables 1 to 3 below measure the level of legitimacy, neutrality and autonomy and
effectiveness of the EMBs as well as determine whether these elections were successful overall,
flawed in some way, or outright failures. The method of assessment is adopted from the work of
Straus and Taylor (2009) which calculates the scores based on the appointment process, length of
tenure, and financial autonomy to construct an additive index of EMB legitimacy, autonomy,
neutrality and effectiveness. Table 1 measures the legitimacy (legal status, as well as
commissioners’ qualifications and level of acceptability as credible leaders) of the EMBs of
Ghana and Kenya as perceived by political actors, reports of election observers, and scholars.

90

The effectiveness of EMBs depends on electoral management, voter registration and polling, ballot counting,
declaration of results, resolution of election-related complaints and law enforcement.
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Table 4.1: Comparing the Legitimacy of the Electoral Commissions of Kenya and Ghana
(1991-2008).
Election Kenya
Years

Ghana

Remarks

19911992

Low (3)

New ECs established. Legal framework for ECK was

Medium (5)

supported by republican constitutions. ECK
commissioners were perceived to be legitimate. Ghana’s
IEC was perceived to be less legitimate as it was
established by the military regime (PNDC).

19961997

Low (3)

Medium
(6)

Kenya maintained the status quo with some reforms in
1997. EC officials were perceived to be controlled by
the president and were blamed for alleged rigged
elections in 1997. Ghana established a permanent EC
backed by the national constitution and initiated reforms
to strengthen the legal framework for elections.

20002002

High (7)

High (7)

Both ECs were perceived to have exercised high levels
of professionalism. Incumbent Presidents Moi and
Rawlings lost the elections and handed over power to
victorious opposition parties.

20042005

High (7)

Very
High (8)

Both ECs were perceived to be professional. Elections
results were accepted widely because of perceived
reduced governmental influence over the process. Ghana
pursued more progressive reforms than Kenya did.

20072008

Low (3)

Very
High (9)

Kibaki unilaterally appointed commissioners; he acted
in other ways that suggested he was preparing to rig the
2007 elections. Ghana’s EC continued reforms to build
trust in electorate and supervised three rounds of
elections with a small margin of victory for the
opposition party without large-scale violence.

Ratings: on a scale of 0-10 with 10 being the most positive score: very high (9-10); high (7-8);
medium (5-6); low (3-4) and very low (0-2).
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Figure 4.1: Comparing the Legitimacy of Electoral Commissions of Kenya and Ghana
(1991-2008).

As shown in Figure 4.1, the EMBs of Kenya and Ghana made a poor start in their
conduct of elections at the resumption of multiparty elections in 1992. The EC of Ghana has
developed progressively over the years. In December 2008 it managed the delicate task of
refereeing the most keenly and closely contested elections in the history of Ghana. The
incumbent lost and handed over power to the opposition. The Electoral Commission of Kenya,
on the other hand, fluctuated in its performance and services delivered to the Kenyan electorate.
It made progress after the 1997 elections, gained high legitimacy in 2002 national elections and
the 2005 referendum on constitutional reforms, only to flop in the 2007 elections as the
president’s party rigged the elections when it appeared would not win fairly. President Kibaki’s
breach of the constitutional arrangement for appointing ECK commissioners and the actions of
the ECK leaders before, during and after election day largely account for the low legitimacy rates
of the ECK in 2007. The legitimacy gap contributed to the perception that the elections may not
be free and fair. Closely linked to the issue of legitimacy are the questions of autonomy and the
non-partisan nature of the ECs. An EMB that is autonomous and neutral (not controlled or
influenced by entity, commissioners not affiliated to any political party and the EMB free to take
decisions without any constraints from an external any bodies) of government and other state
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institutions and nonaligned to either the government or opposition parties is more likely to be
accepted as genuine and reliable and therefore seen as a legitimate referee in elections.
Table 4.2: Comparing the Autonomy and Neutrality of the Electoral Commissions of
Kenya and Ghana (1991-2008).
Election Kenya
Ghana
Remarks
Years
1991Low (3) Low (3) Commissioners for both ECs were appointed by presidents
without consultation or input of key stakeholders. Both

1992

countries were emerging from single party rule and the
executives had substantial influence on the electoral process.
The presidents allegedly appointed their party sympathizers to
the ECs.91
1996-

Low (3)

High (7)

The Kenya government still had influence over the ECK
despite some reforms. Ghana established a permanent and

1997

independent EC and reformed the electoral process to reduce
the influence of government over the EC.
2000-

High (7) High (8)

Both ECs were perceived to be professional. Public perception
of governments’ influence over both ECs reduced drastically.

2002

The results were accepted by many actors. Both incumbent
governments lost the elections.
2004-

High (7) Very
High (9)

2005

Both ECs were perceived to be professional. Both ECs made
reforms to the electoral process that reduced perceived
governmental control of the ECs. Ghana’s president won a
second term in office and Kenya government lost the
referendum on constitutional reforms.

20072008

Low (3)

Very
High (9)

Kibaki unilaterally appointed commissioners and acted in
ways that suggested the ECK was partisan. Ghana’s EC stood
its ground and rejected attempts by both the opposition and

91

The Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC) of Ghana’s first members were hurriedly handpicked by the
PNDC regime without opposition parties’ input. The leaders of the INEC (Justice Josiah Ofori-Boateng (chairman),
Nana Oduro Numapau and Kwadwo Afari-Gyan---deputy chairmen, finance and operations respectively--- and
David Adeenze Kangah) were widely perceived as being pro-PNDC (Debra, 2011).
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government to control aspects of the electoral process. It
strengthened the dialogue with all actors.92 The EKC could not
stand its ground because it was not neutral.
Ratings on a scale of 0-10 with 10 being the most positive score: very high (9-10); high (7-8);
medium (5-6); low (3-4) and very low (0-2).

Figure 4.2: Autonomy/Neutrality of ECs of Kenya and Ghana (1991-2008)

The autonomy and neutrality of Ghana’s EC is growing to maturity with continuous
reforms after each election. Kenya EMB’s growth pattern is similar to that of its legitimacy
curve. As shown in Figure 2, the higher the level of legitimacy, the higher the level of perceived
autonomy and neutrality which influence the level of acceptance of election results as credible.
Scholars attest that the central task of an EMB is to secure the ‘procedural legitimacy’ and
‘substantive uncertainty’ of elections (Kerr, 2009). Mozaffar (2002) extends this position by
explaining that political actors will accept the uncertainty of outcomes in electoral competition if
they are certain that the rules for organizing competition will not pre-determine the outcomes.
92

Throughout the regimes of the NDC and NPP, the EC aggressively defended its independent actions whenever it
had reason to believe that they were legal. In a radical move to secure its autonomy, the EC of Ghana broke legal
ties with the state Attorney-General (AG) thereby ending a long period of reliance on the government for legal
counsel and recruited an independent attorney. The EC insisted that civil society groups seeking to observe Ghana’s
elections and processes could only do so under its authority and accreditation to ensure observers are neutral and
professional to observe. This decision prevented the government from giving accreditation to the domestic and
foreign groups that expressed an interest in observing the 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008 Ghanaian elections (Debrah,
Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2010).
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Therefore, the perceived government control or influence over the ECK contributed
tremendously to reducing public trust in the ECK and the sharp drop in the perception of the
autonomy and neutrality of the ECK in the run up to the 2007. The quality of services delivered
by the ECK led to criticisms and rejection of some election results by many citizens in Kenya
from 1991 to 2008 (the 2002 elections and 2005 referendum are exceptions).
The effectiveness of an EMB is measured by the quality of its members, services
delivered to ensure free, fair, transparent and credible elections that are accepted by majority of
political actors.
Table 4.3: Comparing the Effectiveness of Electoral Commissions of Kenya and Ghana
(1991-2008).
Election
Years
1991-

Kenya

Ghana

Remarks

Low (3)

Low (2)

Both ECs were new and interim. They had weak capacity and

1992

were not well-resourced. Both countries wer still in a singleparty political environment and governments had influence over
the electoral process. Both ECs compiled inaccurate voters’
registers. Election results were not accepted by all parties. In
Ghana opposition parties boycotted parliamentary elections.
Kenya experienced very high level of communal violence as a
result of poor performance of the EMB.

19961997

Low (4)

Medium

KANU manipulated the election process and instigated violence

(6)

in opposition strongholds. Elections were described by
observers as relatively free and fair.93 Ghana’s EC structures,
systems and staff capacity improved; other stakeholders were

93

Domestic and international election observers reported that Kenya’s 1997 elections had many irregularities and
the incumbent manipulated the process but results reflected the will of the people (Commonwealth Secretariat,
1998).
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involved through IPAC in the management of elections as well
as initiated further reforms.94 Results were accepted by the
major actors.
2000-

High (7)

High (7)

2002

Both ECs were perceived to be professional. Election results
were accepted by actors. Both governments lost the elections
and handed over power to opposition parties. Better organized
opposition parties made the elections more competitive and the
ECs lived up to the task by delivering credible results.

2004-

High (8)

2005

Very

The elections were better managed than previous ones; the

High (8)

elections results were accepted by many as credible. Ghana
continued with the reforms.

20072008

Low (3)

Very

The ECK’s image was dented by Kibaki’s actions; some

High (9)

standards of the election processes were compromised by the
ECK. It also rejected IFES support to ensure transparent and
fast relay of results to Nairobi. Results were rejected by the
opposition as rigged.95 Ghana’s EC supervised in very close
elections and power was transferred peacefully to the
opposition party, the NDC.

Ratings on a scale of 0-10 with 10 being the most positive score: very high (9-10); high (7-8);
medium (5-6); low (3-4) and very low (0-2).

94

In Ghana, losing opposition parties accepted the results and conceded defeat, partly because IPAC worked hard to
diffuse conflict and tension between opposition and government. The EC also got the political parties to establish
compromises on the rules of electoral competition (Debrah, 2011).
95
All election observers (domestic and international) described Kenya’s 2007 elections as flawed, opposition
parties rejected the results and unprecedented communal violence erupted in 136 of the 210 constituencies (Waki
Report, 2008).
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Figure 4.3: Comparing the Effectiveness of ECs of Kenya and Ghana (1991-2008).

The capacity of electoral management bodies captures the organization’s ability to
implement its decisions, or its constitutionally mandated functions. This study operationalised
the capacity of the EMB by measuring its level of professionalism as commissioners are
expected to have acquired certain competencies related to the management of elections before
being appointed to office (Kerr, 2009). As shown in Figure 4.3, Ghana represents a special case.
The 1992 elections were characterized by poor election management, while the conduct of the
1996 elections was considerably improved. Ghana’s example demonstrates Lindberg’s (2005)
and Rustow's (1970) theory that democratic behavior produces democratic values. Ghana has
consistently improved its electoral processes and institutions through the professionalism of the
EC leaders and the active participation of all stakeholders in the electoral process. According to
Emmanuel Debra (2011), the most distinguishing factors accounting for the Ghana EC's success
were largely, but not exclusively: making the electoral process transparent, fostering agreement
on the rules of the game, and asserting its autonomy in relation to the performance of its
mandate. Kenya, on the other hand, failed to internalize democratic values and to build
democratic institutions. The ECK’s performance runs counter to the theory that repetitive
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elections are an important causal factor in the development of democracy. This study reveals that
it is not just repetitive elections that help develop democratic culture; free, fair, transparent and
credible elections is what matters. Kenya provides an example of a country in which the
unsatisfactory performance of the electoral management body undermined the popular
legitimacy in elections in which the failures in election administration, among other factors,
contributed to widespread post-election protests, outbreaks of violence, and fractured popular
confidence in the electoral system (Kerr, 2009).
Figure 4.4: Comparing the Performance of the Electoral Commissions of Ghana and
Kenya (1991-2002).

Source: Kerr (2009).

Figure 4.4 shows that Ghana scored higher in all five areas (except finance) than Kenya.
Ghana’s EC demonstrated high capacity and during this period gained more of the confidence
and trust of the electorate than the ECK had. It can be concluded that the level of autonomy,
nonpartisanship and professionalism of EMB members is highly correlated with the quality of
services provided by the ECs. This thesis has attempted to establish that there is likely
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correlation between the election management quality variables (legitimacy, autonomy, neutrality
and the quality of services provided by the EMBs) and the perceptions thereof at the level of the
political elites and among the electorate at large. It establishes the eventual impact of such
perceptions on the legitimacy and level of acceptance of election results in Ghana and Kenya
since the early 1990s. How does the performance of an EMB (measured by the quality of
services it provides), affect the credibility and acceptance of election results? How does the
electorate respond to elections results perceived to be not credible? The next section discusses
how EMB performance may influence the electorate to indulge in election-related violence.

4.2. Effect of EMBs’ Performance on Electoral Outcomes and Election-Related Violence
As discussed in Chapter 1, in a formal contest for power, incumbents and challengers
generally use violence for different reasons and in different circumstances. While incumbents
more often employ violence to maintain power through coercive means of the state (state
violence), challengers are prone to using violence to protest outcomes through non-state means,
such as rebellion and protest. Straus and Taylor’s (2009) study finds that significant violence
occurs in nearly one-fifth of all African electoral contests. This means that everyone should be
concerned with the risk that elections pose to national security and development.
Through a combination of process-tracing and the congruence method, this study
assessed the relations between elections outcomes supervised by the ECs of Ghana and Kenya
and the level of election-related violence in these countries. Figure 6 shows an inverse
correlation between EMB performance and number of deaths caused by electoral violence in
Ghana and Kenya. For the purpose of this study, a recorded death rate of more than ten persons
caused by mob action is considered significant for inclusion in the analysis. The number of
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deaths has been used as the main indicator of violent behavior because of lack of data on the
other forms of injuries.
Figure 4.5: Election-Related Deaths Compared with EMB Performance

Source: The Akiwumi Commission Report (1992); The Waki Commission Report (2008); Lund,
(2003); Kenya Human Rights Watch (2003, 2008); the Parliamentary Select Committee Report
(Kiliku Report)(1992). Data on death tolls for Kenya in the 2002 and 2005 elections are not
available.
Figure 4.5 shows a strong inverse correlation between the performances of EMBs and the
level of violent conflicts as demonstrated by the number of deaths recorded during election
periods. As shown in Figure 4.5, the only significant direct election-related communal violence
Ghana experienced was during the 2000 elections when fighting broke out during the counting of
ballots between two supporters of NPP and NDC (who also came from the Mamprusi and Kusasi
tribes respectively). There is a long standing chieftaincy dispute between the Mamprusi and
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Kusasi tribes. The clashes in Bawku led to the death of 68 people (Lund, 2003).96 The Bawku
case is an isolated one. Election-related communal violence on a large scale is not widespread in
Ghana. The performance curve of Ghana’s EC shows a steady improvement in the quality of
service provided since the 1992 presidential elections. The EC’s performance has contributed
significantly to reducing the incentive for mob action to rebel or protest against the result of
elections in Ghana since 1992. A few isolated election-related violent deaths have been recorded
but not on the scale that warrants inclusion in this study.
The performance curve of the ECK shows improvement in 2002 and 2005 from a weak
start in 1991, but its performance dropped sharply again in 2007. The decline is largely
attributable to executive control of the ECK in the run up to the 2007 elections. Although the two
countries share similar characteristics in their political development, it is worth noting that
Ghana’s history of low levels election-related violence is partly attributable to the programmatic
nature of political parties’ campaign messages which are largely focused on government
performance and ideological issues. Ethnic considerations manifest only marginal saliency in
Ghana. Kenya’s elections, on the other hand, have been heavily influenced by ethnicity, unfair
distribution of resources and patron-client relationships which has led to mistrust, fear, and a
sense of injustice among the public.
The study finds that access to vital resources, especially land, is a central contributor to
higher levels of electoral violence in both countries (but to a much lesser extent in Ghana).

96

There were rumors that the Bawku chief (Bawkunaba), a Kusasi, would be removed and a Mamprusi chief would
be enskined (installed) if the NPP won the elections in 2000. The NPP won and the chief was never removed. The
Bawku skin (skin is a term used to describe chiefly titles of chiefs who sit on skins as a symbol of authority in
northern Ghana) dispute is between the chiefly tribe of Mamprusi (who have been chiefs of Bawku since the precolonial era) and the acephalous Kusasi tribes as to who owns the Bawku land and therefore has the right to be chief.
The dispute dates back to the pre-colonial era. Successive governments, since independence have attempted to settle
it but have so far failed. There is a public perception that the Mamprusi support the NPP while the Kusasi support
the NDC. This perception has fed into rumors that ascending to the Bawku throne is linked to national partisan
politics (Lund, 2003).

149

Elections trigger claims of indigenous status in states with significant migration like Kenya and
Ghana. Higher levels of election-related violence are more likely where local rival groups
fighting over access vital resources. Politicians view these conflicts as essential to winning in
close elections as in the Rift Valley Province in Kenya and the Bawku dispute in Ghana.
Figure 4.5 shows great improvement in the performance of Kenya’s EC in the 2002 and
2005 elections. A major reason for this improvement was the reduced influence of the incumbent
president, Daniel Arap Moi over the ECK as a result of constitutional and electoral reforms. In
addition, the ECK stepped up its services and adhered to standards of electoral process and
procedures more than before, probably because it had a ‘freer hand’ (due to less governmental
control) to do a better job this time round. Some analysts and political pundits who thought that
the 2002 and 2005 peaceful elections were strong indicators that Kenya had gotten over the
election-related violence syndrome, seem to have ignored the fact that the two main contestants
for the presidency in 2002 (Mwai Kibaki of NARC and Uhuru Kenyatta of KANU) were
members of the same ethnic group (Kikuyu). Furthermore, many underlying factors such
‘playing the ethnic card,’ a winner-take all mentality and the use of gangs to intimidate
opponents (though gang activities reduced in 2002) had not dissipated but were less salient in
this election (Mueller, 2011). The lack of an incumbent, a more organized opposition, and the
strong message of change reduced the tension in the 2002 elections. It could be argued that two
Kikiyu candidates for president might reduce the tension and bitter rivalry compared to an
election with competing candidates from traditionally rival ethnic groups. Also, in the case of the
2005 referendum on constitutional amendments, there was less power to be won or lost and
therefore less control of national resources at stake. The stakes were low, leading to lower
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tension and fewer fears as compared to other elections when the battle line is drawn between
‘losers’ and ‘winners.’
However, in 2007 when the perceived credibility of the ECK sunk low, coupled with the
ECK’s abysmal performance in the highly competitive and ‘too close to call’ elections, Kenya
slid into chaos and the vote triggered unprecedented levels of violence, deaths, displacement of
people and loss of property. Although the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya followed old
cleavages and fault lines, the violence was triggered by the ECK’s flawed handling of the
elections.97 The pre-election day violence that claimed approximately 600 lives followed the
patterns of violence in Kenya that had existed since the reintroduction of multiparty elections in
the country in 1992. Election observers’ reports indicate that the voting process went on
smoothly, devoid of major violence.98 The EKC’s inability or lack of capacity to be firm, fair
and transparent and the flawed collation and tallying of Kenya’s election results is a clear
manifestation of the EC’s lack of control of the electoral process and the level of Kibaki’s
influence over the EC. The EC officials’ connivance with government agents to tamper with
election results undermined the autonomy, neutrality and effectiveness of the ECK. The carnage
that followed the pronouncement of Kibaki as the winner of the elections no doubt was triggered
by the suspicious election results delivered by the ECK. One of Kenya’s problems is that
elections take place regularly but in an environment that is not wholly democratic. Justice
Kriegler argues that in Kenya in 2007, nominal elections were conducted within the old practices
of a one party state. He notes that relevant laws exist but they were not adhered to and that
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International observers later reported that both sides had been guilty of falsifying constituency returns.
Furthermore, the ECK was found to have inflated the totals, resulting in 325,131 more votes being counted in the
presidential than in the parliamentary poll and numerous other discrepancies between constituency reports and
announced results (Kniss, 2010).
98
The EU, Commonwealth, AU and many domestic election observers were all satisfied that election day voting
was a huge success without any serious cases of violence reported.
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incentives to apply relevant laws were nonexistent (Independent Review Commission, 2008).99
This statement is reminiscent of the non-adherence to rules and regulations that is all too
common by political actors during elections. They don’t play by the rules of the electoral game
and the ECK failed to live up to expectations (Waki Report, 2008).
The role of leadership in creating the right environment for the ECs to be effective
cannot be overemphasized. Political leaders in the Fourth Republic in Ghana created the right
environment for democracy to flourish by allowing the EC to operate according to the
constitutional provisions and respecting the will of the electorates through the ballot box.
Rawlings stepped down after two successive terms in office and accepted the defeat of his party
led by his vice president, Atta-Mills in 2000 elections and handed power to the victorious
opposition NPP. Agyekum Kuffour, likewise, allowed the EC the free hand to develop the
systems and procedures for free and fair elections. He and his part, the NPP accepted defeat at
the 2008 elections---the most closely contested elections in Ghana’s history--and handed power
back to the NDC. This commitment of the country’s leaders to the course of democracy has
made significant contribution to Ghana’s successful conduct of elections since 1992. Kenya, on
the other hand, has conducted flawed elections and experienced election-related violence because
its leaders have failed to create an enabling environment for the ECK to develop and deliver
credible elections to Kenyans.

4.3. Most Similar System Design for Ghana and Kenya
Given the common characteristics of Ghana and Kenya in their socio-political
development a most similar case design is adopted to juxtapose the causal factors explaining why
99

The Akiwumi Report on the ethnic clashes of the 1990s notes that civil servants, lawyers and others who tried to
follow the law and report infringements were punished whereas those who turned a blind eye to misconduct or
undermined the law were rewarded (Mueller, 2011).
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the two countries experienced different levels of electoral violence. Tables 4.4A and 4.4B are a
summary of the main variables in a most similar case design. They show the performances of the
ECs of Kenya and Ghana from 1991 to 2008 and depict how their performances correlate with
the election-related violence in the two countries.
Table 4.4A: Most Similar Case Comparison of the ECs of Ghana and Kenya (1991-2001).
Country Characteristics and EMB Capacity Status
Is it a former British colony & Anglophone?

Ghana
Yes

Kenya
Yes

Is the legal status of EMB stated in the national constitution?

Yes

Yes

Does the executive consult with other stakeholders before

Yes after

Yes 1997

appointing leaders of the EMB?

1992

onwards

Is expertise the basis for selecting electoral commissioners?

Yes

Yes

Is the EMB designed to be independent of government?

Yes

Yes

Is the EMB in practice neutral and autonomous of government

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Is First Past The Post (FPTP) the electoral system?

Yes

Yes

Is the country multi-ethnic with partisan and socio-political

Yes

Yes

$752-987

$1,097-1,194

Yes

No

influence and manipulation?
Is the tenure of office of commissioners’ permanent or long
enough to ensure job security?
Does the EMB control its budget and other resources for
elections? Is the budget from the consolidated fund?
Is EMB’s dispute resolution mechanism effective enough to
resolve electoral complaints?
Is the EMB effective (fulfilling its mandate of conducting
credible free and fair elections to the satisfaction of majority of
the electorate and other stakeholders)?

cleavages?
What is the GDP per capita range for election years (in US $)
from 1991 -2001?
Does the EMB have a supervisory role over political parties and
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does it effectively engage them and other actors on the electoral
processes?

Table 4.4B: Most Similar Case Comparison of the ECs of Ghana and Kenya (2002-2008).
Country Characteristics and EMB Capacity Status

Ghana

Kenya

Is it a former British colony and Anglophone?
Is the legal status of EMB stated in the national constitution?

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Does the executive consult with other stakeholders before

Yes

Yes

Is expertise the basis for selecting electoral commissioners?

Yes

Yes

Is the EMB designed to be independent of government?

Yes

Yes

Is the EMB in practice neutral and autonomous of government

Yes

No100

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No101

Yes

No

Is First Past The Post (FPTP) the electoral system?

Yes

Yes

Does country multi-ethnic with partisan and socio-political
cleavages?
What is the GDP per capita range for election years (in US $)

Yes

Yes

$1776-1520

$1,300-1,672

Yes

No102

appointing leaders of the EMB?

influence and manipulation?
Is the tenure of office of commissioners’ permanent or long
enough to ensure job security?
Does the EMB control its budget and other resources for
elections? Is the budget from the consolidated fund?
Is EMB’s dispute resolution mechanism effective enough to
resolve electoral complaints?
Is the EMB effective (fulfilling its mandate of conducting
credible free and fair elections to the satisfaction of majority of
the electorate and other stakeholders)?

from 2002 -2008?
Does the EMB have a supervisory role over political parties and
100

Although the constitutional provision establishing the ECK makes it autonomous, in practice, the executive has
influence over its operations and therefore is perceived as partisan.
101
In theory, the ECK has a dispute resolution mechanism but in practice it is ineffective. The reluctance of the
executive branch of government to seek justice due to partisan consideration has hindered the effective adjudication
of electoral disputes (Waki Report, 2008).
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does it effectively engage them and other actors on the electoral
processes?

Table 4.4A and 4.4B show that Ghana and Kenya have similar socio-political and
cultural contexts. The two countries were colonized by the same imperial power (Britain) and
inherited the same governance and electoral systems. The tables show that there is no correlation
between income levels and the level of performance of the EMBs and by extension between
income levels and violence during elections. Kenya, with a higher GDP growth rate has a lower
performing EMB and a higher rate of recurring election-related violence. It is worth noting that
in terms of income disparities and inequalities, Kenya is not much different than Ghana.
Therefore, economic factors do not appear to have much of an impact on the electorate’s
behavior and incentive to indulge in election-related violence. Income levels do not play a
significant role in determining the differences between Ghana and Kenya in the conduct of
elections and related violent conduct.
A very important pattern that emerges from Tables 4.4A and 4.4B is that all but one set
of variables separates Ghana and Kenya when it comes to the quality of elections and level of
electoral violence. These are performance of the ECs of the two countries and political leaders’
commitment to allowing the ECs the free hand to operate or to covertly influence its operations.
While Ghanaian leaders have allowed its EC to develop, Kenya leaders have influenced the work
of the ECK in order to stay in power.
Ghana has a higher level of autonomy and non- partisanship than Kenya. It has an
effective dispute resolution mechanism in place, it has demonstrated a high level of
professionalism in the conduct of elections, and exercised a high level of management and
102

The ECK engages political parties in the election processes but this is not as institutionalized as in Ghana where
it is decentralized to the district levels with the rules of the game clearly established and enforced.
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engagement with political parties and other stakeholders. However, Ghana’s EC is not perfect.
The commissioners of Ghana’s EC are appointed by the president (in consultation with the
Council of State, an advisory body to the presidency solely appointed by the president). This
arrangement is open to abuse by the president. Ghana’s EC also faces operational challenges.
The EC’s inability to provide adequate voting materials for local level elections in 2010, frequent
break-down of machines during the biometric registration exercise in May 2012, and violence in
Accra and Kumasi at registration centers has generated debate about the capacity of the EC
officials to operate complex machines to confirm the identity of registered voters in the
upcoming 2012 elections. Sections of the electorate have raised red flags about the ability of the
EC to hold successful elections as tension grows between political party supporters ahead of the
elections in December 2012. Four major political parties (the NDC, NPP, PNC and CPP)
dragged the EC to court in July 2012 for attempting to use the old voters’ registers to conduct byelections in the Wulensi and Kwabre West constituencies. Public outcry over what is perceived
as the inefficiency of the Ghana EC includes its inability to enforce the electoral rules and the
cumbersome and slow adjudication processes of election disputes by the Attorney-General.
There are examples of inefficiency, incompetence and institutional failure on the part of the EC
(although the situation has improved since the EC declined the services of the Attorney-General
and hired its own legal advisor)(Debrah, Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2010).
The ECK, on the other hand, is deficient in most of these variables, partly because of the
environment created by political leaders of Kenya and partly because the EC leaders failed to be
resolute, fair and firm on pursuing their constitutional mandate to ward off any machinations
from the government to influence the electoral process. These variables (non-partisanship, a
higher level of autonomy and professionalism, engagement with political actors, effective
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dispute resolution and resisting temptations from government to be drawn into any unfair
dealings) are the critical ingredients that scholars attest constitute the central task of an EMB to
secure the ‘procedural legitimacy’ and ‘substantive uncertainty’ of elections (Kerr, 2009). When
EMBs operate effectively in all three levels of their mandate (rule making, rule implementation
and rule adjudication), they provide a trusted mechanism for adhering to the electoral rules
(Mozaffar, 2002). It is this mechanism that structures the preferences and expectations of
political actors and induces an acceptance of the final election results. It is therefore not
surprising that Kenya is associated with recurrent electoral violence because the EMB has so far
failed to gain the confidence and trust (or meet the expectations) of the Kenyan electorate and
political parties.

4.4. Accounting for Other Intervening Variables
Although it is expected that the autonomy and capacity of EMBs influence popular
perceptions of election quality, there are other factors that potentially mediate the causal pathway
that are not the focus of this study. These include the commitment of government to respect the
autonomy of the EC and not to influence its work, political parties’ activities, ethnicity and other
cleavages, economic well-being, electoral system and margin of victory in elections. In this study
the performance of the ECs of Ghana and Kenya demonstrate that the quality of work of EMBs
has a huge influence on elections results. It also shows that Ghana’s EC achievements to a large
extend is attributable to the commitment of successive governments to support the EC develop.
The converse is the case in Kenya where governments have used the EMB to conduct regular
elections to legitimize their continuous stay in power ---to the detriment of the growth and
development of democratic institutions, particularly the ECK.
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All things being equal, elections are more likely to be considered flawed or unacceptable
if the victory margins are narrow because relatively low levels of incompetence or attempted
fraud can affect the outcome. Similarly, some elections may have been accepted by political
parties and observers alike in spite of procedural and technical flaws because of wide margins of
victory that would preclude the problems from affecting the outcome (Hartlyn et al, 2008). I
argue that a small margin of victory contributes to higher levels of tension and suspicion;
however, if the EC gets things right, delivers quality service and is firm and fair, it can avert any
negative fallout related to elections despite the margin of victory. Ghana’s EC is a test case for
this debate. In the 2008 elections in Ghana, it was the professionalism and quality of services
provided by the EC, the EC’s credibility as well as the democratic values exhibited by political
leadership (the presidency and political parties, especially those in opposition) that steered
Ghana away from violence when the ruling NPP lost to the opposition NDC by less than 1
percent of votes cast. A ruling party accepting defeat with a margin of victory of just 0.46
percent of votes cast without dispute and violence in Africa is unprecedented. Yet Kenya was
thrown into violence with a margin of 2.35 percent between the winner (President Kibaki) and
the main opposition coalition leader (Odinga) in the 2007 elections. It has been argued that the
closeness of the result contributed to the violence. The violence may have not happened if the
margin of victory was large enough to compensate for any anomalies. This, notwithstanding, the
fact still remains that the ECK might have saved Kenya a great deal of horror and agony if it had
performed its work professionally. There is abundant evidence from election observers that the
ECK colluded with the ruling party to rig the elections (Waki Report, 2008; EU Observer
Mission Report, 2008; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2008). The ECK had the constitutional
backing to be firm, autonomous and non-partisan and it could have invoked these provisions to
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resist any pressure from the government to influence the elections. Ghana’s EC stood its ground
to ward off efforts by the government to influence its work in the early days of Ghana’s return to
constitutional rule (Debrah, Asante and Gyimah-Boadi, 2010).
The study finds that ethnicity is a trigger factor for election-related violence that has been
extensively used in Kenya to win power and distribute resources to clients and cronies. In the
absence of a solid foundation for national political organization, the already entrenched nature of
regional (tribal) associations was bound to be the predominant feature of political organizations
(Ajulu, 2002). Citing Muigai (1995), Rok Ajulu argues that in the absence of other platforms
upon which to base political appeal, ethnicity presented itself as the most natural basis of
political organization, feeding, as it does, on pride and prejudice. In Ghana ethnicity does play a
salient role in politics with the Ashanti and Ewe ethnic groups showing their ethnic bias towards
their home region candidates and parties through bloc voting. However, the programmatic nature
of political parties and successive presidents’ affirmative action to deal with inequalities, Ghana
has so far largely neutralized the effect of ethnic biases during elections. Ethnic undercurrents in
political campaign are not uncommon in Ghana, but the electorate is discerning and they vote
based largely on the issues not ethnicity (the Ashanti and Ewe are exceptions). Furthermore, the
largest ethnic group, the Akan is too fragmented to mobilize voters on ethnic lines to vote en
masse for any political party.
The findings of this study show that because of the non-programmatic political parties
and zero-sum ethnic politics, two tenets which are fundamental to democracy are yet to be
accepted by the electorate and political parties in Kenya. These are political loss (accepting
defeat through the ballot box) and the rule of law, which is perceived as arbitrary and subject to
personal influence rather than legitimate and neutral. This is partly the reason why recurrent
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communal violence has become one of the means to either maintain power or capture power to
safeguard the security of one’s group as well as control and distribute resources to clients. I
argue that the solution to Kenya’s democratization challenges lies in developing auditable
procedures that prevent or deter fraud and corruption. Kenya must adopt measures to ensure
transparency and inclusive participation in the election process and most importantly, it needs a
credible, autonomous and non-partisan, well-motivated professional election management body.

4.5. Theoretical Implications of Mansfield and Snyder’s War Theory for Transitional
Democracies
In his classic text on democratization, Robert Dahl warned that political transitions are
risky. To introduce competition and contestation into a previously closed political system invites
the potential for conflict between incumbents and opponents as each weighs the costs of violence
and toleration (Dahl 1971). Mansfield and Snyder extended this position by theorizing that
transitional democracies can lead to war. Thus:
Countries undergoing incomplete democratization---that is, stalled transitions from
anocracy to democracy that results in autocracy within approximately five years—
are more likely to be involved in war than other regime types. Incomplete
democratization is, especially likely to lead countries with weak political institutions
to start wars” (Mansfield and Snyder, 2007 p.170).103

These scholars argue that in transitional states, open political space in the early stages of
democratization between declining old autocratic powers and the new democratic institutions

103

Anocracy refers to a regime type in which power is not vested in public institutions (situated midway between an
autocracy and democracy) but spread amongst elite groups who are constantly competing with each other for power
(Web Dictionary, 2012).
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lead to intense competition between old and new elites and the unhealthy interaction between
mass political participation and underdeveloped institutions can lead to war.
Although Mansfield and Snyder’s theory focuses on interstate wars, the dynamics are
applicable to the internal struggle within countries that are transitioning from one form of
government to democratic rule. Particularly important is the revelation that weaknesses may
occur in the general institutions that underpin central authority as well as those that regulate
political participation. Both Ghana and Kenya have experienced weaknesses in their system of
authority through one party dictatorship or coups. The ECs still face institutional challenges.
Ghana seems to have escaped the five-year long stalled transition in anocracy since it
returned to multiparty system in 1992. Kenya’s GNU is a semblance of anocracy according this
theory. Is Kenya’s GNU the beginning of anocracy in Kenya? Or can the analysis be extended to
the period since independence when elites use ethnicity and regular elections to keep themselves
in power in a ‘semi democratic environment?’ Whatever the answers to these questions,
Mansfield and Snyder’s war theory teaches us that transitional democracies are not only prone to
interstate wars but internal strife caused by the same factors could destabilize countries in
transition. Both Ghana and Kenya might have experienced at some stage war with themselves--in the form of ethnic conflicts, coups, and other unrests. In many ways Kenya is still at war with
itself as manifested in the recurrent violence during elections. The lesson learned is that
institution building and the cultivation of democratic values such as tolerance, respect for the
rule of law and human rights are necessary for a non-violent democratization process in cleavage
societies. Building democratic institutions and democratic citizens implies aspiring to judicious
use and sharing of national resources, striving to minimize inequalities and ensuring effective
leadership. Political leaders must show the way by leading by example as democrats.
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Lastly, the theory enjoins all countries and pro-democratic organizations to prepare
before embarking on national elections. Elections have the potential to cause violence; therefore
it is prudent to build the institutional infrastructure needed to manage the turbulent processes of
increased political participation, particularly in settings where unresolved issues of national
identity can be exploited for antidemocratic purposes (Mansfield and Snyder, 2007)

4.6. Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Research
Employing process-tracing with the congruence method and adopting the most similar case
design to compare the quality of services provided by the EMBs of Ghana and Kenya, this
research finds a strong inverse correlation between the performance of EMBs and electionrelated violence. The credibility of election results and the incentive for violent behavior on the
part of the electorate as a way to win power or protest against the results of elections to a large
extent is influenced by the performance of EMBs. Professional, autonomous and non-partisan
EMBs provide a much greater chance of successful and violence-free elections in emerging
democracies in Africa.
The findings reinforce the view that a policy focus on reforms and the strengthening of the
electoral process as well as institutions is the best way of neutralizing the negative influence of
ethnicity and other cleavages in emerging democracies. Consolidation of electoral institutions
tends to parallel that of other key democratic institutions which in turn imbue electorate
confidence in the EMB. Ghana’s example shows that improving the quality of elections in
emerging democracies requires generating a virtuous circle of reforms, building on lessons
learned from past practices and maintaining sustained engagement with relevant stakeholders
from state institutions, civil society and international pro-democracy groups help to strengthen
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democracy. Focusing on developing the other institutions of democracy, political leaders need to
be conscious of the ills of negative ethnicity and adopt policies to mitigate their effect as the
surest way to avoid violence during elections in multiethnic societies. It could therefore be said
that a successful EMB is a symptoms of an enabling environment for democracy to grow. Since
the buck stops with the leaders, the challenge should be seen as challenge of leadership.
The study establishes that nurturing democratic behaviors among the public to respect the
rule of law and accept the ‘rules of the game’ by political parties (including a preparedness to
lose elections), constitute important steps towards successful elections in multi-ethnic and
cleavage societies undertaking democratic transitions.
The experience of Kenya defies the established view that continuous and regular elections
lead to improvement of the electoral process and the development of democratic values and
principles. The study reveals that the existence of non-programmatic political parties, the lack of
institutional checks on the executive branch of government, the incumbent’s unwillingness to
give up power, and the expectation of benefits from clients encourages the adoption of other,
non-democratic means of determining the distribution of national resources in cleavage societies.
Kenya’s example is a case in point where ethnicity has always trumped issue-led policy for
doing politics. In part, this explains the length to which leaders and followers are willing to go to
get their person (from their ethnic group) in power by all means and at any cost. This partly
explains why politically inspired violence has become diffused and has erupted during almost all
elections in Kenya since independence, particularly in multiparty races. This trend is likely to
continue in 2013 if political actors do not change behavior and the ‘must win at all cost’
mentality. There is a higher probability for violence if the two dominant coalitions choose a
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Kikuyu and a Luo as their presidential candidates (most likely Uhuru Kenyatta for the PNU and
Raila Odinga for ODM).
The analysis suggests some potentially interesting avenues for future research. The
transitional scenario and the violence involved presents an opportunity for broader research to
ascertain its effect on transitional democracies that have different characteristics and contexts.
For example a comparative study of election-related violence in Francophone and Lusophone
and between them and Anglophone countries will provide more insight into the challenges that
emerging democracies in Africa face during elections, because almost all African countries at
independence adopted the governing system of their colonial masters. The systems vary and may
have different and varying effect on the political context in each country. As major stakeholders
in elections, the activities of political parties and their role in fomenting and /or preventing
election-related violence deserves a deeper analysis. Another area for further study is the role
political leadership (incumbent presidents and ruling parties) play to influence the work of EMBs
as well as the results of elections.
To achieve successes in conducting elections in African countries undertaking transition
to democracy, those countries must necessarily develop and sustained legitimate, autonomous,
non-partisan and effective EMBs to neutralize the destabilizing societal cleavages. We learn
from Ghana’s example that the commitment of national leaders to building a cohesive nation
through conscious efforts of nurturing democratic values and building democratic institutions in
an enabling environment is the surest way to conducting free, fair and credible elections in which
election and peace officers will count only votes--- not votes and dead bodies--- during and after
elections.
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APPENDIX 1
The Electoral Commission of Ghana
The 1992 constitution provides for an absolute majority system. The candidate who
receives more than 50 percent of the valid votes cast is declared elected. If no candidate obtains
more than 50 percent of the valid votes cast, a run-off election will be held for the two candidates
with the highest number of votes within 21 days. The president of the republic (together with the
vice president as his/her running mate) and members of a unicameral parliament are elected on
the same day, but with different votes and on different ballot papers. The regular term of office is
four years. The president is eligible for reelection for a second four-year term and barred from
contesting after the two conservative terms in office. A candidate may stand for presidential and
parliamentary elections either on the ticket of a political party or as an independent candidate.
Political parties based on ethnic, religious, regional or other sectional divisions are prohibited
(Electoral Commission Act, 1993).
The principles of universal, equal, direct and secret adult suffrage are applied. Every
citizen who has reached the age of 18 years and is of sound mind has the right to vote. To enjoy
this right, citizens have to be registered voters and be resident in the electoral area where they
intend to vote. Their names have to be included on the voters' list of their respective polling
station. Special arrangements are made to allow citizens who by reason of their duties on the
polling day are unable to present themselves at the polling station where they are registered to
vote through a special voters' list or per transfer voters list for those who have moved residency
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or on special election assignments on the voting day. Registration and voting are not compulsory
(Constitution of Ghana, 1992).

Operational Design of Ghana’s Electoral Commission
The sub-divisions of the electoral commission of Ghana all headed by a deputy
chairperson of the EC and led by a coordinating central director. The elections department is
responsible for the core electoral functions whilst the department of research, monitoring and
evaluation is responsible for evaluating the commission’s programs. The monitoring unit is
responsible for documenting all of the commission’s activities and monitors the activities as well
as neutrality of all political parties legally registered with the commission. It also validates
political parties’ activities and credentials, their sources of funding, as well as audits their
campaign accounts and budgets. The commission’s information technology and public relations
divisions ensure the EC’s filing system is computerized. In addition, political parties in Ghana
are required to have offices and conduct business in at least two thirds of the country’s districts
(Electoral Commission, 1992).
The EC operates a decentralized system with representation in each region and each
district of Ghana. The regional offices are headed by directors, and district offices by district
electoral officers in each of the country’s districts (Electoral Commission Act, 1993). Clear
reporting lines between different levels of the electoral management body reduce the risk of
misunderstanding and failure to follow instructions (Fall et al., 2011). According to Fall et al
(2011), Ghana’s EC is without a doubt one of the best equipped election management bodies in
Africa as regards its powers over the electoral process. It has the ability and power to impose
sanctions on election law breakers. It establishes the voters’ register and updates it annually,
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organizes, supervises and verifies all public elections and provides civic and electoral education
to the voting public (Electoral Commission, 2012). The commission also determines the location
of polling stations according to demographic parameters manages the production of voting
materials and recruits and trains all polling staff. It is the sole responsibility of the EC to collect
all election materials and ballots once the polls are closed and it is the EC that announces the
results (Electoral Commission Act, 1993). The EC chairperson declares the results of presidential
and parliamentary elections but may delegate that responsibility to other individuals appointed
by the commission at the constituency level and at the polling center (Provisional National
Defense Council Law, 1992). It also collects and distributes financial and material resources
allocated to political parties by the Ghanaian public authorities. The EC is constitutionally
empowered to check, on a regular basis, the validity of constituency boundaries across the
country and make changes to the number of constituencies when they are needed Fall et al.,
2011.
The EC has the power to investigate and invalidate election results if alleged
irregularities are proven before the publication of provisional results or that which is considered
as provisional results. The Supreme Court of Ghana invalidates results of presidential elections
that are proven to be flawed while the High Court performs that function for parliamentary
elections (Provisional National Defense Council Law, 1992). Election results nullified by the
courts require holding new elections. The EC also has the power to correct some irregularities
such as data collection and entry errors. In such cases, aggrieved persons can bring the case
before it Fall et al., 2011.
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APPENDIX 2

The Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK)
The electoral commission of Kenya was established in 1991. Various laws provide for the
management of elections by the ECK. The most important laws for this study are the
Constitution, the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act, 84, the Election Offences
Act, 85 and the Local Government Act 86. The 1991 Constitutional amendment establishes the
ECK with functions and powers to administer and supervise elections in Kenya. It also provides
for the appointment of commissioners, their conditions of service, security of tenure, operational
independence and removal procedure (Okello, 2006).
The 1991 Constitution (amended) provides for an electoral commission consisting of a
chairman and a maximum of 21 members appointed by the president. The legislative instruments
establishing the ECK are similar to that of the 1993 EC of Ghana. The Constitution defines the
commission’s responsibilities as: registering voters, maintaining and revising the register of
voters; directing and supervising the presidential, national assembly and local government
elections; promoting free and fair elections; promoting voter education throughout Kenya; and
such other functions as may be prescribed by the law (Constitution of Kenya, 1991).
The electoral commission also has the mandate to delimit parliamentary constituencies
with the responsibility to review the number, boundaries and names of the constituencies at
intervals of between eight and 10 years. The chairperson and vice-chair of the ECK must have
held or be qualified to hold the office of judge of the High Court or judge of Appeal Court. All
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commissioners must be Kenyan citizens. There is a code of conduct for members of the electoral
commission provided under the National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act of 1992.
Electoral commissioners are appointed by the president for a term of 5 years and are eligible for
reappointment. They enjoy security of tenure and can only be removed by the president. For the
2007 elections there were 22 electoral commissioners, including the chairperson. The
independence of the electoral commission is guaranteed by the Constitution; in the exercise of its
functions it is not subject to the direction of any other person or authority (Constitution of
Kenya, 1991).
By virtue of powers derived through the Constitution the ECK employs its own staff. It
has a Secretariat which consists of an Administrative Secretary and a deputy and heads of
departments namely Finance, Supplies, Public Relations, Computer and Cartography. The
Deputy Administrative Secretary is responsible, among other duties, for election matters. During
general elections, however, ECK can employ temporary staff to assist him. The ECK finds that
more preferable than having a director of elections or a chief election officer. The ECK employs
election officials it calls District Election Coordinators (DECs) each of which is, in the district,
in charge of such functions as the ECK may specify. Basically the DECs provide support
services to the returning officers (ROs) during elections. They are also Registration Officers and
in that capacity they oversee the revision of voters' registers in their respective districts. Each
DEC has three (3) junior officers to assist them (Kivuitu, 2001).
Other Supporting Legislative Frameworks
The National Assembly and Presidential Elections Act (NAPEA) buttress the
constitutional provisions by giving the ECK the overall power to conduct presidential and
parliamentary elections in Kenya. These Acts also empower the ECK to make regulations for the
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proper conduct of elections. Furthermore, the Acts contain an electoral code of conduct and gives
the ECK the right to prosecute for an offence under the Code. At the council level, the Local
Government Act provides the foundation upon which the ECK administers local government
elections in Kenya. The Election Offences Act describes the election offences and sanctions for
the offenders (Okello, 2006).
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APPENDIX 3

Measuring the Performance of EMBs of Ghana and Kenya
The model for the measurement of the quality of elections and the performance of EMBs
in Ghana and Kenya has been influenced by factors such as autonomy, legitimacy, neutrality and
professional competences of its members. The first indicator of EMB autonomy is the
appointment process score, which captures the inclusiveness of the appointment process of EMB
commissioners. Various studies indicate that EMB autonomy and neutrality is positively
associated with the number of institutions and political actors that are involved in the appointing
of EMB commissioners (Kerr, 2009). While in Ghana the president does makes appointments in
consultation with the council of state members, in Kenya, the president had complete authority
over the appointment of EMB commissioners (until 1997, when amendments were made). These
changes were again thrown overboard by Kibaki prior to the 2007 elections when he unilaterally
appointed all the commissioners (Kenya Electoral Act, 1997). The second indicator of EMB
autonomy/neutrality is the tenure of the EMB commissioners. EMB commissioners are more
inclined to act impartially when they have some security of tenure. The concept of tenure is by
the number of years EMB commissioners are appointed to their positions as well as the
possibility of their terms being renewed. Ghana’s EC commissioners are appointed for life and
accorded the same privileges as justices of the Superior Courts (Ghana Constitution 1992 Article
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44). In Kenya, EMB commissioners serve for five years and are eligible for reappointment. Both
arrangements offer security of tenure.
The legitimacy of an EMB is measured by the legal and constitutional provisions that
mandate it and the process of establishing its members. A more participatory process involving
major political actors is more likely to give higher levels of legitimacy to an EMB than when
members are handpicked by a few.
Data Used to Measure the Performance of the EMBs
The data used in this study is derived from Ghana and Kenya electoral codes, EMB procedural
regulations, such as Kerr’s (2009) study on assessing the impact of EMBs, Elklit and Reynolds’
(2000) study of on the impact of elections administration on legitimacy of elections in emerging
democracies, and election observer reports that detail formal rules governing assessment of the
electoral process and quality (judgments and assessments by informed election observers based
on a set of standards) of the work of EMBs. This study adopts a combined coding methods used
by researchers such as Hartlyn et al, (2008), Elklit and Reynolds (2000), and Scott and Taylor,
(2009) to measure the various variables for EMB performance. The elements listed below
numbered 1 to 6 have been summarized into a single score range of 1-10, with 10 being the most
positive score and 0 the lowest.
Variables Used to Assess the Performance of EMBs
1) Legal framework supporting EMBs-10
1.1 Proper and implementable framework for EMB-2
1.2 Comprehensive electoral time-table-1
1.3 EMB members accepted as legitimate, impartial and transparent-3
1.4 Degree of quality of EMB service delivery-4
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2

Electoral management-14
2.1 Fair system for constituency demarcation and seat allocation in place-6
2.2 Constituency and lower level information readily available-2
2.3 Voter and party registration free from serious bias- 2
2.4 Provision to ensure all parties have equitable access to state-owned media-4
2) Voter registration and polling-27
3.1Voter registers are free of any bias and accessible to voters who want to check their
particulars-5

3.2 Transparent and secret method of ballot without bias-4
3.4 Availability of systems to preclude and/or rectify fraudulent voting-7
3.5 Accessible, secure and secret voting in place-6
3.6 Level of intimidation and voters are able to express their will freely-5
4) Vote counting and declaration of results-27
4.1 Vote counting is transparent and accurate and tabulation reflects polling booth count- 8
4.2 Results are available to interested members of the public-4
4.3 Counting is completed without undue delay and in the full view of the public-8
4.5 Results announced and winner declared in a transparent manner and publicly -7
5) Resolving election-related complaints-14
5.1 Proper dispute resolution mechanisms are in place and address complaints swiftly and in
an impartial and nonpartisan manner-8
5.2 Court disputes are settled without undue delay-6
6) Provision for law enforcement is adequate -8
6.1 Law enforcement agencies are deployed at polling stations to ensure orderly voting -5
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6.2 Law enforcers are nonpartisan, professional and address complaints/malpractices swiftly
and justly-3
Indicators are adapted from Elklit and Reynolds (2005). The 11 elements proposed for the
measurement of the effectiveness of elections. The total of the sub- elements equals the
weight of each of the six main indicators.
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